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Summary.
The general theme of this thesis is an exploration 
of the relationship of Legal Theory to the general part 
of philosophy. Ordinary Language philosophy is uniquely 
role-oonscious, concerned not only with the what but with 
the why of philosophy; as such, it offers jurisprudence 
not only a contribution ab extra, but holds forth a more 
intimate offer in a role of philosophy which it may adopt 
to rehabilitate or accommodate itself within the realms 
of that very philosophy.
This general theme is sometimes explicitly considered, 
but is implicit throughout the four chapters of this thesis, 
of which the following synopses are provided.
CHAPTER 1 .
ORDINARY LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY 
The development of this modern philosophy is traced 
from its earliest adumbrations in the concerns of Frege 
and Russell with logic and language. The career of 
Wittgenstein, universally recognised as its most influential, 
if its most idiosyncratic philosopher, is used as an ideal 
narrative vehicle for the chronicling of that development, 
and the ideal exponent of its characteristic doctrines.
The ideas of the earlier and the later Wittgenstein are in 
turn considered with due regard paid to his methodological 
and substantive contributions and the extent to which 
these changed, endured, or interinformed throughout his 
philosophic development#
Finally, his relationship to the generality of 
ordinary language philosophers, is considered by means of 
a comparison with Gilbert Ryle, equally a member, if less
the leading light, of that movement.
CHAPTER 2 .
ORDINARY LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY AS APPLIED TO LEGAL THEORY 
To illustrate this, the writings of H.L.A. Hart 
are considered, firstly, to exhibit how the methods and 
substantive ideas of that philosophy can, almost intact, 
be applied within jurisprudence; secondly, it is shown, 
beyond this mere fact of application, that Hart’s insights 
are not only successful applications, but are effective 
almost in proportion as they are exact applications of 
that philosophy’s insights.
Two major contributions by Hart, those on Ascriptive 
Language, and the Law as a system of rules, are subjected 
to an in-depth and corrective criticism. This chapter 
concludes with a brief statement of the significance of 
the argument to date upon the relationship of legal theory 
to general philosophy.
CHAPTER 3 »
ORDINARY LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY - REVIEW AND CRITICISM 
Here are treated several criticisms of crucial 
importance to this philosophy, the rebuttal of which is 
necessary to confirm our earlier advocation of it as the 
most rewarding method of philosophy.
Firstly are considered criticisms made by structural 
linguists, that ordinary language philosophy, especially 
Wittgenstein's, is too much an abreaotion from the errors 
of Logical Positivism, and so misconceives the role of 
language in philosophy.
Secondly, a set of criticisms, made by several 
philosophers, among them, phenomenologists, is considered 
to the effect that this philosophy heis too arbitrarily
and too behavicuristically excluded the "inner" or the 
"mental" from philosophy.
Thirdly, em attempt is made to characterise, or 
expose the manner of conviction sought and achieved by 
this philosophy to vindicate it against charges of 
subjectivity.
CHAPTER 4 .
JURISPRUDENCE - AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 
To provide a useful comparison, Scandinavian Realism, 
and the writings of Qlivecrona, among other realists, are 
examined. As a relatively modern school in jurisprudence, 
its development, and that of Qlivecrona’s thought, are 
traced to reveal the important formative influences, 
upon Qlivecrona, of the theories of Petrazycky, and upon 
both, the broadly anti-metaphysical movement in philosophy 
of the early part of this century.
Qlivecrona's ideas are critically evaluated with 
reference both to ordinary language philosophy, and to 
other theorists of the realist school.
A comparison of the Realist and the Linguistic approach, 
as a philosophy of law, concludes this chapter.
CHAPTER 5.
A 3H0RT EXERCISE IN JURISPRUDENCE 
The thesis is concluded with a brief practical example 
of the use of a linguistic approach as a solvent to some 
traditional problems of legal theory. The grammar of the 
legal rule is examined to provide a distinction between rule 
as practice and ruling as ’speech-act'; this distinction 
is then applied to the relationship of the courts etc. to 
the corpus of legal practice and behaviour in both municipal
and international law, and usefully extended to provide 
some insights into the interrelationship of those two 
structures of law themselves.
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CHAPTER 1.
ORDINARY LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY.
To give, in an essay on jurisprudence, first 
and cardinal importance to the works of Wittgenstein, 
and v/riters and theorists v/ho share his approach to 
pure philosophy, stands in need of some apology, 
if only to lawyers and jurisprudents whose recourse 
to the abstractions of puruly philosophic works 
(sc. those not applied to legal problems) has been 
infrequent•
Since the whole tenor and argument of the chapters 
which follow is precisely to demonstrate how large a 
jurisprudential fabric can be rested on the foundations 
of ordinary language insights and methods, I shall 
here offer only a short justification, by way of preface, 
of the approach adopted lest any reader feel discouraged 
by the (only) apparent irrelevance of the themes initially 
introduced.
In theory, there is not, and I have never seen any­
one argue directly that there is,any boundary at all to 
be drav/n between philosophy, tout court, and legal theory 
or, if preferred, jurisprudence. (Here no distinction 
is made between these terms). I omit to make much mention 
of Roscoe Pound's pragmatist approach, in his Philosophy 
of Law^t where he sees philosophy, per Dewey,^ as the 
analyst of the values of the times, and can therefore 
conceive of jurisprudence as merely the tabulator and 
explicator of law as seen and operative in our era and 
society. Now that pragmatism has been rehabilitated 
from those excesses of that relativism with which it 
shocked us in its infancy, few would like to imagine 
philosophy as circumscribed either in its objectivity 
or in its relevance to particular disciplines. Nobly, 
it is seen as available to the solution of problems etc. 
in every field of human activity.
In fact, however, jurisprudence, at least that
of English-speaking universities, operates at some
remove from general philosophy. This distance could
be instantiated on a variety of planes; for example,
a noticeable time-lag separates the philosophically
avant-garde, even the modern, from its appearance in
or ingestion into, legal text-books. At universities
lav/ faculties behave with an isolation more typical
of professional lawyers than academics; in application,
too, jurisprudence, if seen as worthy of any prominence,
or even bare inclusion in a syllabus, is felt to be
of necessity of a practical orientation, to review,
or hover near to, the phenomena of the courts, statutes,
criminal behaviour or contracts etc.; to ench an extent
2is this so that, in some particularly shallov/ pieces? 
it ranks merely as a prosaic journalistic coverage of 
court work and decisions on conceptually "tricky" eases.
Further exemplification of this poor contact on 
the part of jurisprudence, its shallow short-changing 
treatment of problems epicene to philosophy, is 
presently unnecessary, as such is later to be substant­
iated in full; but so much, I think, has been said at 
least to clear the way for the ensuing attempt to 
approach jurisprudence, or to demonstrate such an 
approach, only after some generally valid philosophic 
ground has been established. It is in this regard that 
ordinary language philosophy is, besides being to 
jurisprudence new-fangled, a "paradigm case"; it 
offers, explicitly in Wittgenstein, both a method 
of philosophical analysis, a set of "doctrines" or 
insights, and, most importantly, a description of the 
role philosophy v/ill play vis-a-vis other disciplines, 
and here is meant rather the study of law, than
jurisprudence. It may well be that, however well such 
a case were argued, hov/ever damnatory an indictment 
it proved against current researchs and, indeed, 
current authorities within jurisprudence, the 
ideal of the "Philosopher-Lawyer" will be as impractic­
able as an earlier "Philosopher King". It will yet be 
stressed that, until such a radical new approach is 
used, until the devices of modern philosophy are 
pressed into the service of the law, jurisprudential 
books, articles and perhaps research , will seem to 
any critical philosophical eye, as superficial, shallow 
and of little or no use outwith that narrow market, 
of undergraduate and "thinking" lawyer, the past practice 
of jurisprudence has created for itself*
The Philosophy of Wittgenstein.
Wittgenstein's career in philosophy is unique in 
v/ays more numerous than can shortly be mentioned; of 
all his distinctive eind unparalleled achievements, 
feats, insights or behaviours, however, I could best 
commence by the introduction of the "earlier" and the 
"later" Wittgenstein. While these''nicknames" are as 
commonplace as they are vital to any treatment of the 
philosopher, or of ordinary language philosophy, they 
must be introduced at the outset of our argument 
addressed, as it is, to the philosophy of law. For 
many philosophers produce one Weltanschauung, bheirone 
and only statement of their philosophical 'confession'; 
some, unfortunate, or perhaps unequal to the magnitude 
of the problems they grapple with produce a plurality 
of philosophical accounts which, in fairness, show 
a pattern more of vacillation than consistent or con­
tinuing development. Wittgenstein alone, in a working
career from 1912-19 53 produced 2 almost complete, and 
mutually disparate, philosophical statements; the 
earlier is contained in the Tractatus Logico Philosophions,^ 
and the later, in a variety of loosely-knit collections, 
of which the Philosophical Investigations^is the best 
knovrn and annotated. We may pro tempore, characterise 
the former as a categorical euid a priori description 
of the relationship necessarily obtaining between thought, 
language and the world, the latter as a more fluid and 
dexterous treatment of the same matters, to which no 
such peremptory, though no less complex, a categoris­
ation is applied. Each of these philosophies was widely 
accepted, acclaimed and dominant tn the age of its
promulgation; to such an extent that, in understanding 
his works, in seeing them as, between and betwixt the 
two, some unum quid, or through-going and consistent 
body of thought, it is necessary to attempt an examin­
ation of each corpus of thought, early and later.
Only then may be identified what continuing elements 
characterise both, given that the later Wittgenstein
i.e. that of the Philosophical Investigations,^ has 
much to say in direct criticism of his earlier 
publications.
A further complication than the temporal length 
and variety of Wittgenstein’s philosophy, is its sheer 
breadth of application, and the appeal it provides 
to a scholar of any discipline, mathematics, physics, 
moral philosophy, logic etc. This would make any 
exhaustive treatment of his contributions to them be­
yond the reach of anyone not the equal of their author.
It is doubtless in consequence of this amplitude of 
thought that the shelves of libraries abound with 
summaries of Wittgenstein’s thought, or summaries of
its development, or its author’s career of thought 
etc., seen from a bewildering number of viewpoints.
I apologise, then, for now adding yet another 
summary account, lost it be considered that I presume 
to censure existing summaries as inadequate, or in­
ferior to what I might provide. Rather, it will be 
my aim to sift out of the vastness of Wittgenstein*s 
works, those insights which, it is believed, can be 
directly of service in the prosecution of, and the 
solution of the problems of, jurisprudence. It is 
hoped, further and just as importantly, by the ex­
pedient of comparing the thought of the earlier 
Wittgenstein and that of the later, as Wittgenstein 
himself did, there can be identified the genesis and 
the subsequent operation of a quite novel philosophical 
method which some, e.g. Strawson^, have with reason 
considered as Wittgenstein's foremost contribution to 
philosophy.
The Earlier Wittgenstein.
The Tractatus Logico Philosophicus stands apart 
from any other philosophical work, even from later 
writings of its author. It is, in style, terse, 
elliptical, severe and almost biblical in its enunciation; 
still more awe-inspiring, it professes openly to be the 
last word in philosophy, a profession which its author, 
at any rate, took and meant seriously enough to abandon 
philosophy for some 10 years or so.
Treating it, anyway, as the "last word", our 
understanding of the import of the Tractatus will be 
facilitated by canvassing v/hat the earlier words were 
in the philosophical problems on which the Tractatus 
was, in its author’s eyes, the final arbitrament.
6 7Frege and Russell , to whom Wittgenstein acknowledges
a great debt, had made important discoveries on the
nature of language in the course of their endeavours
to express arithmetic/mathematics as, au fond, a
logical system governed by finite axioms, just as, in
fact. Euclidean geometry was so governed. In applying
the algebraic notions of 'function*, 'argument' and
'value* to the 'predicate', 'subject' and truth value
of the proposition, it was discovered that language was
somehow too lax, or equivocal as expressed, to function
with the consistency and coherency one has in arithmetic
or any other axiomatic system. Sentences such as "The
present King of France is bald" seemed, as stated, to
elude categorisation as true or false. The role of
proper names, as against 'universals' further complicated
any straightforward grasp of the logical implications
of sentences containing them.
The important upshot of this was the determination 
to re-express ordinary language in an economic and un­
equivocal language of logical symbols, whose operation 
7/0uld be.- a priori and, in isolation from ordinary 
parlance, governed by the determinate axioms of a 
logical system, i.e. a "prepositional calculus" was 
invented. As in all idealist programmes, snags later 
occurred: the notion of set, introduced to define 
natural numbers, and in language, to depict the 
structure of logical implication and inference yielded 
insoluble paradoxes. Russell's own remedy, of a theory 
of types, to outlaw classes of classes, and of an 
axiom of infinity, to allow for a definition of natural 
number not dependent upon classes, proved unacceptable.
In an important respect, then, the Tractatus must 
be seen as complementary to, and critical of,the work 
of Frege and Russell: in another equally important
respect the Tractatus accepts a similar general view 
of the nature of language and its relationship to 
the world of facts.
In the former regard, Wittgenstein diagnosed 
Russell's error re classes as an illegitimate attempt 
to state 'semantic' laws, where really only 'axiomatic' 
laws are applicable to bare symbols. Further, he 
considered that the Frege-Russell treatment of the 
logical structure of language as aimed at, or con­
cerned with, propositions nearly in the form of 
ordinary language e.g. "Socrates is Greek", or "All 
Athenians are Greek" was still too shallow. Their 
intractability to consistent logical re-ordering was 
due to the fact that these sentences are, despite 
appearances to the contrary, complex. A correct ex­
position of the logical form must reveal the elementary 
propositions which are the components of any proposition 
of our language as we see it.
In the latter regard, it is important to understand 
just how much, and it was a great deal, of the Russell 
"stage-setting" that Wittgenstein does in fact in­
corporate.
1. It is accepted that there underlies our ordinary 
ext^ression of a proposition a logical form vmioh only 
careful analysis will reveal. This structure will be 
set out systematically to reveal, in logical form, 
the structure, in Wittgenstein's case, of the world 
mirrored or represented by language, just as, in 
Russell's case,logic represented the structure of 
mathematics•
2. It is accepted that the proposition is the basic 
unit of language, that it is truth-functional: it says
"what is tho case" . Whsit does not havo this truth
either
functional quality iSAa tautology, which says nothing 
of the world, or is said in total alienation of sense*
3* A proposition derives its sense according as it 
properly reflects reality*
4*- Philosophy is composed of logic and metaphysics; 
that is, the burjiness of philosophy is to show the real 
structure of a proposition, and to apply that accuracy 
so obtained to unravelling the mi stale en metaphysics 
of 'subsistent* meanings^ and all such like 'essences' 
which have hitherto filled the vacuum of philosophical 
puzzlement.
Prom these two sources, a recognition of, and 
acknowledged debt to the pioneering work of Frege and 
Russell, and a criticism of its shortcomings, Wittgenstein 
fashions a philosophical theory distincHy his own, but 
which is directly intelligible as an alloy of those 
component influences which shaped it*
In the Tractatus, then Wittgenstein professes to 
exhibit the relationship of language, thought, and 
the world, or all that is the case. We are told briefly, 
and with the sense of one being a privileged guest at 
the fount of definitive knowledge, the following tenets 
of a new and final philosophical credo.
1. The world is composed of objects which are combined 
in their being into the facts of reality. These facts
in turn combine to form a state of affairs*
2. These objects, facts and states of affairs, and 
their relationship are mirrored in language. This 
consists of names, for objects, which combine into 
elementary propositions, which in turn combine into
the familiar propositions of ordinary language*
3* The relationship of 1 to 2 is pictorial, in that 
the state of affairs, of the world, shares the same 
logical form as the proposition, of language, that 
states that it is the case or not* This pictoriality 
is just like that of the courtroom "mock-up" using 
models etc * of the facts in issue in a case*
It is to be noted that Wittgenstein considered it 
unnecessary, not difficult, to identify what a 'simple' 
object was, or to example an elementary proposition*
His atomism v/as a logical necessity, not an empirical 
contingency, and that was no business of philosophy*
His logical certainty of this relationship, and the 
existence of simples, is based on his utter conviction 
that this had to be the case, or language and the 
world could not be the case.
4* Propositions are true or false as they describe 
a state of a affairs, obtaining or possible.
5* Since the world is composed of objects combined 
into states of affairs elementary names and propositions 
describe the totality of all possible and actual states 
of affairs according as they combine throughout the 
whole gamut of their combinations. As earlier said, 
Wittgenstein was helped towards, or led to this re­
duction of the world to 'simple' objects, and language 
to 'elementary' propositions to avoid Russell's Theory 
of Types. He proceeds to construct a set of truth 
tables which combine conjunctively, not hypothetically, 
elementary propositions, composed of simple objects, 
into the totality of those statements of which alone 
it may be said "true or false."
6. What does not, like such a proposition, say 
something in picturing the world is nonsense - and 
cannot be said. Tautologies say nothing of the world, 
and fail of effect by trying, like the dog trying to 
eat its tail, to picture their o\m logical form. 
Statements of metaphysics too, cannot exist, as, not 
picturing reality, they can have no logical form.
Finally, and most enigmatically, the sentences of 
philosophy, as exegetic of the 'phenomena* of logical 
form and pictorial relationships, which are neither 
'simples' nor any complex of such, cannot mean anything.
7. It follows that there is logically a limit to what 
can be said - the world of reality, or the possible,
is the limit of langu.age. What we cannot say e.g. 
a proposition of philosophy, we can at least allow 
that it shows something, while recognising its lack 
of propositional sense. In a nutshell, the logical form 
of/\a proposition must exist, but as it is not of the 
stuff i.e. simples, that facts and propositions are 
composed of, we cannot say it exists; saying it, however, 
does show its operation, though the proposition making 
such an assertion is strictly not meaningful.
8. It will, given the validity of 1-7, henceforward 
be the business of philosophy to do no more than point 
out where the limits of language and sense have been 
overstepped. In Wittgenstein's own terms then, whenever 
someone says something metaphysical we shall simply 
point out that he has failed to impart any meaning to 
his terms. Equally, there can be no 'propositions'
of ethics, or aesthetics etc. Indeed, conclusions like 
these and others of Chapter VII of the Tractatus seem
to toll the knell of philosophic aspiration and method 
as then knov/n, however much they are the inexorable, 
pitiless conclusion of the preceding argument. As 
we flounder in the vacuum of speech and sense which 
Wittgenstein has made out of conventional philosophy, 
he further complicates our perplexity by introducing
i.e. showing, not saying, a somewhat mystical account 
of v/hat, possibly, can be. left over for philosophic 
consolation or meditation, beyond the limits of 
language and the world. This is not how the world 
is, (since he has now demarcated its limits, as at 
one v/ith those of language), but that it is. But the 
mystery of its existence in the existentialist manner, 
like that of ethics, aesthetics, poetry etc. and all 
that we recognise perforce as not traceable to re­
ality, or expressible in genuine proporitions of truth 
or falsity, seems to lie in the realm of the merely 
"showable". If it helps to clarify the embarrassment 
of our perplexity, it lies in the realm of the sense­
less v/hich is not like a contradiction, or a tautology; 
those say nothing of the world, being, respectively, 
analytically false or true. Nor is the fact of the 
world*s being a statement of metaphysics which neither 
says, nor shows anything. Rather the totality of facts 
that are the v/orld is beyond the limits of a language 
which may exhibit the propositional form only of 
facts within that totality; language can do no more 
than show, but not depict, this existence.
Before addressing any criticism to this picture 
of the world and philosophic analyses of it, certain 
important themes manifest within the Tractatus should 
be identified as characterising, in one mode, continuing
léItmotips of Wittgenstein's philosophy which survive 
the "7/reck" of the Tractatus. Indeed, in view of my 
overall purpose, it is relatively immaterial what are, 
for exemple, the flaws in the * pic tirr e-relation ship, ' 
or just where logical atomism is wrong etc*; my present 
concern is to note the continuing themes in Wittgenstein* s 
philosophy and to see how these were orientated, or 
redirected in response to a diagnosis of faults such 
as in Logical Atomism, or the proposition as a 
'complex' or a 'simple' etc *
1 * Generally, Wittgenstein fundamentally sees the 
solution of the problems of philosophy as achievable 
only by means of an examination of language: how 
language works is how we think; it is, somehow or other, 
the mode of rendering the world intelligible.
2* Language needs analysis; we can be "beguiled" by 
a failure to identify accurately what a sentence, a 
v/ord, or a proposition performs* The ' surface' grammar 
is equivocal, and any superficial intelligence it 
holds forth must be sifted to disclose the nuances of 
a deeper grammar, underlying it, as in the Tractatus, 
or somehow otherwise implicit in it lii^ o the many 
facets of a cut stone*
3* The role of philosophy is to describe, not to 
discover* It will shov/ what alv/ays , of meaning or 
truth or significance, has been there; it will not, 
as some natural science, synthesise or fabricate or 
invent, ex nihilo, something new* It is in this un­
covering facility of philosophy that the philosopher 
will achieve his goal i.e. to get a clear sight of 
things as they are, such that, no further philosophical
perplexity existing or sullying the clarity of our 
vision of reality, he may in peace and contentment, 
give up his philosophy.
I shall purposely eschew any more particular 
description of these 3 major themes, or indeed, add 
any supernumeraries; it is not to he denied that all 
manner of particular parallels could he drawn between 
themes of the Tractatus and the same echoed in later 
works; it is the delight of one or another commentator 
upon Wittgenstein to see the picture-theory, or atomic 
facts, or the 'proposition' etc. etc. alive and well 
in the Philosophical Investigations^ or the Brown Book^^ 
or doctrines of logical form in On Certainty. I submit 
that this labour on their part is, at worst, highly 
tendentious and hair-splitting, and at best, adding 
but little, and that only in details, to what are above 
set out broadly as the principal continuing themes in 
Wittgenstein's philosophy; these will be exampled in 
later consideration of his writings after the Tractatus.
To return, then, to the instant criticism of the 
Tractatus, notwithstanding the powerful, compressed 
and tightly-knit force of the argument, once its initial 
"shock" has been absorbed^ there must be noted certain 
matters not sufficiently enlarged upon in the text.
Firstly, Wittgenstein mentions, or rather legislates
that there must be elementary propositions, that there
must be 'simples' to which names are attached. Yet
nowhere are they exampled; indeed no clue is offered
as to how we (i.e. when not doing philosophy) should go
looking for them. Doubtless, we could, as the Logical 
12Positivists did, identify these as elementary 'sense- 
data' and incorporate them, together with Wittgenstein's 
stress upon the centrality of the truth-functional
proposition to philosophical rectitude, into that
philosophy which sees the meaning of a statement as
12its method of verification (verificationism).
For those not so inclined, however, sense-data seem 
as elusive in empirical application to concrete examples 
of meaningful language? just as much acts of faith as 
the simples they are replacing. A table is not a 'complex* 
of simples, "legs", "shape", "atoms", "perspective" 
etc., and if 'simples' are not these, it is surely too 
much to accept Wittgenstein's stipulation of the logical 
necessity of their being, as base elements in a pro­
position, solely to underwrite the picture-relationship 
of language to the world*
Further, this picture-theory, on closer analysis 
seems to be divested of its initial attractiveness 
as seeming to indicate v/hat all propositions do. We 
may consider propositions which advert to a composite 
situation e.g. "All the players in the team are wearing 
green jerseys", or "All even numbers are divisible by 
two" - it seems impossible or, if not, highly implausible 
to interpret these, per the picture theory, and the 
atomic viev/ of propositions as composed of elementary 
parts, as "x wore a green jersey..." "y wore a green 
jersey..." etc. etc. This enumeration, anyway, in 
universally quantified (e.g. open) statements, is 
impossible, and the need always to 'decompose' a pro­
position into its elements renders complications which 
may easily be imagined, in all manner of disjunctive 
statements; e.g. "this is either red or not any other 
colour than blue", would, per Wittgenstein's account, 
have to be reduced to as many propositions as there 
are colours excluded.
Thirdly, Wittgenstein maintains in the Tractatus
as a stipulation vital to the whole argument, that all 
elementary propositions are mutually independent. This 
is a necessary requirement in the construction of his 
truth-table schématisation of all possible states of 
affairs. In virtue of this, a statement that "x is y” 
pronounces not only its ov/n factuality, but the simple 
non-faotuality of all contrary situations. Now, for 
the pool of such elementary propositions to represent 
all possible states of affairs, it is necessary that 
their power of combination be not circumscribed e.g. 
by one being conditional upon another. In fact, however, 
many propositions of our language do imply a variety 
of consequent propositions, and the original of a 
variety of elementary propositions would, in virtue 
of its consequents, alike complex, effectually pre­
condition the truth or falsity of other elementary 
propositions.
The importance of these criticisms is not that 
they prompted Wittgenstein or anyone else, to try 
to make a better picture-theory, or plug the gaps in 
logical atomism; in fact, little or no attempt was 
made on his part to defend his theories in these regards. 
Rather their significance was in the effect they had 
upon their author to examine not the articles of his 
philosophic creed but, much more radically, to review 
those philosophical methods which he came to believe 
had misled him into the enunciation of such theses.
It is this fundamental overhaul in his philosophical 
methodology on 'Wittgenstein's part that, more than 
anything else, accounts for his pre-eminent position 
among modern philosophers. So important is this 
methodological concern on his part that we can see 
his future philosophical writings, in. one major dimension
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not as substantive contributions or essays upon 
particular problems, but rather as repeated self­
schooling in a correct method of doing philosophy.
In Wittgenstein, then, it is no exaggeration to say 
that the method is elevated to equal importance with 
the subject matter; while none doubted, either before 
Wittgenstein or after, that, in philosophy, the method 
and the subject-matter are mutually-conditioning, the 
unprecedented primacy now given by Wittgenstein to 
the method is unquestionably revolutionary.
In our examination, then, of the later Wittgenstein, 
that is, his career subsequent to the Tractatus and the 
realisations of its errors and what caused them, there 
will be seen an amalgamation, or co-operation, of those 
three signal themes set out above on the role of 
language in philosophy and the goal of philosophy, and 
a new method of analysis, with each, theme and method, 
informing the other.
The Later Wittgenstein.
I do not think we do Wittgenstein an injustice in 
presenting only two representations of his philosophic 
thought over a period of 40 years. It is realised, of 
course, that to some extent his radical alteration of 
earlier opinions was a gradual phenomenon. Much time 
and discussion could be expended in tracing in the 
note-books, even of 1913, undeniable adumbrations of 
his later views, such as "Distrust of grammar is the 
first requisite of philosophizing" (Notes on Logic" 
in like manner, we could dissect the Blue or Brown Book^^ 
authentic statements or versions of the author’s thought 
in the period 1930-33 and say what looks back to a 
rigid view of language and philosophy, or still hankers 
after a ’pictorial' rendering of the proposition. There
might be found much that is indistinguishable from the 
more mature and considered writings of the philosopher 
in later years: the notion of the language-game is 
most prominent, inneed almost full-grown, in the 
Brown Book.^^
All this is indisputable; yet it will suit our 
pur*pose, and indeed conform to Wittgenstein's last 
and most certain opinion on the course of his own 
philosophical career if we contrive, by foreshortening 
the sequence of time and thoi:grit-development, a some- 
v/hat sharper contrast between the later and the 
earlier Wittgenstein. This stark contrast will be achieved 
in order to highlight the changes in methodology, for, 
as I hope to argue, the basic themes remain, in substance, 
similar.
In the Philosophical Investigations, then, the most 
mature and comprehensive of his writings, Wittgenstein 
himself looks from a distance at the Tractatus and 
offers a diagnosis of the faults which rendered that 
work unsatisfactory; this may well serve as the best 
introduction to the description of the ideas later put 
forward. The tone of the latter work, relaxed and informal, 
and without any serious attempt to arrange in any systematic 
chapter and verse, immediately marks the contrasts to 
be drawn from the Tractatus frsimed as that work was in 
a tight, almost breathless, compressed style, with a 
numbering system of almost mathematical precision. His 
self-condemnation is candid and explicit, and allows our 
objective criticism of the faults of the Tractatus, 
not an opportunity merely to agree or disagree with the 
opinions of a critic of his own work, open to suspicions 
of bias and evasiveness. I shall consider these criticisms 
in temoorary isolation from what insights and replacement
doctrines they led to, for there will emerge such 
a clear link between the two that a temporary sever­
ance will not obscure this clarity. I shall refer later 
to these errors, as diagnosed, by the serial number 
here attached.
1. Wittgenstein first makes an assault upon his own 
view of the name-object relationship, one, however, 
by no means uncommon in the course of philosophy* The 
view is that a word functions only as the name of an 
object; that we learn a language simply by being pre­
sented with an object, and then being given a name to 
it, like some label or recognition "tag". In the 
Philosophical Investigations, the version of this theory 
recorded is that of A u g u s t i n e , b u t  it could equally 
well be that of Wittgenstein as exhibited in the Tractatus * 
This view in the Philosophical Investigations, is now 
subjected to lengthy criticism, one which amounts to
an empirical testing of this "explanation schema" of 
"naming by word" in a variety of ordinary circumstances.
Its total inadequacy is demonstrated by the overwhelming 
weight of instances of word-usage so diverse and differing 
from that limited sphere of operation where a name- 
object mechanism does work i,e. the primitive * language 
games’ of para 2. and para.8.^^ This leads, and here 
methodological considerations are paramount^to ;-
2. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein's approach had 
been a priori: as he says^^ "The answer to questions 
(so it seemed) is to be given once and for all and
18independently of any future experience", and later 
again "tongue-in-cheek", "Yet this is how it has to 
be..." He elsewhere diagnoses his mistake here as 
stemming from a desire to fabricate a solution, and 
then, like some Procrustes, construe all facts to fit 
the a priori mould prepared for them, "as a requirement"
-k'U'
or a "must" dictated in advance by the pattern of our 
views. He says^^ in the same spirit "'We predicate of 
a thing what lies in the method of presenting it..."
He says in Zettel^^ simply and illuminatingly,
"We want to replace wild conjectures and explanations 
by quiet weighing of linguistic facts." We can remember 
what of the a priori had informed the author of the 
Tractatus.
- a word names an object (see 1)
- atomic 'simples* must exist, the "must" here being
a requirement of logic.
- a proposition has the shape of "This is how things are
“ there can be no propositions of ethics etc. etc..
Indeed, these pontifications, and a host of others, 
there being no shortage of them in the Tractatus, were 
all stated, merely as true, and left unexampled, un­
vindicated and most grievously of all, quite unconsidered 
in relation to reality. Henceforward, a new almost 
fanatical empiricism will replace this a priorism.
3* The proposition of the Tractatus was taken as simply
of the form "This is how things are". He returns to
20this earlier arrogation on his part "A proposition, 
(seemed) a queer thing...we sublime the signs themselves., 
we assume a pure intermediary between the signs and the 
facts" (sc. a pictorial relationship). All this is 
jettisoned by the empirical consideration of examples 
of what a proposition can be used for, and how little 
a part of its meanings and roles are to state "This is 
how things are."
4. He had earlier established a distinction between 
'simple' and 'complex'. This distinction is applied at
two levels; firstly, a word, such as "table" was seen 
necessarily as signifying a combination of elements 
within it; and secondly, a proposition as uttered was 
to be resolved, for the purpose of exposing the mode 
of its significance as a proposition, into a set of 
elementary propositions, which determined its truth 
value.
This black-and-white a priorist distinction is 
demolished within the Philosophical Investigations; 
the mundane example of the name "Excalibur" which 
survives the dismantling or destruction of its bearer 
is sufficient to expel this error. There is equally 
no justification upon empirical examination for supposing 
that ordinary propositions as spoken should be rejected 
as inferior to some ideal construct of a philosopher
unable immediately to fit it to his idealised ends,
22He writes, by way of autobiographical comment on 
this very error on his part, "The idea now absorbs us, 
that the ideal must be found in reality..." and "we 
misunderstand the role of the ideal in our language." 
Simply, not all statements are truth-functional 
we do our language scant justice by outlawing, or 
revamping, or condemning as senseless what on its face 
bears not the cast of a proposition of purest logical 
form.
5 . In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein had professed to 
have ended philosophical speculation, on his part anyway, 
by solving the problems confronting the philosopher - 
thus it v/as he would gain that goal of philosophy i.e. 
peace of mind. In the Philosophical Investigations he 
will still achieve the same ultimate goal, but rather 
by dissolving the problem. His remarks on this topic 
are many'^^ "Philosophy is a battle against the be\Vitchment
25of our intelligence by language." In Zettel "the 
difficulty (sc. in our philosophical speculations and 
endeavours) is to stop...we have already said every- 
thing...not anything else follows" (sc. after solution 
by description merely...) In Philosophical Investigations 
"the results of philosophy are the uncovering of one 
or another plain piece of nonsense and bumps that the 
understanding has got by running its head up against 
the limits of language..." In fine,then, the role of 
philosophy is therapeutic: it will tackle a problem 
by showing how it is not a problem at all in fact, 
but has the appearance of one so long as we fail to 
interpret the language in which it is clothed correctly.
" For the d a ir it j-rw e  are aimimg:: ê t i is  indeed com p le te  
c la r ity  .. th e  philosophical problem s should complete 1^  
.disappear, real 'dhscovery is th e  one -th a t imaKes me 
capable o f stoppuog --cfoln^ philoSophj when 1 w an t to . "
6. Finally, the essentialism of the Tractatus is 
disowned. By essentialism, Wittgenstein means not so 
much the old-fashioned metaphysical type, of souls 
or faculties etc.,but rather the desire or the itch 
philosophers, like himself in the Tractatus, have 
felt to offer one single explanation or rendition of 
the problem or matter under examination. It is as 
though if we look at a problem or word long enough 
a unique monist solution will emerge; "Philosophers 
use a word, and try to grasp the essence of the thing,
pQ
for example 'knowledge', 'being', 'object', 'I' etc"
Of the broader sense of essentialism, i.e. seeking a 
'monistic' or universal solution, coûte qui coûte, 
Wittgenstein says^^ "A main cause of philosophical 
disease - a one-sided diet; one nourishes one's 
thinking with only one kind of example." This fixation 
on only one example is due to our inability to resist
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the search for a unique, total and universal solution 
at all costs. It accounts for 'name-ohject' theories, 
private pain theories, and, indeed, this pernicious 
habit has fathered so many chimeras of explanation that 
it must be continually resisted by keeping a constant 
eye to the realities and the variety of phenomena within 
them, that we are supposedly explicating.
In attempting’ thus to serialise Wittgenstein's 
nonetheless objectively valid criticisms of his own 
errors in his philosophy as given out in the Tractatus, 
it has proved impossible severely to separate, as 
though by some surgical dissection, six isolated and 
independent philosophical cancers. There is a necessary 
overlap. Yet for easy future reference, I shall re­
hearse briefly the changes and substitutions made to 
afford thereby a more informed understanding of the 
substantive doctrines, i.e. those not merely method­
ological or in recantation of those of the Tractatus.
1. The name-object relationship is not fundamental 
to language; its undue primacy has obscured a proper 
understanding of the nature of language which will 
nov/ in the Philosophical Investigations be outlined,
2. All a priorist notions and conjectures will be 
outlawed. Philosophical investigation will consist of 
observing the role or the "play" of language in 
context, as used variously in numberless situations 
and environments. ('forms of life').
3. Language is not a machine for churning out true/ 
false propositions - This narrow view of language has, 
like 1.above, obscured a properly broad picture of many 
other regions of our language just as important, yet 
manifestly not "in the business" of making assertions 
of truth or falsity.
4. The distinction made between simple/complex, 
applied to words and propositions, has no genuine 
warrant; the error was to see ordinary language
as somehow defective, and to try and supplement its 
inadequacy by fabricating an underlying substratum 
of "ideal" elements and propositions. In similar 
vein, 'exact' and 'inexact', the currency of strictly 
logical assessments of adequacy or validity, can 
have no primacy in the empirical examination of 
language - these, like 'simple* and 'complex' are 
evaluations showing the prejudices of a priorist 
standards •
5 . All strivings after "one-eyed" solutions or 
explanations will be ended: our inquiry should have
no predetermined 'postulates' of thought, such as will 
preclude us from seeing what the facts are, and, if 
only seen properly, proclaim themselves to be.
6. The goal of these researches, according to the 
new lights of empirical examination, and throi:igh the 
widest possible gamut of examples, will not, Heureka-
like, be to proclaim an ingenious discovery, the whole 
solution, but rather to see how that puzzlement which 
conjured up the problem to bewitch us, arose, not from 
any real source of doubt, but from a misconception or 
misconstrual of the initial terms in which it was 
framed•
It is briefly to be noted that nowhere does 
Wittgenstein amend the earlier doctrines or practice 
of the Tractatus in seeing the primary source and 
substance of philosophy as language, the examination 
of its grammar, and the establishment thereby of its 
limits.
In considering the major substantive contributions 
of the later Wittgenstein as provided in the Philosophical 
Investigations, which it is intended later to apply to 
the problems of jurisprudence, and to exhibit as already 
applied by Hart inter alios, I shall consider Wittgenstein's 
doctrines under the following subject 'headings'.
1. By the meaning of a word is meant its use 
in ordinary language.
2. The notion of a 'language-game' i.e. the 
context of a word’s use and 'the form of 
life' which is its home.
3. The notion of a rule and its practice.
4. "Inner processes" as standing in need of an 
outward (i.e. behavioural) expression.
This notation above, it might be noted, could be 
set out in tabular form, exhibiting on the left-hand 
side things verbal i.e. meaning, language-game, rule, 
inner process, and on the right-hand side, matters of 
behaviour or practice as overtly observable. It is 
precisely this application of language in all its 
component parts to human behaviour in every problem 
under consideration, or in respect of any phenomenon 
mental or sensible one may wish to understand, that 
characterises the later and empirical Wittgenstein.
1. The meaning of a word.
As said, Wittgenstein condemned his earlier 
opinions, as in the Tractatus, whereby he saw a name 
related to an object as some label stuck upon it.
The examination he now offers of the same matter earlier 
treated is professedly empirical and 'anti-essentialist'. 
That earlier theory was explained or suggested itself 
to us by a consideration of how a word was learned
1.e. by 'ostensive définition’. This childhood scene 
is in the first forty paragraphs of the Philosophical 
Investigations exhaustively examined; a fictitious society 
of builders is imagined v/ho do in fact portray such a
way of using and learning the word. This reductio ad 
absurdum shows the poverty of such an account. In 
fact, the ’language-game' i.e. context of use of 
the word as a 'name' is so primitive and limited and 
almost alien to our own ordinary linguistic environ­
ment that it must be seen that 'naming' an object 
is only a viable teaching-aid to one who already has 
a developed grasp of the language. 'Cstensive definition' 
likewise is not an unimpeachable or unquestionably 
acceptable matter. For how do we know what of the 
shape, colour, or outline, for example, of any matter 
'ostensively defined' is in fact intended. Once 
disabused of these too simple notions of the operation 
of language, and having now not the complacent certainty 
the Augustinian theory^^ held forward, Wittgenstein 
attempts to wean the now discomfited. reader away 
from his habit of clutching at any one solution towards 
a looser, less clear-cut, but more accurate appreciation 
of what the meaning of a word can be.
2. The notions of language-game and form-of-life.
These concepts, indeed, these terms themselves 
are vital to any treatment or consideration of not only 
of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, but almost, if one 
is to judge by the frequency of their use by other 
philosophers and commentators, in the general body of 
ordinary language philosophy.
The notion of the language game is not a difficult 
one; its hold over us is not in respect of its pro­
fundity, but the future all-round utility it can provide
within ordinary language philosophy. Wittgenstein 
introduces the language-game in para.7 of the 
Philosophical Investigations: he has described, as 
above, a primitive, non-existent society of builders 
and blocks who use words as Augustine^^ would say 
we always use them: "We can think of this process...as 
one of those games by means of which children learn 
their language...! will call these language-games... 
and will sometimes speak of primitive languages as 
language-gamesAs successive contexts, (forms of 
life) are later constructed as needed to exliibit 
a typical use of a word, Wittgenstein generalises the 
term language-game to do duty for the linguistic practice 
appropriate to that context. He defines their purpose: 
"The language-games are rather set up as objects of 
comparison which are meant to throw light on the facts 
of our language by way not only of similarities, but 
also of dissimilarities."
This is almost an epitome of that method in philo­
sophy knovvTi as or dinar y-language analysis, and it will 
later be fruitful, to compare the work of Ryle and 
Austin, briefly, as almost identical in method to 
this. What is of especial significance in Wittgenstein's 
device of the language-game and its environment ('form-of- 
life' ) is that it encapsulates at once hi s new-found 
post-Tractatus empiricism and anti-essentialism. The 
language game is a mode of providing, and identifying 
as by language game (2) or ( 47) of the Philosophical 
Investigations a particular instance considered to 
throw light on any problem of meaning or usage. It 
is a device which renders example-hunting so easy, 
and just as importantly will allow limits, albeit not 
of any sharp delimitation, again to ’be set up in regard
to language, just as surely, though differently located 
in the Tractatus. There philosophical error consisted 
of overstepping the terminal limits of sense, by saying 
the unsayable etc. In the Philosophical Investigations, 
philosophical error will consist in a failure to 
identify to which language-game a word, on any occasion 
belongs, or in fact playing the wrong language game; 
one must always ask "is the word ever actually used in 
this vmy (sc. the v/ay we would like, in the interests 
of discerning an essence), in the language-game which 
is its original home".
Further, the language-game, like the rule, need 
for the same reasons have no sharp boundaries; yet 
that it has boundaries is still not less certain for 
all their lack of sharp definition. This sureness, 
then, will provide us with a dissolution of our puzzle­
ment, will spare us the pursuit of essences, inner 
•shadow performances', in short, the long catalogue 
of philosophical vanities.
3. The notion of a rule#
Wittgenstein has considered the word "game".
He has examined, by example, various games to see what 
they have in common., Example quickly shows that they 
have not enough in common, e.g. squash, draughts or 
monopoly, to afford any basis for ostensive definition 
per genus et differentjam. Nonetheless, none are in 
doubt as to how to characterise a game or recognise 
one. The loose similarity they share is rather in the 
natuT'e of a family resemblance; the family of cases 
we call or recognise as games he further compares 
in contiguity, to the fibres of a worn thread.
It is perhaps unfortunate that Wittgenstein has 
a double object in introducing the notion of "game": 
it is a paradigm case both of a word whose meaning he 
asserts is governed by rules of usage, and also of a 
'rule-bound' activity, of which 'meaning a word' is 
another case. Yet the concept of a rule is so crucial 
to his argument that this rather confusing introduction 
is excusable.
The meaning of the word 'game' is known to us from 
a consideration of how it is used. We know the meaning 
by knowing when to apply it and actually applying it 
throughout the v/hole range of its application. This 
application is public knowledge, ordered and held 
reasonably constant by common observance of those rules 
circumscribing its correct use. These cannot be exact; 
cannot we imagine doubtful cases? But the desire for 
exactness is to be resisted, as not a result of our 
into the actualities of word usage, but rather as 
a requirement we had for no reasons other than the 
philosopher's compulsion to "solve or die", a com­
pulsion nov/ resisted and castigated.
Having thus proved that rule-governance is, however 
less exact than a label, an effective delimitation of 
a word's use, and therefore its meaning, Wittgenstein 
proceeds to examine the phenomenon of 'rule-bound* 
behaviour itself. His concentration on the notion of 
the "rule" at this early stage is for the following vital 
reason: he has located language firmly on the level of 
the public and the shared. It is learned by being 
enacted in ordinary shai^ed contexts; its usage is 
ordered, indeed functions only by dint of agreement of 
usage according to the rules, and, importantly, agree­
ment on judgment upon what deserves an application 
of the word according to those rules. He will later use
JW-
these foundation doctrines to attack the doctrine of 
* inner processes’ i.e. 'seeing', 'thinking', 'reading', 
'wishing', 'Moping' etc. as mental events going on 
within the head of the private individual, independent 
of, or inwardly shadowing the external public performance 
An important example of such 'myths' is the so-called 
doctrine of the 'privacy of sensation' whereby it is 
imagined that 'one knows pains from one's own case', 
and has in fact "christened" one's own sensation.
It is important, then, that Wittgenstein settle at 
the outset the public nature of obeying a rule lest it 
later be alleged by the private-pain theorist that he 
can, privately and in isolation from any public language 
use 'words' for his own secret sensations.
Wittgenstein is therefore from the outset obliged 
fully to exhibit the nature of the practice of rules.
A rule is not the set of consequences which follow its 
observance; one who obeys a rule does not weigh a 
situation, seek an end, or envisage an end, by an 
interpretative consideration of the rule as here or 
there applied. One does not ponder over a rule, at 
least when one is observing it: observing a rule is a 
practice. It is likewise a basic article of our common 
humanity to do, alone of animate things, what is 
involved in following a rule. The observing of a 
sign-post consists not in a diagnosis of what a sign­
post is, and where it points, not in any purely cerebral 
process of interpretation, but in the common praxis 
of going in its direction, which constitutes the 
sign-post as a prop of rule-bound behaviour, and our­
selves, as seen, as rule-bound in behaviour.
It must be said that what Wittgenstein here says 
of rule-bound behaviour is among the most difficult of 
his writings, and has attracted, e.g. from Findlay^^
in his essay "On Meaning and U s e " c r i t i c i s m ,  not 
as being difficult, but rather downright obscure.
I shall treat this criticism at length in later 
chapters, but I here submit that there is a 
distinction, however subtle and difficult to grasp, 
between a practical application of a rule on the 
one hand and a (considered) interpretation of it, 
which latter would alone allow the private-pain 
theorist to justify his claim that private pain 
identification and naming is a feasibility. The 
ground is thus cleared for Wittgenstein to advance 
to
4. Inner processes stand in need of outward criteria.
It is in respect of the later Wittgenstein's 
concern v/ith these matters so central to epistemology 
that the greater amplitude of philosophical thought, 
concern, and coverage of the later Wittgenstein's 
writings, as compared with the earlier, can most readily 
be recognised. In hiis earlier work, he makes passing 
reference to 'reading*, 'thought*, 'belief* etc. 
which concepts are, of course, the stuff of philosophy, 
however brief and elliptical the philosopher's treat­
ment of them may be. Beyond this brief mention, e.g.
"A proposition is a thought", he spends little effort 
on their elucidation other than to fit 'thought' 'the 
real', 'belief into their respective positions in; 
the framework of the world and language.
In the Philosophical Investigations, indeed, in 
all his works from 1930 onwards, the themes of con­
sciousness i.e. the mental processes which, since 
the dualism of Descartes, had formed the 'Philosophy of 
Mind’ appear in Wittgenstein, conventionally, as themes
of the first importance. In turn, the concepts of 
'understanding*, 'reading', 'wishing', 'imagining',
'sensation', are all subjected to an exhaustive 
analysis in order, in each case, to show the empti­
ness of traditional beliefs that there is a shadow 
'inner* act within the mind, the counterpart of the 
external physical ' show' of the ex^)erience in question. 
The examinations, in each case, consist in the 
collation, or assembly, of a series of language-games 
designed to display the variety and fecundity of uses 
that these 'mental process' words can assist in. In 
consequence of this variety no one inner process can 
be identified, or if it can, in terms of brain-impulses, 
or odd isolated 'feelings', is not anyway that inner 
process our dualists had in viev/ when advancing their 
theory. In the analysis of * pains', perhaps a case 
to be differentiated from the typical intellectual 
inner process, there is an attack not only upon a
dualist account, but on that equally pernicious 19th
3 7century empiricist account-^ of how we know sensations, 
that is, as from an * inward eye' to our own personal 
and private mental expériences, I know what "tooth­
ache" is, by remembering, or consulting some private 
file I keep of those sensations I have had, to recall 
a personal experience of the sensation; or, I know 
what 'red' is by seeing the likeness between a per­
ceived instance of that colour and an 'image* of that 
colour v/hich reposes in my mind and is peculiarly 
my ovm.
Hov/ever much the difference in special import, 
and thus length and depth of treatment they receive, 
Wittgenstein's message is always the same; in the 
philosophical examination of these 'process' words, 
we look to hov/ they are used and the context of such
usage. In V/ittgensteiri's terms which I feel may now 
he used with understanding, we look out the language- 
game and the form of life; we note not an essence, 
common or responsible in every instance, hut a family 
of cases, or contexts where what is responsible for 
the characterisation of 'acts of understanding' 
is the behaviour, both before and after the alleged 
'flash of understanding’, 'act of faith', 'hardening 
of intent', 'meaning', not any instantaneous inward 
act. He advises us"^ "^  "Try not to think of understanding 
as a mental process...but ask yourself 'In what sort of 
case, in what kind of circumstances, do we say we 
know how to continue the series?" The message is repeated 
over and over again, with remembering, imagining, a 
'sense or feeling for a word* s meaning', dreaming, 
calculating in tho mind, and we shall here detail, in 
order to illustrate the method of research by 'compare 
and contrast the language-game’, only his examination 
of tho phenomenon of reading. It may briefly be schem- 
atised as follows:-
Para 156.
1. Wittgenstein considers, first, the case of a reader 
of 'ordinary competence' reading a newspaper, as we may
do with varying degrees of attentiveness and concentration.
2. To this we contrast one learning to read.
3. This tempts us (and we make some start to a solution 
by admitting a plurality of 'essences' or mental pro­
cesses) to concede or discern two different inner acts
of consciousriess .
Para. 1 57.
4. V/e next consider the case of one being trained, human 
or creatures of some ot’ner kind, to read.-this introduces 
further doubt over the existence of that inner process
of reading of which Wittgenstein's dialectical 
adversary was at the outset so certain.
Para. 158.
5. A st,andard "get-out", that of supposing it is 
only our present lack of complete neurological know­
ledge on these matters that stops us short of pro­
nouncing, with 100/ certainty, an'inner act'# This 
is shortly and rightly dismissed as a priori, and in 
no way legitimated by any of the prior stages of the 
examination.
Para. 159
6. We next consider one pretending to read, or, para. 
160, one reading under the influence of a drug*
Para. 162.
7. In desperation, to counter the threat made hy such 
diverse and difficult cases to smother our erstwhile 
confidence of our belief in an inner act, we try to 
define reading.
"Derivation" is suggested and, as a definition, 
is tested variously as differing modes of derivation; 
cyrillic, codes etc. in para. 163, are considered and 
are found quite unhelpful.
Para. 165.
Next it is alleged that what characterises reading 
is "the way words come in a snecial way" when we read, 
as against, say, deciphering a strange code*
Para. 168.
"Words causing our' reading them as they properly 
should be read," is next considered as an explanation, 
if not a definition, of v/hat reading means. "When we
read, don't vve feel the word-shapes causing oui" 
utterance?" This, as the previous suggested solution, 
is quickly demolished by the absurd example of a jumble 
of type-symbols (para.169) v/hich have no less a causativ# 
operation upon us to "mouth" sounds; no such "mouthing" 
however could ever be termed reading.
Para. 170.
'Guiding' is next considered as the key to the 
phenomenon of reading, and, as by now we can expect, 
in para.172, Wittgenstein invites us "to consider the 
experience of being guided...(and)...imagine the 
following cases"; on our consideration of them, he 
asks, as though any answer could possibly be given 
uniquely to comprehend the gamut of variety his 
examples display, what is there in common to them. 
Wittgenstein concludes, therefore, in para,178, that 
in suggesting that "guiding" was the quintessential 
mental experience of reading it was "a single form 
of guiding which forces the expression on us." As 
he concludes with reference to these purported de­
finitions and others on other concepts, in para.182..
Thrs ro le  [ec, o f words' in language ]  is w hat we. neeoj to  
unde rs tand  in o rd e r to  resolve philosoph.ical paradoxes 
And hence d e fin itio n s  usual! fa i l to  re s o lv e  th e m ."
The conclusion Wittgenstein reaches, and the nearest 
one in doubt is to get to a definition for reading, is 
in fact what Wittgenstein has said as far back as para. 
164, i.e. that what v/e have alone are criteria for 
judging 'reading' etc. to have been, or to be case.
"We use the word 'read' for a family of cases." In all 
instances, too, our use of these criteria must be founded 
upon the external behaviour, context, and situation of 
the p erson reading .
Tiie same method of analysis is repeated with 
equal illumination, and displaying a bewildering 
talent on Wittgenstein's part for the effortless 
serialisation of a host of suggestive examples, for 
the other standard "type" mental processes whose 
elucidation has been the object of the philosophy 
of mind. Further consideration of these matters in 
themselves is of course not my purpose, and I consider 
it now appropriate, with this example clearly before 
us of the full-blown operation of the later Wittgenstein’s 
matured philosophy so empirically and flexibly at work, 
to reconsider, by way of simamarising our argument to 
date, his principal and vital insights and how these 
may be of fundamental use to us as we advance to the 
problems of jux’isprudence.
Summary.
1. I noted that, for no good reasons, jurisprudence 
seems to stand at some remove, to its ovm prejudice, 
from the general body of philosophy and its modem 
currents. As philosophy is a unity, we should not be 
discouraged from looking to its more avant-garde and 
vital areas for inspiration.
2. Ordinary language philosophy seems to offer us 
both a method of philosophical analysis and a set of 
substantive doctrines on the natiu'e of philosophy 
just as much as on the nature of its traditional 
elements.
3. Wittgenstein was the natural choice of exemplar 
of this philosophical movement as his philosophical 
career discloses the rarity of having provided two 
distinct but related philosonhical 'confessions’. There
could, it might earlier have been thought, have been 
chosen, for example, J.L. Austin, or Ryle, or Searle 
e t c a s  a typical philosopher of ordinary language 
whose writings would equally well have demonstrated 
v/hat are the concerns or aims of this philosophy.
It is here not necessary to rely on the fact that 
they all owe much to Wittgenstein, rather than vice 
versa. It is enough to note, what I hope is now 
obvious, that Wittgenstein's longer career can be 
seen as almost a history of twentieth century philo­
sophy out of which ordinary language philosophy was 
borne, and makes background, or preliminary contexrt-
drav/ing almost unnecessary. Had Austin been chosen,
6 7not only Frege, Russell, but the earlier Wittgenstein 
v/ould have had to be sketched in anyway.
4. These were each in turn articulated to reveal how 
generally language may be seen as the "open sesame"
or "lynch-pin" to the problems of philosophy and the 
resolution of philosophical puzzlement. In both instances 
we are shov/n how errors arise, classically, by a failure 
to notice when v/e overstep the boundaries of language; 
dispensing with Wittgenstein's metaphor, one fails to 
see that false ideas arise from a mistaken construal 
of our represent at ion in linguistic form of the phenomena 
Under examination.
5. By considering how Wittgenstein developed his 
matured ordinary language philosophy by progressing 
from the Tractatus to the Philosophical Investigations, 
v/e have been able to witness stage by stage the growth 
and "breeding" of ordinary language philosophy. I have 
tried to state not only the fact that, but explain the
reasons why, in turn, a priorism yielded to empiricism, 
why scientific rigour and desire for definitiveness 
at all costs yielded to a looser and more flexible 
attitude of seeking dissolution rather than solution 
of the problems of philosophy, and how, within this 
total volte-face of philosophic orientation, language 
still remains central, but differently "rotated round 
the axis of our real need
6. Finally, I tried to assemble the principal material
i.e. as against methodological (though it is as ever 
almost impossible to separate these), contributions of 
Wittgenstein, i.e. the concepts of language-game,'
’forms-of-life*, the concept of the 'rule*, and his 
exposition of the phenomena of language as a learned 
process, and 'inner states’ as, in all important cases, 
to be replaced by consideration of the external cir­
cumstances and criteria founded upon them.
In the course of this preparatory work, certain 
key terms have been introduced with explanations of 
their use and importance; it has been the aim of such 
an introduction not idly to eulogize Wittgenstein or 
ordinary language philosophy as such. It is rather so 
to define such terms that they may now subsequently be 
used as the vital currency of the jurisprudential 
analysis offered in the following chapters, in which 
terms like 'rule', 'a priori', 'inner process' etc. 
are as worthy of lengthy definition as they are in­
dispensable to accurate analysis. Some such terms 
are already familiar and, in well-known cases,
an integral part of jurisprudence. That others are
terms
still esoteric to legal theorists, who use thes^Aeithei* 
with a gaucheness so revealing, e.g. Olivecrona^f or not 
used at all when the matter in question cries out for 
their usage, is in itself proof of that back^vard and
anomalous state of contemporary jurisprudence I 
adverted to at the commencement of this essay.
Before passing on to the more familiar terrain 
of jurisprudence, albeit to be worked with an 
apparatus imported from other fields, I should like 
to offer one other aspect of Wittgenstein's work which 
it is hoped may throw some light on the relationship 
between Wittgenstein and the general corpus of ordinary 
language philosophy. As names or references in this 
thesis, they may appear to some extent interchangeable, 
perhaps in the same way as "Hoover" is to "vacuum- 
cleaner" . This relationship, i.e. that of the foremost 
exponent, or inventor, naming his class, is perhaps 
less than accurate, and in hope to show more accurately 
how we should see Wittgenstein vis-a-vis ordinary 
language philosophy, I propose briefly to compare his 
philosophical approach as already described, with 
that of Gilbert Ryle, as revealed, on his part, in
A b
The Concept of Mind. I shall spare the reader any 
more lengthy rehearsal of a philosopher's career and 
central submissions, in Ryle's case, having devoted 
ample space already to that of Wittgenstein. Here 
need only be considered what Ryle saw as his object 
or purpose in the Concept of Mind, and how this is 
somewhat different, and, talc en all in all, somewhat 
less, or as displaying a lesser number of philosophical 
dimensions than Wittgenstein.
It is not to be denied that Ryle and Wittgenstein 
share much common ground: the substantive doctrines, 
both those attacked and those put forward, are much 
the same:-
- Wittgenstein's 'inner processes' are Ryle’s 'ghosts 
in the mind.'
- Ryle's 'categories', which mark divisions in 
language, and whose non-observance or 'confusion' 
have spawned almost all the confusions or problems 
in philosophy, are the other's ‘ iangbagb'games'-
- Ryle, too, perhaps more methodically, runs 
through the gamut of 'inner acts* and likewise 
directs us always to a consideration of the 
context of the employment of the word 
('wish*, * imagine*, * obey* etc.) in ordinary 
language. The catalyst of this examination
is, naturally, the * category* appropriately 
selected.
- In sum, Ryle believes the meaning of a word is 
its use.
Similarities like this could be endlessly noted. 
Yet to pronounce an identity between Wittgenstein and 
Ryle merely on the content of their philosophical 
writings would show, in the pronouncer, a too shallow 
discernment, a failure in seeing the overall worth of 
a philosopher merely in those worthwhile '’propositions* 
of sense we can lift out of his work. It is as though 
Plato were an idealist only, and the * dialectics*, 
or the early but sophisticated grapplings with language 
as the difficult medium of philosophy, merely incidents 
to substantive themes. We look, then, to Ryle's 
overall project ; he does not conceal it, but proclaims 
it with candour and determinedly in the preface to 
The Concept of Mind;
"This book offers., .a theory of the mind. Its arguments 
are not to increase our existing knowledge about minds, 
but to rectify the logical geography of the knowledge 
we already possess." He begins his argument with the 
'*official myth*' that Cartesian heritage which says 
that humans have body and mind, the first public, 
the second private etc. etc.
His avowed aim is to disabuse us of this false 
notion and, in so doing, explain how it has arisen i.e.
by * category* confusions.
Wittgenstein, in contrast, in his preface to the
47Philosophical Investigations tells us he "is assembling 
a series of remarks;" these are informal in their 
juxtaposition, and, in form, a very easy, sometimes 
too easy, blend of dialectic. The reader, imaginary 
disputants, and theorists of one sort or another easily 
become the casual colleague of Wittgenstein's inquiries. 
Tha book, we are told, is an "album", recording a number 
"of sketches of landscapes, made in the course of...long 
and involved j o u r n e y s . H e  informs us, lastly, that 
it is not intended "to spare other people the trouble 
of thinking...but, if possible, to stimulate someone 
to thoughts of his own..."
It cannot be denied, least of all by myself, that 
Wittgenstein does more in this book than present, for 
our use as we may, some "handy hints"; when Strawson 
says^^ that Wittgenstein did arrange his thoughts etc. 
he tells us, what all must see, that Wittgenstein un­
questionably did have a relatively concrete set of 
views, some of which I have already considered. Not 
all is mere showing, helping, therapy etc; in a 
satisfying measure, rather, some of Wittgenstein's 
ideas are fully-fledged and developed philosophical 
theories e.g. the language of pain, the nature of 
the rule etc.
That Wittgenstein is constantly a blend of a 
method of philosophy, and a body of philosophy, I 
have already tried to make clear. But it is confusion 
on just this equiparate conjunction of these two 
facets that has led to fallacious interpretations of 
Wittgenstein in a manner that would not be possible 
with Ryle. We may see this confusion manifest firstly, 
in those who see Wittgenstein as ’cloaking', like some
charlatan, merely Rylean ideas, under a **jargon** of
a ’*'bewitching style** which is not a dynamic part of
50his philosophy e.g. Hems, negards; the stylistic, 
idiosyncratic Wittgenstein, who sees philosophy as 
"showing the fly the way out of the fly-bottle", 
as to be explained simply by merely biographic conr- 
siderations of the authors admittedly strange life­
style or psychological history. Hems, most ungenerously 
and anyway, courtesy apart, quite unwarrantedly makes 
the following and other similar points:-
- Wittgenstein* s concentration on ordinary language, 
and his concern for how language is learnt, is
simply the result of his interwar years as a 
schoolteacher in an elementary school. His con­
cern with the ordinary'* everyday** use as against 
the type of scientific esoteric language of the 
Tractatus marks a merely personal preference.
- The "dialectic", or "governessy" style of the 
Philosophical Investigations likewise is a residue
of his teaching period.
- His "anguish" at philosophy, his desire to "put
a stop to it" is again not objectively warranted, 
but just one neurosis among the many others 
Wittgenstein entertained.
Hems* error is, in short, to see Wittgenstein as a
stylist; he sees under the stylistic "front" the man,
and in seeing these only is blind to the philosopher.
We may remember Frege* s^ pertinent remark that a
thought has an existence apart from its thinker.
Wittgenstein himself feared that his later work would,
if it made any lasting contribution, provide only a 
I I 51* jargon* . To see him as providing simply a style, or
even, in some predominating way, a mode, rather than 
the articles, of a philosophy, is simply unrealistic*
The via media between these two opposite con­
fusions must surely be to allow that Wittgenstein
is magnanimous enough to contain concerns both for ‘
f o r
the method and a the substance of philosophy. It is 
in virtue of this recognition of the size of his 
contribution that I argue that Wittgenstein offers 
more, in respect of "number of philosophic dimensions" 
than Ryle.
Wittgenstein offers, in short, an alternative 
mode of seeing philosophy, or what the business of 
philosophy im^- to dissolve problems, and give peace 
of mind enough to stop doing philosophy; he offers 
us, too, a method of achieving that end i.e. empirical, 
non-essence seeking, research among the 'ground of 
philosophy' where we may clear away 'the rubble*•
Finally he proposes, for our acceptance or not; 
for we too may philosophize, a set of tailor-made 
doctrines. Each of these three we may freely accept 
or reject, but it is a measure of the artifice of 
their composer, that the three, in providing at all 
stages, a mutual and coherent support, must all be 
digested before any one, or others in consequence, 
wholly or partially, may be rejected.
In contrast to this, a criticism of Ryle does not 
require us to rethink what is the object of philosophy 
or what is its role vis-a-vis other disciplines; nor, 
indeed, need one reconsider how we may practice 
philosophy according to those guidelines made manifest 
by the course of his inquiries. It is thùs in regard 
to the breadth of matter, not so much that matter 
Wittgenstein compresses into his philosophy, but 
rather that matter we are given for future consideration
and digestion, that Wittgenstein is lifted far above 
other ordinary language philosophers. For the actual 
digestion or realisation of these depths, or successive 
dimensions implicit within his work, does almost 
realise within the reader the author's hope that his 
book will help, or ’stimulate* others to produce 
a philosophy of their own. Among these "others* we
52may number Searle, Malcolm, Strawson, Anscombe etc* 
all of whom acknowledge a great, almost embarrassing 
debt to Wittgenstein, and yet have not failed to 
qualify consensu prudentium as original contributors 
to the problems of modern philosophy.
In less spectacular fashion, it is my purpose only 
to examine how Wittgenstein*s philosophy has in the 
past aided and may further aid the current pursuits 
of jurisprudence.
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ORDINARY LANGDAGE PHILOSOPHY APPLIED Ï0 LEGAL THEORY
It was the explicit aim of the first chapter of 
this thesis to make quite apparent what the methods, 
and the substantive themes, (and the development 
of both of these), were of ordinary language philo­
sophy. I now wish to show how the import and insights 
of this philosophy, with its content and method 
specified in detail and its terminology, especially 
that of Wittgenstein, exhibited and explained, may be 
applied within legal theory.
It is hardly to be thought, if we bear in mind 
that this technique of philosophy is by no means the 
invention of yesterday, or la®t year, or anyway hot 
from the presses, that its insights etc. have not as 
yet illumined the area of legal theory. In fact, that 
it has been applied to a large extent and with no little 
success and skill by H-L-A. Hart^ makes this taslc or 
project of illustration on my part in some regards 
easier. I propose, then, to consider in turn the 
following general aspects of ordinary language philo­
sophy as applied to legal theory*
(1) An eclectic examination of the contributions to 
jurisprudence of Hart, as exemplifying ordinary language 
techniques and aims.
(2) A consideration of criticisms made against that 
philosopher's views which will, it is hoped, contain
not only an assessment of already published criticism,
2 2 2 such as that of Sartorius or Hall or Bodenheimer and
others, mainly American,who perhaps regard true analytic
philosophy as some pre-war and American vintage, but
also to add further criticisms that may be applied to
Hart's work in the light of what here has already been
said of ordinary language philosophy.
3. To canvass yet further matters or areas where an 
ordinary language analysis can be looked to, to 
extend our understanding of persistent problems in 
legal theory; in particular, these are the nature of 
legal rules, the matter of judicial interpretation 
and how jurisprudence should treat that matter, and 
the ever vexatious question of strict liability.
1. THE 'WRITINGS OF H.L.A. M R T .
It is not my purpose nor is it necessary, or even 
appropriate to the overall project of this thesis, to 
review the whole content of Hart's contributions, and 
these are many, to jurisprudence. What is here my 
intent is to show ordinary language philosophy as 
effective within jurisprudence, not to argue that Hart 
has all the answers, or that his explanation-in-sum 
of law and a legal system is the correct one. Indeed 
there are important reasons of methodology, as much as 
of his being right or wrong, why even Hart himself would 
not thank or admire anyone for such a vindication of 
his ideas.
It is necessary to adopt, as said, an eclectic 
rather than a generalising or comprehensive approach 
in selecting, not randomly or broadly, but carefully, 
of all his theses those that exemplify as ideally and 
evidently as possible the use of ordinary language 
techniques. These may allow us in their mere exhibiting 
to add or interpolate at each stage a precise identific­
ation of that particular ordinary language method or 
theme Hart is in fact applying. It is recognised of 
course that this exercise of identification does not
in itself constitute any proof of his intentions 
which must, and will, he attended to in due course; 
but I think that it is legitimate for my present 
purposes to name, and otherwise evaluate, Hart's 
submissions, as though exercises capable of separ­
ation.
By way of preface to a consideration of Hart, 
it is not irrelevant to consider, what perhaps needs 
no saying to a student of philosophy, that Hart is 
an Oxford academic, and taught at that University in 
those vital post-war years which saw the growth of 
ordinary language philosophy, more narrowly known as 
the Oxford School of English (and analytical) philo­
sophy. It is not surprising that Hart should catch the 
full "blast" of the ideas of Ryle, Austin, and of 
course, those of Wittgenstein, whose ideas, formed 
at Cambridge, as one critic has colourfully put it, 
at Oxford "were grafted on to an Aristotelian philo­
logical stock...the resultant fruits (of) which.... 
are considerably drier and cooler..."
It is thus no accident that Hart's magnum opus, 
The Concept of Law" seems like a*'sister volume" to 
Ryle's The Concept of Mind ; and, since it proved 
useful to examine the preface to that latter, we may 
commence best our examination of Hart by looking 
similarly at his prefatory remarks as set forth in 
the preface and first few pages of that work. Hart 
tells us, in fact, in that preface that his book "is 
concerned with the clarification of the general frame- 
work of legal thought", (which seems merely a trans­
lation of Ryle's "rectification of the logical geo­
graphy" of what epistemology we know already), and 
concludes his preface with an assertion that".*...
in this field of study" (sc. jurisprudence) "it is 
particularly true that we may use, as Professor J.L. 
Austin^ said, 'a sharpened awareness of words to 
sharpen our perception of the phenomena*".
Even beyond the preface, the first chapter 
appropriately and significantly entitled "Persistent 
Perplexities" is devoted to establishing that by 
now characteristic climate which ordinary language 
philosophy desiderates, namely, a recognition of 
that conceptual fog that philosophy is designed or 
ordained to dispel in its clarificatory, or re- 
charting, role. Hart informsus^ that the past course 
of jurisprudence has contributed mEiny "assertions 
and denials concerning the nature of law, which... 
seem strange and paradoxical...such statements,"
(e.g. that Law is the primary norm which stipulates 
the sanction), "are both illuminating and puzzling: 
they throw a light which male es us see much that is 
hidden...but leaves us without a clear view of the 
whole
Indeed it is no exaggeration that the aim of this
first chapter is not to say simply, as Olivecrona
7might do in Lav/ as Fact , that as yet no totally 
accurate or satisfactory explanation of the phenomena 
of the law has been given, but to present what is 
basically the same information, but with a leading 
emphasis upon the "confusion", the "paradox", the 
"seeming" illumination, the partial knowledge etc. 
that characterises jurisprudence and its persistent 
struggle to understand those three questions which 
Hart,  ^ (and they are sufficiently comprehensively 
stated for us to accept them), sees as central to that
science, the Command Theory of Law, the nature of 
legal obligation, and the place of rules in an ex­
plication or understanding of a legal system* These 
three questions are treated as equally manifesting 
the issue of attempts to provide a definition, and 
that on the simple Augustinian model,^ which Hart, 
in typical ordinary language style recognises or 
pillories as the stock "bête noire" of philosophical 
analysis, and the source of all the paradox and 
confusion he has earlier exhibited. He concludes 
this introductory chapter^^ saying in advance of a 
contextual examination of such simplistic attempts, 
notably that of Austin, to provide a definition of 
law that "nothing concise" (sc. simple or handy) 
enough to be recognised as a definition could provide 
a satisfactory answer "to these three major problems*"
In fine then, we have in this preface and the
introductory chapter an almost explicit avowal of intent
to apply ordinary language analysis to the law; firstly,
11his method will be to remove puzzlement or, to
"dispel doubt and perplexity"; secondly this method
12will involve looking, again quoting Austin , "not 
merely at words...but at the realities we use words 
to talk about a sharpened awareness of words...to 
sharpen our perception of the phenomena"; and thirdly 
his target, (or, in Wittgenstein's terms the ground he 
will just clear the rubble from), will be the simplistic 
definitions which humanity craves for, and past philo­
sophy has too indulgently and confusingly provided.
Having struck the by now familiar therapeutic or 
clarificatory note at the outset, it remains now to
examine the succeeding analysis of unsatisfactory 
attempts to define law or laws, to see how faithful 
Hart is to this avowal of intent so clearly and con­
fidently set out above. To show this, and further 
provide an opportunity to show, in context and in 
detail, the use of ordinary language devices, will be 
best done by considering the arguments Hart applies 
against perhaps the most notorious of the attempts 
to provide a definition of the leiw, in Chapters 2-4 
of The Concept of Law, the command theory of Austin 
Such a choice is surely not an accidental one.
Just as Wittgenstein began by a description or state­
ment of the Augustinian name-object theory of meaning 
and Ryle with Cartesian dualism,which, with equally 
simplistic motives, showed mind and body as separate 
entities, in both cases for cogent reasons of strategy, 
so too Hart strategically begins with a description of 
Austin’s theory. The successive stages of its examination 
are as follows:
At Chapter 2 of The Concept of Law
4
1) Law is described by Austin as basically and simply 
effective in that we obey it because a sovereign or 
state literally commands us to obey; if we do not, 
then a punishment or sanction will extort obedience, 
and equally, act as an example to others to obey.
2) Hart proceeds to investigate the nature of ’command’
by an empirical consideration of the forms of life of
15imperative language or command situations, and notes 
that there is no essence in common to the various uses 
of the interrogative if "The varieties of social situation 
in which use is...made of imperative forms are not only 
numerous but shade into each other..." Being told that 
lav/ is imperative, then^ is not to define it after all, 
for it still may be comparable to any one of a number 
of possible imperative practices.
3) Hart then looks to the law to see what imperative 
use it suggests as appropriate to it. This consideration, 
again empirical,leads to an identification of certain 
nuances in 'obedience to a law', i.e. those of the 
general nature of the commands of the law, and the 
permanence both of that sense of authority we feel in
so obeying it and the threat or sanction that will 
visit us should we disobey. All these features different­
iate law as effective from the face-to-face order/ 
threat "gunman situation" v/hich Austin’s description 
contemplates.
4) These empirical examinations of law and reality 
via language lead Hart to conclude that Austin's theory, 
only seems to convince as a model or version of, if 
anything, a penal type of statute. Even that much praise 
is too much for Austin's theory, for when he adverts
to a person who is hfibitually obeyed, his description 
does not do justice to the complexity or hierarohio&l 
plurality of these persons of authority, and those 
offices of authority, that are a characteristic part 
of any legal system.
5) In short, Austin's system is too "one-sided", or
monistic, in that he fails to do justice to the variety
of laws (and legal personalities) that can be seen in
17a legal system, which Hart ' now proceeds to exhibit 
by a consideration of yet more forms-of-life, and a 
determination after the precepts of ordinary language 
methodology to replace, for the instinct to define, 
a pluralistic, looser consideration of the variety 
that is reality.
6 ) Hart enumerates various types of law^^ as, laws 
which confer powers on ordinary individuals, to make 
a v/ill etc., or to officials to exercise authority,
lav/s which bind the legislators themselves, laws 
which set up standards of behaviour, failure of which 
v/ill entail punishment etc. To comprehend this gamut 
of types of law, the simple model, if it is to sur­
vive as a realistic representation, will have to be 
modified to account, principally, for differences 
in respect of the content, the mode of origin and 
the range of application of the various laws. One 
might remember here a similar "hauling over the coals" 
process, in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations 
where the advocate of a name-objeot view of meaning 
or the private pain theorist was suffered to suggest 
emendations to his original unembroidered and so easy 
definitions.
7) In regard to content, then, Hart points to the
real distinction between power conferring, and duty
imposing laws (at p. 27 op. cit. How can one see the
Austinian * sanction* as relevant to the former? Two
suggested solutions are dismissed as artificial,
20and prompted by "the itch for uniformity in juris­
prudence."; firstly, to say that the nullity that 
attends a failure in respect of a power-conferring law 
is a sanction, is really the artificial transfer to 
the (epiphenomenal) stage of sanction of what is
part of the rule's existence as a rule; secondly, the
21Kelsenian ' theory, which would make of both types 
of rule merely antecedents, or "if-clauses" to a 
command properly, or really, addressed only to an 
o f f i c i a l  . ., does not reflect the evident reality that, 
in respect of power-conferring rules, the law has been 
really entrusted, really is at the disposal of the 
individual* This is a distortion, plausible only because
it is a distortion that seems to provide uniformity 
of explanation where otherwise a vexing plurality 
would have to he acknowledged «
In regard to the range of application, too, an 
empirical canvassing of the variety in this respect 
again shows the poverty of the command theory* So 
far is it from being the case that there is one 
sovereign or many, the reality of law seems to con­
found, in many instances and manners, the "commanded" 
with the "commanding".
Finally, in regard to the modes of origin of 
lav/s, diversity of custom, of statute, of judicial 
promulgation, such variety cannot be fitted into 
the strait-jacket of Austin* s theory without serious 
distortion to preserve the theory as a uniform or 
universal explicator of law* We are forced to invent
the "tacit order" to allow for delegations of
sovereign-power to ministers or judges or other agents 
of the sovereign, and, in an arbitrary and a priori 
fashion, say that a rule of customary law is not 
in fact law until applied by a court*
In sum, Hart has outlined as much the "itch for
uniformity" and the need to resist it as the unreal 
distortions of reality that such an itch leads us
to commit in jurisprudential analysis; in his own
22terms that "the effort to reduce to this single 
simple form the variety of laws ends by imposing 
upon them a spurious unity*" He importantly adds that 
to look for uniformity is not a mistake merely insofar 
as it produces distortions, but much more damagingly 
obscures a true appreciation of the "distinguishing 
characteristic of the law" (which lies) "in its fusion 
of different types of rule."
Hart continues to make a good case better by 
exposing yet further flav/s in Austin's account in 
respect of the nature of the "sovereign" that 
that theory postulates, in particular, his identity, 
his succession etc, and what the continuity not only 
of the "habit of obedience", on the part of the 
subjects, but of legislative authority, in fact, 
the impersonal permanence of a legal system, can 
be, or how they may be analysed* This is clearly with 
a view to giving us the "fresh start" of Chapter 5, 
having conclusively exposed the errors of the command- 
theory, and introducing his own suggested explanation 
of law as a system of rules. For the present, however, 
rather than follow Hart to the issue of rules as 
though a mere addendum to his criticism of Austin* s 
theory, and not, as is the case, as an important matter 
deserving, and later to receive, a full assessment, 
it will be more appropriate to recapitulate shortly 
what Hart has been about methodologically*
He has indeed remained faithful to the statement 
of intent; he has considered the forms of life of 
legal language by a linguistic concern for the 
adequacy of a theory's descriptive fidelity to the 
facts it would hope to portray* In the archetypal 
sense of ordinary language methodology, he has as 
yet only therapeutically dissolved or explained where 
that puzzlement noted at the outset of the book comes 
from, i.e. the distortions consequent upon an "itch 
for uniformity". By achieving a "fresh start", he 
has "cleared away the ground" and, in that very act 
of clearing, we can see clearly the underlying reality, 
that lav/ is in fact a system of various, diffuse rules, 
not to be uniformalised * His attitude, again in the 
model, or mould, of ordinary language analysis, is
distinctly empirical and a posteriori i.e. he looks 
to the facts and then will record, or comprehend, 
in his account, their variety, contrary to the 
and almost other-worldliness of Austin or Kelsen etc®
It is submitted that this is, in fact, a palmary and 
effective exemplification of the precepts of ordinary 
language philosophy both in its methodological and 
substantive doctrines, within jurisprudence, and it is 
mostly in virtue of the closeness of Hart at this stag© 
to this model of analysis as the ideal that this early 
part of the Concept of Law is most respected.
To exhibit again this application, I propose next 
to examine, having already justified my eclectic attitude,
Hart's essay, "The Ascription of Responsibility
24and Rights"23. It is Hart's aim to consider, so far 
as jurisprudence is concerned, "the logical peculiarities 
which distinguish these" (sc. ascriptive) sentences 
from descriptive sentences. Hart's concern is, of course, 
wider than merely jurisprudential in that it is his 
aim to characterise ascriptive uses of sentences with­
in the sphere of legal usage. Having there constructed a 
working "model" or characterisation, he looks to the 
more general matter of action-sentences of the form 
"He did it" etc., to argue that these too are mis­
construed if considered merely descriptive; which
2 5misconstrual he says  ^is the source of yet more 
"philosophical puzzles."
Hart's jurisprudential target is that view which 
sees law as^^ "...a set, if not a system, of legal 
concepts such as 'c o n t r a c t t r e s p a s s , which 
he considers as yet another instance of "a disastrous 
oversimplification." To see just how over-simplified 
this attitude is, Hart examines the use of legal 
language, or the forms-of-life in which, in court,
such concepts or words are used, and particularly..".* 
the distinctive ways in which legal utterances can 
he challenged"; he hopes that these will reveal the 
basic fallacy of assuming, or postulating an "inner 
state", such as mens rea, voluntariness or foresight 
by way of imposing h spurious unity" upon hetero­
geneous matters.
An examination of the stages or steps of this 
particular theory or insight provided by Hart will be 
additionally illustrative of ordinary language methods 
in that, while it is possible to see it as only in 
part jurisprudential, it is better to see it as an 
unum quid in that Hart here is conducting a much more 
broadly-based research into a certain language game, 
i.e. that of ascriptions. There is no good reason 
to see a language-game, or a form-of-life bounded 
by an academic boundary. If his article is seen in 
this light, the whoi'e becomes an intact and tightly 
woven linguistic exercise in that compare-and-contrast 
method Wittgenstein adverts to in the Philosophical 
Investigations. "The language-games are set up as 
objects of comparison...to throw light on the facts 
of our language by way not only of similarities, 
but also of dissimilarities." It is precisely this 
search for and provision of similarities in respect 
of ascriptive language, that, at one, lead Hart from 
an initial legal context to consider more general 
areas of human behaviour, or forms-of-life; and at 
the same time they make his conclusion of equal 
relevanoe as he says, to the philosophy of action 
as to legal theory. Indeed, the article may be seen 
as a vindication of what I have earlier argued, in 
theory, that there are no real and therefore ought
to be no arbitrary divisions of philosophy.
Hart's argument may be analysed as follows:-
1) He attempts to characterise ascriptive uses of 
language in the legal i.e. judicial context, where
a correct application or examination of their use in 
this context shov/s that 'trespass’, 'contract' etc. 
are not used to describe blmitly what is a fact the 
result of the obtaining of a necessary and sufficient 
set of other blunt facts, but are used to label or 
describe the case as, in the absence of possible 
traverses, rejoinders etc. being a 'contract',
'trespass' etc.
2) This conditional "labelling" he names 'defeasibility'; 
the palmary instance of a defeasible concept is that,
in the criminal law, of mens rea, which exhibits this 
conditional quality; here the charges of the prosecution 
stand or fall, i.e. are "defeated", as and if the usual 
defences of diminished responsibility, duress etc. 
are held to apply.
3) A failure to see the reality of this, (and it is 
after all merely a recitation of what in fact is the 
progression of charge, defence, counter-charge etc.) 
leads to, or accounts for, the tendency to see mens 
rea (or in Scots law, more graphically, dole or a 
guilty mind), as a particular positive mental quality 
which all these responsibility absolving pleas 
fundamentally (must) disclose* This same error under­
lies the more modern variants of "foresight" and
"intention" .
4) Having characterised, in the ideal exemplary con­
text of the lav/, the notion of defeasibility, Hart
28steps outside the law-courts to consider comparisons
and contrasts, or in his own terms, cases "similar 
in important respects in spite of important differences• 
and considers a variety of contexts in which appear 
legal words, applied defeasihly in the context of the 
court. The difference is not so much that they are now 
non-ascriptive, or non-defeasible; for clearly the 
case of a layman’s saying "He bought a house", where a 
lawyer would not, in recognition of some obvious defect 
of form, is a defeasible assertion. This is shown by 
the fact that it is withdrawn, or at least not re­
asserted once the defect at law is recognised. The 
difference is rather the non-judicial role of the 
utterer of the defeasible statment, and, equally 
importantly, the similarity is that in both contexts, 
judicial/forensic, and ordinary, we mi stale e the nature 
of these utterances as merely the sumraary of factual 
circumstances which seem their only obvious or simple 
basis.
5) Emboldened, then, by this wider than legal re­
levance, or manifestation of defeasible utterances,
Hart moves, at one, from jurisprudence to the philo­
sophy of action, and from legal contexts, in whole or 
in part, to everyday contexts, to look for others 
where the same error may be discerned i.e. the con­
fusion of descriptive and ascriptive (defeasible)
29language. He describes the error in his own terms, 
as that of "identifying the meaning of a non- 
descriptive utterance ascribing responsibility, with 
the factual circumstances supporting that acription", 
or assumed to do so.
6 ) Once again the surveys a variety of ordinary 
circumstances, all exhibiting the action statement 
"x did y" i.e. typical admission or accusation 
situations, and applies to them the standard set of 
theories of action, which have sought to discover 
under the outer expression of such utterances inner 
acts of will, or decision, or choice# He considers 
successively,^^ as possible solutions "voluntariness", 
"consciousness", "intention","ability to have chosen 
otherwise" or "having freedom of will" as some magic 
human quality, and by empirical testing, shows how 
these attempted or seeming universal solutions just
do not account for or explain the various contexts 
and shades of usage in the "family of cases" of human 
action and the language games we use in connection with 
that family. No uniform solution can account for our 
attribution or discernment of "accidental", or "under 
duress" or "unforced" or "unintended" or "unforseen 
consequence" etc.
7) He concludes on the basis of this empirical survey 
that, in these typical cases, what we do is ascribe, 
and our use of terms such as "accidental", "foreseen" 
etc. advert not to any inner process, but rather to 
our need, if their application is to alter or inform
us of anything, "to judge (i.e. ascribe) again: 
not to describe again"•
8 ) Finally, again employing the by now familiar 
precept of compare-and-contrast Hart distinguishes that 
ascriptive use of language he has tried to identify 
from two other notions it might seem to resemble, or 
restate. Firstly, he is not preaching behaviourism, 
which would say we know a human action only from its
external aspect or perception, and there is no more 
to it than that. Hart’s point is rather the linguistic 
one that, in an important class of action statements9 
w© are not out to describe all that an action is, 
which is, after all, what the behariourist too is 
actually doing. Rather, in this class, om" aim is 
to ascribe, or determine responsibility for that action, 
which appears in a descriptive "guise” tailored by 
that very attributive intent upon our part.
Secondly, he distinguishes his ascriptive use 
from any evaluative i.e. praise-bestowing or morally 
reprehending uses of language, such as have been 
suggested by moral philosophers as exhibited in certain 
areas of moral discourse. Hart’s point, as he repeatedly 
tells us, is a logical one; the difference between 
describing and ascribing is not that we praise or blame 
with the latter, but stay neutral, as it were, with the 
former; it is rather that when we ascribe, like the 
judge, we are in a domain neither that of fact, or 
truth and falsity, nor that of moral praise or censure. 
Just as there is a via media open to a judge in virtue 
of the logic or the nature of his office to condemn 
legally, as a judge, without informing his judgment 
with moral import, so too, for the same logical 
reasons, can we, in using language ascriptively, do so 
without any need as an inevitable consequence to imply 
moral praise or censure.
Once again we may instructively look at what sort 
of examination Hart here is conducting, and again we 
see an almost total observance of the precepts of 
ordinary language philosophy. He has conjured up for 
our attention somewhere over twenty various examples 
of certain ascriptive or other uses of language and 
invited us to make with him the inevitable conclusions.
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He has again noted the traditional error of philo­
sophy in difficult cases, that of hypostatising the 
inner process, which, it is remembered, is always 
to stand in need of outward justification; his analysis 
of cases or examples has shov/n that this justification 
is not forthcoming.
Further, the analysis that he offers is appropriately 
not a substitute universal analysis of action-statements, 
(and I think Hart has been unfairly criticised for 
affecting to provide such a solution), but merely an 
"investigation" which brings to our attention a particular 
type of case, the judicial and those comparable to it, 
which Hart is careful to specify narrowly* Nor indeed 
does he say, even in regard to those examples of 
statements that are ascriptive in nature, that they 
are exclusively so, or cannot, in other contexts have 
quite unequivocably descriptive senses* It is important 
to understand that it is the context of the use of a 
statement that characterises it as ascriptive, and it 
is this attention to the context as well as the form 
( the language-game as language in context of use or 
in its form-of-life) that Hart, as an examplar of 
ordinary language analytical techniques must, and is 
too seldom especially in regard to this article here 
under discussion, be given credit for.
Finally, as the natural or double-effect of his 
analysis, to extend our understanding of language,
Hart is ever as much conscious of the need to dispel
confusion or puzzlement as to create new insights.
61His aim has been to solve some of "the philosophic
62puzzles concerning action", and^ "many philosophical 
difficulties" that come from ignoring the distinctions 
he is to noint out in this article.
It is of course too much to expect of Hart, as 
fundamentally a jurisprudent, to state such thera­
peutic aims explicitly, as though the main, or one 
major object of his work, as Wittgenstein might do, 
were to remove puzzlement as an end in itself. Hart 
is not doing the philosophy of law, in fact, to 
let himself, or us for that matter, find a way of 
"stopping" or giving up that exercise; nor can his 
consciousness of the rationale of philosophy be a 
matter that he will expressly state in a book of 
jurisprudence (it is clear from his lecture "De­
finition and Theory in Jurisprudence" that his con­
sciousness of the importance of methodological, or, 
if you like, "meta-jurisprudential"concerns is vastly 
more than in any contemporary, or even precursor,in 
jurisprudence.)
We do have, however, abundant evidence of his 
awareness of the therapeutic role of philosophy, 
not explicit in his books, but implicit in, his con­
stant reference to "philosophic puzzlement" etc. 
references which are not mere empty "window dressing" 
or verbiage, but important indices of what Hart’s 
guiding lights are, i.e. the precepts of ordinary 
language philosophy. Perhaps more importantly, there 
is in Hart's writings, the "double" effect that a 
philosophical approach so inspired will inevitably 
produce - on the one hand creative or substantial 
contributions or insights, and on the other, a removal 
of those fond, simple notions that produce, in their 
inadequacy, our confusion. It is this double-effect 
that can allow, in the criticism of Hart, a rare 
measure or dimension of selectivity of acceptance 
of his insights. In regard to the instant example of
ascriptive language, as I shall argue later, we have 
every reason to accept his excellent critique of old- 
fashioned themes, i.e. the therapeutic part, but 
accept the creative only with reservations. Yet in 
recognising, as with Wittgenstein, so too with Hart, 
that there is a close internal relationship or mutual 
informing of method and substantive insight, whereby 
the one supports the other, we realise that the above 
measure of selectivity must be nicely applied. That 
this duty is one w^ e owe to Hart marks him pre-eminently 
as following faithfully and effectively the guidance or 
inspiration of ordinary language philosophy.
Before advancing to criticism of Hart’s work along 
the lines indicated above, I wish to consider not only 
from a methodological viewpoint, but also out of regard 
to its crucial importance to jurisprudence, and to 
general ordinary language philosophy, the treatment Hart 
offers of the notion of the rule as applied in the 
explication of law and a legal system. It is not my 
purpose to examine the overall adequacy of Hart’s 
structuring or representation of a legal system as, 
among other things, a fabric of rules, or having as 
one fundamentally distinguishing characteristic a 
union of primary and secondary rules; this task would 
require a major thesis on its own part and involve 
other matters (such as the distinction or relationship 
of law to morals etc.) quite removed from my present 
concern•
Rather, I wish to set out Hart’s use and reliance 
upon the notion of a rule to show how the use of that 
notion in his work parallels or is meant to parallel 
the role and use of the concept of a rule, as we have 
shown it, in Wittgenstein’s exposition of language-use.
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It is thus, in this case, not so much that Hart has 
borrowed or followed a method, but rather that he 
has applied, en bloc, a complete and substantive 
theory or insight of ordinary language philosophy*
To illustrate this, we may first rehearse those 
steps on Hart’s part, which lead him or allow him 
to introduce rules into his analysis of the law, 
as follows:-
1) He considers Austin’s notion of "habitual obedience 
to a sovereign", in Chapter IV, as inadequate to account 
for the persistence of laws and the continuity of 
authority, for reasons already here cited.
2) He conducts a linguistic inquiry into the uses of 
the word "h a b i t " , a n d  contrasts it to the notion of 
a social rule, which, as a communal thing rather than 
a personal or individual thing as suggested by the 
command theory, seems to be of more use in "identifying" 
the phenomena of legal obedience and persistence.
He concludes this comparison by noting these differences 
between habit and social rule; the former needs only 
a convergence of behaviour which need not be conscious; 
the latter imports a reflective consciousness, e.g. 
in criticism of non-conformance with the rule, and more 
importantly or generally, has an internal aspect, in 
that the rule is looked to not as a mere precipitate 
of uniform practice, but somehow as setting a standard 
of judgment, optimal behaviour etc., or by which, 
as in a game, comments, acknowledgments, demands, etc. 
may be made.
3) To this now characterised "social rule", Hart adds^^ 
another distinction, made earlier between power-conferring 
and duty-imposing- rules.
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664) Hart concentrates on the other "limb" of the 
habit of obedience, to inquire into the linguistic 
use of the term "obligation", oi', in ordinary language 
terminology, to conduct a depth-grammar analysis*
Austin had assumed that the obligation, i.e. to obey 
the command of the sovereign or the gunman, was to
be presumed at least, if all else failed, from the 
fact that he was obeyed. This analysis does not do 
justice to the reality of what an obligation is in 
that it does not cease to exist when it is not in 
fact responded to. It is in realisation of this aspect 
of an obligation that the predictive theory, which 
sees legal rules etc. as predictions only of what is 
likely to transpire, in effect, was provided; by so 
picturing the operation of legal rules and obligations, 
it pre-arms itself against any factual disproof, such 
as the "obligation" disappearing if not recognised 
and responded to. It makes of obligation, as it does 
of a rule of law, a mere likelihood, or a matter of 
high or regular probability.
5) Hart reverts to the notion of the rule, and
particularly its internal aspect, to scotch this
67proposed solution by observing that the "characteristic 
use" i.e. of a statement citing rules, "is not to pre­
dict" (a certain course of action)", but to say that a 
person's case falls under a rule". It is just this 
direct involvement, or critical and present awareness 
of the persistent force of a rule which enables us, 
as governed by or sharing in it, to display this 
characteristic use.
6 ) Hart illustrates the converse of the internal 
aspect, again by the compare-and-centrast method, by
I f:
68considering the case where an observer merely 
views, but does not take part in the social practices 
of a group. Here the form-of-life (or the language- 
game) of predictions based upon the patterns or 
regularities of the observed conduct. One might in 
this form of life achieve some success at prediction 
even hazard explanations or theories, but one could 
never pretend to criticise or mark as deviant or 
abnormal etc., save in the simply statistical sense. 
Ordinary involvement in legal rules, via the internal
aspect, is much more, and other than, merely statistical
7) Hart completes the introduction of rules by con­
sidering^^ the empirical realities of a legal system 
and how its refined ends, or specific needs, bear 
upon the as yet unqualified notions of the social 
rule and its internal aspect, which he terms, thus 
unqualified, primary rules. Because these primary 
rules are uncertain, or possibly in need of arbitration, 
static and in need of an agency of change more speedy 
in operation that the cumbersome shift of social con­
sensus and, indeed, without an enforcement agency, not 
guaranteed as efficient, Hart looks to a secondary 
set of rules which will specificially remedy each of 
the above defects. He observes that "the union of 
primary and secondary rules is at the centre of a 
legal system," and it is into this two-tiered ex­
planatory scheme that Hart will fit all the elements, 
personalities, and phenomena of the law that hitherto 
have been so grievously misplaced by earlier juris­
prudence .
By way of comment, which need, since Hart's 
technique should be by now familiar, only be brief, 
it is to be noted that, at least to stage (6) above,
Hart is, as ever, and ideally, empirical and linguistic 
in his analysis. He considers the concepts of oblig­
ation and rule not as matters of theory, still less
ones that allow of any a priori assumptions or 
personal introspections, but concepts whose meaning 
consists in or is illumined by an interrogation of 
the contexts and occasions where we say a rule is 
in force or an obligation exists. At stage (7), 
however, in The Concept of baw^^ where Hart outlines 
the elements of law, his attitude changes; he is no 
longer considering the realities of social or legal 
practice, but considering in a non-empirical manner 
what ideally a legal system wants, almost a priori 
and by definition, or what qualities it must possess 
if it wants to be an effective, or indeed a genuine 
fully-constituted legal system. The change is marked; 
from tho reality of the forms-of-life, of chess games, 
social rules of etiquette, gunmen, there is a sudden 
other-woaddliness of "this regime of primary rules"
"a legal system" "the simplest forms of social structure" 
In fact, these latter are idealised abstractions or the 
theoretical desiderata of a system of representation of 
the phenomena of law, not those flesh-and-blood matters 
which, prior to their introduction. Hart had been deal­
ing with.
To say, simply, that Hart has forsaken his erst­
while faithfully followed method is of course to 
imply no criticism; yet it will be seen later, in a 
consideration of criticisms made of Hart by Ralph 
Sartorius,^^ among others, concerning precisely this 
fusion of primary and secondary rules into an instant 
explanatory scheme, that Hart’s sacrifice of his model 
is a matter of more than merely casual significance.
What is more remarkable than either of these 
matters, and more deserving of immediate consideration,
is the extremely close parallel between Hart and 
Wittgenstein in making the concepts of the rule and 
rule-governed behaviour primary (I do not here intend 
Hart’s use of the word) and central to their analyses, 
respectively, of the law and language; both alike 
make considerable explanatory use of the phenomenon 
of "games" as the paradigm case of rule-bound be­
haviour •
To explore or assess the extent of this parallelism, 
it is helpful to consider that Wittgenstein was, to 
a considerable extent, doing something new, or pro­
viding an analysis of language radically different to 
any that had preceded it, when he showed us how language 
could be seen as a network of uses of words; these 
uses were loosely, but undoubtedly and effectively, 
circumscribed by rules. An appreciation of these rules, 
and the uses of language, he argued, was a vital pre­
liminary to any further philosophical analysis of those 
concepts traditionally the subject of philosophical 
analysis. In Hart’s case, however, it can hardly be 
said that an explication of law on the basis of rules, 
or even a view of law as a framework of rules is, 
in itself, anything new. Legal rules, simply, had always 
been there in jurisprudence* whereas rules, that is, 
the rule-practices of language and its use, not the 
trivially important prescriptive rules of grammar or 
prose etc. had not before figured in the philosophy 
of language.
Notwithstanding this difference, more apparent than 
real, there may be identified what of the "new" Hart
This very fact, however, would make it all 
the easier, or quite natural for Hart to 
apply the rule-theory of ordinary-language 
philosophy to the analysis of the law.
does share with Wittgenstein, if we consider not his 
use of rules of law as the innovation, hut his con­
centration upon the internal aspect of the rule, 
for which he male es an otherwise exaggerated claim 
that"most of the obscurities and distortions surround­
ing legal and political concepts arise from the fact 
that these essentially involve reference to what we 
have called the internal point of view."
It will be remembered that, by this internal 
aspect of a rule, Hart intends the fact that a rule 
does not exist apart or in isolation from those that 
it applies to, as some statistical reading, or some 
dry matter which exists only in a legal text-book 
or statute. A rule is a practical matter, a thing 
used by those bound by it, to criticise by, to 
behave by, to appeal to as well as to conform to, to 
demand conformity with, apply social pressure with 
etc. etc. It is this pragmatic, or practical dimension 
of rule-bound behaviour which is the counterpart, almost 
but not quite the exact counterpart, of Wittgenstein’s 
concept,of a rule as a practice, and only to be con­
sidered as existent as behaved, not theorised or 
conceptualised as something apart from behaviour.
It is, to express the parallel in another perhaps 
more graphic way, almost as though Hart sees rules 
as the words of the language of the law; that is, 
if WT© are to say what the law is, in any context, 
either jurisprudential or practical, it will involve 
the use of legal rules and a full understanding of 
what a legal rule signifies. So too in philosophy, 
a treatment of its subject matter must intimately 
involve, or even develop upon, a consideration of 
the use of language and the rules that govern that use.
7b-
Yet it might he thought that there must he some 
limitation to this parallel* Wittgenstein, for example, 
has shown, or at least is taken in this thesis to 
have shown, that a rule of language the regular 
practice which constitutes that rule, that a rule is, 
in fact,a regularity in and of practice, not any 
empty formula (see pages 143S-’of this thesis). Hart, 
on the other hand, while he has recognised the all™ 
important practical dimension of the (legal) rule, 
never goes so far as to say that a legal rule is 
that practice or regularity of behaviour in itself, 
that there, in being enacted o;r exhibiting its 
regularity, it exhausts itself. He puts limits to the 
internal, practical aspect of a rule, saying that its 
practical aspects consist of a critical, reflective 
consciousness on the part of those bound by it. That 
this limitation is necessary on his part is clearly 
because Hart still sees or wishes to see a legal rule 
as fundamentally and traditionally the prescriptive 
production of the legislature, or its delegates, or 
judges, or customary creation. To Hart, a rule is still 
a blend of prescription and practice, i.e. both rule 
and regularity, and I do not think that he imagines 
that practice should alter or shape prescription, 
certainly in any constitutive manner. In regard to the 
rules of language-use, however, there being no pre­
scriptive element, clearly a change in practice is 
a change in the rule.
I think it is important to ask whether Hart's 
choice so to limit the practical dimension of "rule- 
bound" behaviour, even in the law, to a purely critical 
or reflective level of operation, and to exclude from 
it any self-constitutive or self-changing role, is 
a correct, or justifiable one. The question may be
alternately seen as being whether the traditional 
attitude to a rule of law, whioh Hart accepts, as 
fundamentally and immutably the creation of statute 
etc., and thus rigid or impermeable or unchangeable 
by mere practical considerations, is to be defended 
against, or is allowed to stop all consideration of 
what the actual practice of that rule is. It may be 
that in that practical context one might characterise 
it better, or more accurately, even if so characterised, 
it differs from the text of the statute that created it® 
In short, are we to see rules as pre-eminently formal 
matter beyond the effects of practice, save, casually, 
by criticism, or substantive matters? Here we could 
consider a situation in a society, after the fashion 
of Wittgenstein, which had a law that formally pre­
scribed that all adults wear black hats, but their 
practice in the matter of hats, is in fact to wear 
blue on Sundays, red on Mondays etc* Here we would ask 
what is the rule of law-the practice or the prescript? 
Less fanciful and much more familiar examples could 
easily but perhaps less emphatically outline the two 
dimensions of a rule of law e.g. the disparity between 
the practice of observing speed-limits and their en­
forcement, and the letter of the law®.
This double dimension of the rule and Hart's 
treatment of it will be examined in the next section 
of this chapter, in conjunction with an examination 
of other criticisms of those insights or contributions 
of Hart earlier discussed.
In summary, then, of this present part, I think 
it may accurately be said that Hart does exliibit, 
indeed a fundamental characteristic of his approach 
to and treatment of the problems of jurisprudence is,
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the application of the whole gamut of ordinary language 
devices, both in regard to its method of analysis, 
its substantive tnemes, and its therapeutic aims in 
philosophy. It will be my aim to demonstrate that this 
application on his part, if it is not already apparent, 
has been vastly effective, despite what will later 
be said in criticism; indeed, I shall try to show that 
these very criticisms signify his departures from that 
method, as in those two instances noted above, rather 
than defects inherent in or attributable to that method 
of philosophy.
II Criticism of Hart's contributions.
It will be remembered, from the earlier analysis 
given of Hart’s article "The Ascription of Responsibility 
and R i g h t s " t h a t  he was there concerned to portray 
the ascriptive riat'ore of certain judicial utterances, 
or utterances made in contexts very similar to the 
judicial one, and, at the same time, put forward a 
theory of general relevance to the philosophy of action. 
In his own w o r d s , h e  says that "I now wish to defend 
the similar, but perhaps more controversial thesis that 
the concept of human action is an ascriptive and a 
defeasible one."
Whatever else is certain in Hart’s article, it is
now clear that the controversial nature of his thesis
was an accurate prediction on his part, given the
seeming broad, almost sweeping, generality of the thesis
he puts forward. I now wish to consider Feinberg’s
45criticisms of this thesis. He is by no means alone in 
criticising Hart on this matter, but his article, 
written a number of years after, and published in 1965 
presents therefore a seasoned and balanced criticism, 
one free from earlier more indignant reactions and 
responses to Hart's thesis ; indeed, more positively, 
it would not be inaccurate to say that the criticism is
a model of tolerant and unprejudiced comment, neither 
indulgent nor, on the other hand, lacking in firm and 
positive adverse criticism.
Now, I earlier argued in regard to Hart, asto 
the general body of ordinary language philosophers, 
a care in criticism, or in exact terms, a mindfulness 
that their work is a blend of methodological and sub­
stantive insights. Mindful of this obligation, it is 
here intended to present and consider the criticisms 
put forward by Feinberg, and see whether perhaps they 
stand in need of adjustment in the light of a certain 
aspects of Hart's article not fully appreciated on the 
part of the critic.
Feinberg's assessment of Hart's thesis takes the 
form of a stage by stage application of that ascriptive 
manner of interpreting action-statements to each broad 
type of such statement as used in everyday existence.
He commences at "faulty-action" sentences and de­
scriptions, and concedes that in certain notable con­
texts, and those non-legal, there are "defeasible” 
faults which figure or are framed in, an ascriptively
functioning "action-statement"; tnese are, among others, 
the institutional contexts of the school, and the report 
card, the contexts of card-games "cheating", (or indeed, 
any other game where there is a quasi-judicial appeal 
to rules), the context of the performance-record of a 
baseball player etc. Feinberg’s basic attitude or stance
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here is shorn when he submits that "There is something 
qua si"judicial or quasi-official about the defeasible 
ascriptions, even when uttered outside of institutional 
contexts which...distinguish them from the non-defeasible 
ones." He e scampi es the latter class by the statement, 
which he says is purely descriptive, "He broke down and 
cried" or "He stammered". He concludes, then,with reference
to this class of 'Faulty-action’ statements there are 
disclosed, contrary to Hart's generalisation, certain
purely descriptive statements.
47He proceeds next to 'normal-action’ sentences, 
and inquires in what sense such/ ordinary sentences
ascribing
involveAresponsihility to the subject. He discerns 
five categories within this class of statement, the 
first two being ascriptions of simple causality, 
physical or personal, and ascriptions of causal- 
agency, which are distinguished from the first as 
representing a "telescoping" or various '*sub-acts" 
into a seeming unity of action; e#g. "Jones startled 
Smith" really adverts to a concatenation of acts and 
circumstances which we encapsulate or condense in one 
monolithic utterance. Thirdly, there are "simple 
agency statements", disclosing no such telescopic effect, 
such as "he moved his finger" in the course of opening 
a door. The remaining categories of statement are 
imputations of fault, which he has already examined, 
and imputations of liability which not only note a 
fault but propose or suggest further consequences, 
or exposure to consequences, in respect of that fault*
He says then that there is no class among the above 
that could not be ascriptive, insofar as an ascriptive 
sentence ascribes ’responsibility', or indeed, re­
sponsibility is a matter we ascribe, rather than de­
scribe; this type of ascriptivity thenhas the nature 
of an analytical truth. Yet, equally importantly, we 
sometimes give an action-statement in answer to the 
question "What did x do?" not "Who did it?"', when we 
say "X did it"; and this shows us that action-statements 
are not always ascriptive, however much they bear the
same form both when ascriptive and descriptive.
He concludes this seotion^^ by saying that his 
five-fold classification does give Hart some qualified 
support in that all action-statements, insofar as a 
"responsibility" aspect i^may be seen in them, could 
function ascriptively; this "could function", is of 
course, less than Hart's "are". Yet Feinberg qualifies 
this measure of acceptance by saying that Hart's 
rider, that they are also "defeasible in the manner 
of legal charges" needs further qualification.
In the third section, then, Feinberg sets out to 
explain or analyse just what these qualifications are. 
His aim is to identify firstly what distinguishes the 
same sentence as, in one context, descriptive, and, 
in another, ascriptive, and secondly having identified 
that distinction, use it to characterise exactly or 
expand the notion of defeasibility to allow us to 
see just to what extent that characteristic applies, 
to the class of action statements as a whole.
491. He considers as a possible distinction the 
suggestion that descriptive uses concern or report 
matters of fact as against matters of attribution.
Yet the indicative mood, so "matter of factual", 
seems to figure in both uses. Still, the ascriptive 
use he suggests can be contrasted with the "fact- 
reporting" use if we consider statements which re­
present decisions on our part, not discoveries. 
Ascriptive sentences have an irreducibly discretionary 
aspect. A further characteristic he terms their con­
textual relativity, where the user of such a sentence 
must not merely decide but judge relative to the 
situation in which he judges. Factors conditioning that 
judgement may be, variously, the less than total set of
facts available, a particular purpose e.g. an 
insurance claim, or a practical interest where we 
assign a cuase to a phenomenon in hope thereby to 
control it.
2) Having thus characterised what is in essence the
50ascriptive quality in a statement, Feinberg says
that these two qualities (of discretion and contextual
relativity) do entail that ascriptive sentences "exhibit
a vulnerability logically analogous to the defeasibility
of some legal claims."
Returning then to his five-fold categorisation,
51Feinberg says of all the classes of causal attribution 
i.e. all classes save that of "simple agency" that 
"properly rebuttable causal ascriptions commit the 
error, not of misdescribing, but of misrepresenting."
He concludes, however, by saying, and I think we 
may agree with him, that sentences of simple agency 
cannot be anyway seen as ascriptive, as ascriptivity 
has been characterised in his terms. And it is with these 
types of utterance that the philosophy of action is 
archetypally concerned in the question of what different­
iates an action and a mere bodily movement, or, in 
Wittgenstein's terms "What is left over if I subtract
the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise
52my arm? "
To summarise, Feinberg has added the following 
important qualifications to Hart's generalisation.
1) Action-statements are capable of both an ascriptive 
and descriptive use, not always ascriptive.
2) Defeasibility is not, as Hart alleged, the essential 
quality of all action-statments (as ascriptive) but only, 
as analysed into a union of discretionary and contextually
relativising functions, what serves to distinguish 
an ascriptive from a descriptive use of a statement.
3) An important class of action-statements, those 
of simple agency, as not disclosing any discretionary 
or contextually-relativising quality whatsoever, are 
never capable of being used as ascriptions of re­
sponsibility, or defeasible;* insofar as the philo­
sophy of action is concerned with their analysis,
Hart has not after all cleared up the problem or 
the puzzlement, as was his boast.
I do not consider that anyone would like to deny 
the accuracy or the truth of these conclusions on 
Feinberg’s part. Indeed, so far are we from denying 
them that it must rather be. admitted that his analysis 
or exploration of the nature of ascriptive language and 
the concept of defeasibility is an extension and 
considerable refinement of Hart's analysis. It makes 
the latter's original insight genuinely universalisable 
beyond the limits of the judicial context, or a real 
and safe contribution to the philosophy of action, if 
no longer a total solution to one of its major problems.
Something yet remains to be said by way of mitigating 
the bluntness with which Feinberg forces us to recognise 
the errors of Hart's analysis. It is not that Feinberg 
has said Hart was totally wrong; as noted, his criticism 
is in extension of, or in rehabilitation of much that 
Hart has said. Rather he has shown Hart to be, in one
* It is realised that, with an effort of imagination, 
almost any statement of action may be seen as 
ascriptive, even "x moved his finger"* yet in 
every non-trivial philosophical use, or con­
sideration of basic statement of simple agency, 
it is clearly non-ascriptive.
respect, totally wrong, namely, in imagining that he 
had provided a solution by seeing what is fundamentally 
wrong on both the new and old version of the traditional 
analysis of action.
I propose now to trace or attribute Hart’s error 
to a confusion on his part between two theses, a 
weaker and a stronger, that he can be seen to put 
forward in the article in question, and between which 
he alternates and is led, by this confusion, to an 
ultimately wrong conclusion.
When he characterises, by example, the archetype,
56or essence, of the ascriptive utterance, he cites
"I did it", "you did it", "he did it" etc. or "Smith
54did it" "Smith hit her" etc. and observes that the 
ascriptive use is mainly in the past tense, or aorist 
"timeless" tense, which aoristic sense distinguishes 
them from merely descriptive uses. At this stage, he 
recognises that these verbs have a descriptive use 
which in fact is so important as to obscui’e the non- 
descriptive use, which sentences containing these 
verbs in the past tense have in common with...judicial 
decisions by which legal consequences are attached to 
facts." I shall call this the weaker thesis, that 
verbs of action have both descriptive and ascriptive 
uses, and that their ascriptive use is comparable to 
the use, in tho judicial context, of sentences 
involving legal concepts i.e. both are to be treated 
as "defeasible utterances".
On the other hand, in those very same pages.
Hart says that "our concept of action Is fundamentally 
not descriptive but ascriptive in character? and a 
defeasible one." This is the stronger thesis, where, 
by contrast with the weaker, the ascriptive use is the
fundamental one, and no qualification of tense is 
stipulated for action verbs. They are in any tense 
ascriptive.
I consider, then, that the weaker thesis is eminently 
acceptable, indeed, represents that part of Hart’s 
thesis that Feinberg accepts. In Feinberg’s terms, 
past tense statements like "Smith hit her" are typical 
ascriptions of causal agency, being "telescopic" 
formulations of various "sub-acts" and further Hart’s 
sense of the "timeless", "aorist" quality implicit in 
the typical past-tense framing of the ascriptive 
utterance is surely just that "non-matter-of-factuality" 
that led Feinberg to the correct characterisation of the 
ascriptive use.
That Hart should confuse this thesis with the stronger, 
and use the same data or grounds to prove both, is both 
an easy and understandable confusion, revealing not so 
much an over-exuberant application of a valuable insight 
as perhaps a basic confusion over exactly what is the 
central problem of the philosophy of action* It is as 
though Hart, to some extent, sees that philosophy as in 
puzzlement over how to construe actions always presented 
for analysis in the past tense, "hitting", "moving" etc. 
always being linguistically framed as "he hit her", or 
"he moved the table". Indeed, if that were how Hart 
without saying as much pictured the puzzlement of the 
philosophy of action, his claim to have solved it may 
well have, thus qualified, not been exuberant. In this 
context, it is perhaps instructive to consider that 
Hart, in a later work, the essay "Acts of Will and 
Responsibility" again contributes to the philosophy 
of action with an examination of the concepts 
"voluntary" and "involuntary". He is there explicitly
concerned with the crucial distinction between a 
physical movement and an act, and offers an account 
or a distinction based upon external criteria of 
when we would say or recognise an action as one or 
the other, which nowhere includes or suggests a re­
cent ing on his part of what he earlier said in his 
article "Ascription of Responsibility and Rights#"
However this may be, whether Hart misconstrues or 
mischaracterises the aims of the philosophy of action, 
between the weaker and the stronger theses as set forth 
above there is still a large, and unpardonable leap 
on the part of the philosopher, one that is additionally 
to be reprimanded in that it illustrates, on his part, 
the very "un-linguistic analytical" practice of a 
limited "diet of examples" leading to an irresponsible 
generalisation. For what he has done in going from weaker 
to stronger, is to assume that what is the case in regard 
to past tense utterances is the case in all action- 
statements. Of the additional contention that the 
ascriptive use is fundamental, it can only be said that 
it is an a priorist pontification nowhere supported 
by example or by reasoning on his part.
In conclusion it may be added that on his later 
enquiry into the nature of an action in Punishment and 
Responsibility, whether consciously in correction of 
his earlier views or not, Hart offers a much more 
careful and lengthy analysis of an act and how it may 
be differentiated, for the purposes of ascribing 
responsibility, from a mere physical movement. He 
there approaches the problems not via a performative 
use of language, i.e. ascription, but from a con­
sideration of the language-games in more orthodox 
use of ordinary language methods, of the words "voluntary"
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and "involuntary". He rejects "inner act" theories, 
making them stand in need of the external criteria 
of "appropriateness" to one's project, for voluntary 
actions, and "ability to control" for involuntary acts 
etc- Such an analysis not only avoids the substantive 
errors we have noted, with Feinberg’s assistance, 
inherent in his earlier article, but shows, I think, 
an instance of Hart’s occasional lapses from his 
methodological model, and the severe cost of such a 
lapse. I now wish to consider another contribution 
to jurisprudence earlier considered primarily from 
a methodological point of view, and now to be 
criticised in substance, that of Hart's use of rules 
in the explication of a legal system.
Hart's use of the concept of the rule*
I have earlier made it clear how important, indeed, 
central to Hart’s explanation of a legal system is the 
notion of a rule; his reliance upon that notion is two­
fold. Firstly, he sees the crucial difference between 
a "pre-legal" society, and a modern legal system as 
marked by the presence in the latter of secondary 
rules of recognition, change and adjudication. Secondly, 
the analysis of a rule of law and its internal aspect 
as perceived or sensed by those subject to it is 
vital both to seeing what is wrong, or missing, in 
earlier attempts to explain the operation or effective­
ness of law, and to our understanding of what we are 
doing when we observe the law and thereby render it 
effective. I propose now to examine each of these two 
matters in turn.
1) Hart proposed as the basic cause or need for the 
existence or addition of secondary rules to primary
ones the fact that, without them, the primary regime 
would he static, inefficient and uncertain. Secondary 
rules were, in essence,remedial. At p.92 of The 
Concept of haw Hart characterises the distinction 
and relationship between them as follows; "...primary 
rules are concerned with the actions that individuals 
must or must not do ... secondary rules are all concerned 
with the primary rules themselves". At p.79, however, 
he characterises them in another way, as follows:
"rules of the first type impose duties; rules of tho 
second confer powers, public or private". Indeed, he 
had earlier made this distinction between power- 
conferring and duty-imposing rules when earlier con­
sidering the variety of types of law and legal rule.
Now, as Sartorius points out clearly in his
56article "Hart’s Concept of Law" Hart is really making 
two different distinctions, which are so misleading 
as to allow, in many instances, an allocation of the 
same rule of law to either class of primary or secondary 
rules, according as which criterion is used. According 
to the first criterion laws governing marriage or 
wills etc. are primary, whereas, if the second is 
followed, they are secondary.
If we ask what is the unique and unequivocal 
distinction between the two types of rule, a number 
of possible answers could be seen as offered by 
Hart; possible answers are that secondary rules ara 
"constitutional" or that they are "public", or that 
they are "power conferring" or, as Sartorius suggests, 
if anything, Hart's real preference behind the ob­
scurity of ambivalent expression is that the only 
real secondary rule is the rule of recognition. The 
inevitable conclusion is that there is no one clear 
distinction between two types of legal rule, at least
to be drawn from Hart's account. This is not to deny 
that all the above distinctions are valid and important, 
only that they will not fit into that neat bifurcation 
of primary and secondary that Hart proposes.
It might further be said that this lack of any
clear distinction does not directly bear upon the
internal aspect of a rule, which is not in virtue of
its relationship to any other rule but simply that of
57its nature as a rule. Hart does state, however, 
that, as minimum conditions necessary and sufficient 
for existence of a legal system, those rules deemed 
valid by the system's ultimate criteria of validity 
i.e. the rule of recognition, must generally be obeyed 
and its rules of change and adjudication must be accepted 
as common public standards by its officials. This seems 
to show that Hart does not consider it necessary , or 
indispensable that the internal aspect of a rule be 
sensed by the citizens, but must be sensed by the 
officials though only in regard to the "secondary" 
rules of change and adjudication. As for whose is the 
sense of the internal aspect of the rules of recognition 
which yield the validity here mentioned, Hart does not 
seem here concerned to answer, or even aware that the 
question might be put. That he takes it as an unquestioned 
donne doubtless supports Sartorius's suspicion that 
ultimately the secondary rule is the rule of recognition.
Now it is not my purpose here to examine the overall 
adequacy of Hart's explanation of a legal system as some
union or other of primary and secondary rules; when
58Sartorius is prepared to concede that, despite the 
lack of clarity above noted, "the distinction between 
primary and secondary rules....is an important distinction, 
with considerable explanatory power...to traditional
problems of legal philosophy", he leaves intact, or 
accepts Hart’s formal, if not substantive, point that 
a legal system of rules is a "two-horse" affair, as 
though rules were either primary, or secondary, or 
had spells at being one or the other, or sometimes 
were both. It is submitted that Hart’s error is not
only creating "hybrid" distinctions, as Sartorius
59characterises him ..."between the constitutional 
rules...on the one hand, and those rules which impose 
duties etc...on the other hand," but one of imposing 
an unjustifiable limit on the variety or number of 
rules he might distinguish within a legal system/.
Indeed a recognition of just this unwarranted assumption 
of a binary system of rules might have spared Sartorius, 
had he made it, the "will-o'-the-wisp" pursuit after 
the elusive distinction between the two, which is 
surely only to be seen among many.
Hart has, in fact, failed to canvass the full 
variety of legal rules; they may be duty-imposing, 
power-conferring, institutional, analytical, general 
or restricted in application, temporary, permanent, 
constitutional,adjudicative, dynamic, static etc. 
and may refer to or regulate other rules, which last 
type of rule may, in its turn, be the subject of yet 
another rule of interpretation. This failure of Harty 
otherwise more than eager and adept at an empirical 
examination of the variety of the instance of the 
phenomenon he is examining (which examination usually 
puts out of tho question any uniform, or, for that 
matter, binary, explanation) is to be explained by 
his eagerness to explain the essence or essential 
characteristic of a legal system. He wishes to mark 
a particular stage of development at which an informal
"pre-legal‘’ society becomes a legal system, or a 
particular quality or essential characteristic which 
a legal system must have to be a legal system.
I noted earlier that this change, from empirical 
to speculative, in Hart's thesis, was marked by the 
introduction of the "other-wordly" terms such as 
"pre-legal", "simple regime of primary rules", which 
change made obvious Hart's departure from the model 
of ordinary language methodology. He should rather 
have considered what, rightly, had been said on rules 
in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, to the 
effect that our use of them, to be effective, need not 
require any exactness, that rules may be about rules, 
that they take various forms as applied to games, to 
language, or indeed, embodied in sign-posts or charts 
etc. etc.;of this variety of rules Hart is certainly 
aware; indeed the very diversity of the distinction 
he makes, perhaps more intuitively than consciously, 
between primary and secondary rules, can only be the 
product of this awareness. We may agree with Sartorius 
that all these distinctions are illuminating but their 
value owes nothing to being supposedly in hope to 
characterise "primary" and. "secondary" rules, but 
simply and solely in making clear to us the need 
to see the many possible types of rules of law.
So far as Hart's "pre-legal" society is concerned, 
and his attempt to use that "myth" to detect or identify 
what a modern legal system, must have as an essential 
characteristic, I can see it, methodological con­
siderations apart, as no better or more useful than 
many other and older "myths" of the metaphysical sort. 
Indeed, like other such myths, it threatens to obscure
the reality, in this case, of the nature of legal
rules as a practice, to which matter, which I have already
given some consideration, I shall now return.
I have already, in this chapter, and elsewhere 
in this thesis, made it clear that a rule is a practice, 
the summary or formulaic statement of a regularity in 
human behaviour. I have also tried to show that the 
internal aspect of the rule which is a major contribution 
to the elucidation of the concept by Hart is, though of 
great importance, still not expansive enough as defined 
or elucidated by Hart, to comprehend the constitutive 
nature of rule-governed behaviour of the rule that 
summarises it. I earlier distinguished this relationship 
as that between the form and the practice of the rule.
I wish now to interrogate Hart's concept of rules 
as primary and secondary the fusion of which is a major 
essential characteristic of a legal system, and having 
an internal aspect in the light of the above analytical 
criteria; this interrogation will show just how his 
"myth" of the pre-legal society is misleading and per­
haps further indicate a more accurate analysis of a 
legal rule as a practice.
When Hart talks, then, of pre-legal and modem 
societies, he suggest that law, or a legal system is 
(to use the not inappropriate bidogical term) an 
"emergent" phenomenon, which term is used in that science 
to signify "the appearance of a qualitatively different 
phenomenon at a specific stage of complexity of organis­
ation" (This succinct expression is that of Chomsky in 
Language and Mind)^^ In the case of Hart's exposition 
of a legal system, the " ^ qualitatively different phenomenon!* 
is the set of secondary rules, and, to a certain extent, 
insofar as Hart sometimes seems to imagine that the in­
ternal aspect is indispensable or a necessary aspect only
in respect of the secondary rules of change and ad­
judication observed hy the officials of the system, 
the internal aspect itself.
It is submitted, then, that this belief or view 
of the development of rules is not compatible with 
the logic or logical nature of rule-governed behaviour 
as here presented as its genuine nature. As Wittgenstein 
has said, and as his view has been expanded and analysed 
elsewhere in this thesis, rule bound behaviour is, 
like language, a fundamental part of our humanity.
It is impossible to imagine not only, as Wittgenstein 
says at para. 199 of the Philosophical Investigations, 
a situation where only one man follows a rule, or does 
that only once in his life, but, equally, a situation 
where someone suddenly invents at a particular stage 
a new "secondary" type of rule, or, just as importantly 
a new "internal aspect" or sense in a rule.
As Wittgenstein says^^ "there exists a regular 
use of sign-posts)" i.e. rule-governed practices,
"a custom", which I have taicen, I think accurately, 
to mean that human beings have rules as they have language 
in such a way that it is not possible to imagine them 
without rules or language, and still be talking or 
thinking of human beings. Rule-governed behaviour is, 
in fine, a non-emergent phenomenon. Contrary to that 
"mythical" picture of a process of development, humanity 
has all at once the full power of using and following 
rules, or behaving in a complex variety of regular, 
patterned ways we identify as rules or customs. Given 
that this human trait, or characteristic is full in 
the sense of non-emergent, there can be no temporal 
distinction between primary and secondary rules, or
indeed any logical distinction traceable or explainable 
by reference to that temporal distinction* The dis­
tinctions that do exist among rules are various and 
logical, such as are discernible in that catalogue 
of types or varieties of rule provided above, but in 
no sense is any one type finer, or superior, or more 
developed than any other.
By the same token, if all rules are equally basic,, 
or primary in the sense only of being fundamental to, 
or inhering in, human behaviour, if rule-bound behaviour 
is a sine qua non of humanity, so too the internal aspect, 
if it exists as a part of the universal logic of rules 
must belong to, or be shared by all rules, not only 
those supposedly "second-order" rules of Hart.
In this respect, then, none could accept Hart's 
contention, as he has argued it, that a legal system 
is a fusion of primary and secondary rules, though it 
is incontestable that it is, as he importantly stresses, 
a matter of rules, and that our understanding of a legal 
system is to be furthered most of all by a consideration 
of what is, or constitutes rule-bound behaviour;mis­
understandings of these truths, especially in regard 
to the internal aspect of rules, have, he not in­
accurately or exaggeratedly states^^ been the source of 
"most of the obscurities and distortions concerning 
legal and political concepts."
It is in view, then, of this crucial importance 
of the rule and its internal aspect that I venture 
now to suggest that Hart has not done full justice to 
that aspect, or the nature of the rule, not only in 
seeming to see it as necessary only in the rules of 
change or recognition, but in restricting the meaning 
or content of the internal aspect of the rule to 
purely reflectivi& aspects of rule^bound behaviour, 
such as criticising, demanding conformity etc. This
he does, as said earlier, heoause he takes the traditional 
attitude to rules of law, as basically prescriptions 
given out fully-formed by the legislator or judge etc.
His criterion of a rule is, shortly, a formal one.
I now wish to suggest that a more accurate or fuller 
appreciation of a rule, whether or law or not, ought 
rather to be seen as a formal expression, and a behaved 
practice; indeed this suggested attitude is the in­
evitable consequence of what I have already said, that 
a rule is fundamentally a practice as much as a formula 
or summary of that practice, football, for example, 
is both a matter of its rules and the many games that 
have in fact been, or will in the future, he played.
To consider a less mundane example, that of morality, 
it has long been recognised that a moral rule cannot, 
in any Kantian or other sense, have only a formal 
validity - it must be validated in practice. Indeed, 
it is by observation of the practice of moral agents 
that we recognise a moral rule in force, and not merely 
an empty form. As an empty form, it is not only not 
moral, but not a rule either.
It is clear that law is neither football nor a 
matter of morals, and certain special characteristics 
of a legal system must be considered, so that we 
qualify, to some extent, any simple equation of the 
law, morals and football, etc. as like matters of 
formal rule and practice. It is submitted, however, 
that, even in consideration of these specific differ­
ences, there is no reason in any of them why the 
logical point that all rules are somehow matters of 
form and practice should not be made with reference 
to a legal system.
It is recognised that legal rules may be created
instantly, as it were, ex niliilo, to prescribe a 
conduct that, at the time of the formation of the 
rule, may not exist; an example would be a new tax 
or a new divorce regime. , or indeed a whole new code*
It is recognised too, that rules of law are prescriptive, 
unlike many social rules which really are descriptive 
of an observed regularity, which regularity does not 
seem directly the product or the creation of its mere 
formulaic expression* Thirdly, it may be said that it 
is possible for a legal lule to go directly contrary 
to what is actually the current regular practice in 
that matter or activity the rule prescribes for e.g* 
all cars may, as at present in Great Britain, drive on 
the left-hand side of the road, or we all here use 
pounds, shillings and pence, and suddenly a rule of 
law would prescribe that we drive on the right, or use 
decimal currency etc.
It is submitted, however, that these differences 
are more apparent than real* The rules of football 
may be instantly or radically changed and there is 
only a temporary lapse between form and practice*
This temporary discrepancy will eventually be repaired, 
either by the prescriptions being effectively in­
corporated into the area of behaviour it prescribes 
for, or the original practices proving so incorrigible 
as to render the rule a mere form, and bringing about 
its repeal* Indeed there is a tertium quid, where rule 
and practice might never fuse, but I do not see this 
either as surprising, for it a real phenomenon, 
or likely to make us abandon the view here put for­
ward that a rule is a matter of form and practice*.
For it is indubitable that when this third situation 
does come about, a judge or anyone in applying it 
clearly modifies his application of the rule by
reference to the practical dimension of that rule, 
whether practice reflects its observation or no#
In the case, too, of an "informal" social rule, 
it might seem that there is merely a contingent,
i.e. non-internal, relationship between the form of 
the rule and the behaviour. That this is apparent 
only may be shown by a consideration of how we go 
about learning or copying or conforming to a simple, 
non-legal, social rule. It is enough merely to consider 
how table manners are learned to see how, even in con­
texts not usually seen as "prescriptive", or governed 
by any enforceable norms of law, the form, or ex­
pression of the rule, as "always hold the knife in the 
right hand" or "don't smoke during a meal" etc. is a 
vital part, or plays a vital role in sustaining and 
disseminating the practices they describe. The ex­
pression even of such rules, then, is not merely de­
scriptive, but in an unmistakeable, though relatively 
weak, sense, prescriptive.
To show these similarities is not, of course, 
to argue, nor is it necessary to argue, that there is 
any complete underlying identity between rules of law 
and their operation, and any and all other rules. I 
am content only to argue that rules of law, rules of 
football, rules of morals or etiquette etc. constitute 
a "family" of rule-governed activities in the Wittgeneteinian 
sense. There are many similarities, enough to classify them 
into that one family but enough significant individual 
differences to be revealed by, and at the same time, 
demanding, a careful analysis surely to be undertaken by 
the philosophy of law, applying the methods of ordinary 
language philosophy.
It is submitted, however, that the major family
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resemblance is that rules and, rule-governed behaviour 
are a matter of form and practice; both form and 
practice may be as various as the different human 
activities and needs, i.e. the forms-of-life, make 
them and in fact show the varieties in the relation­
ship, or interplay itself, of form and practice.
It is submitted, too, that the internal aspect so 
importantly noted by Hart is in fact a partial 
glimpse on his part of this relationship as sensed,, 
both consciously and critically, and non-reflectively, 
in his benaviour, by the observer and follower of the 
rule in the very act of observance.
Is is submitted, lastly, that had Hart remained 
faithful to his methodological model rather than 
introduce, in an a priori manner, his notions of primary 
and secondary rules, as speculations on what a legal system 
as a system of rules must have, and how it must have developed 
^"^^e-legal society, he would have arrived at a more 
accurate sense of how, as above, we should analyse 
law Eind a legal system as a system of rules.
It would not be safe to leave the matter of legal 
rule as a mutually complementary fusion of form and 
practice without pausing to consider some notable and 
perhaps to be expected objections; these are likely 
upon any emphasis however qualified upon the practical 
or behavioural dimensions of the observance of a legal 
rule. It scarcely need be said that there are many who 
see law as au fond a prescriptive science; its mechanics 
are as formal and prescriptive as its reality^so importantly 
normative as to be factual or behavioural only in a trivial 
sense. To such a view any suggestion that a rule is a 
practice must be ex facie offensive.
Ï0 appease such objections, and to confirm what has
" j y
above been argued in a positive manner, it will prove 
useful to state clearly what is not meant by the sub­
mission that legal rules are a blend of form and 
practice. In short, I have outlined a dynamic relation­
ship between the form, that is, the verbal expression 
or reference of a practice, and the shape or per­
formance of that practice. I have given various examples 
of this fusion without any attempt to quantify what 
weight of ultimate efficacy attachs to practice or 
prescript; one may as well, in another dynamic re­
lationship, inquire whether an electric current owes 
more to the conductor or conducted. Notwithstanding 
this general characteristic of a functionally and 
conceptually complementary relationship, it is not 
impossible for especial reasons to concentrate upon 
one or other part to make precise and unequivocable the 
articulation of the relationship* Lest then future 
criticism of this account of legal rules be too super­
ficial in condemning it as behaviourist or socio­
logical, a serialisation of what is not implied by it 
will provide just this individual attention to the 
component parts of the rule.
1. By practice is not meant that to identify a legal
rule one looks merely to what people do, and having
compiled statistically so many like instances and
exceptions so enunciate the legal rule. As Hart has 
61pointed out, the legal rule has an internal aspect 
in virtue of which the citizen sees the rule, practioe 
or form, as a standard of cntiCism, correction, emulation 
etc. In short, one needs no statistician to tell us the 
law; nor, if he told us, would his intelligence promote 
or account for this reflexive consciousness of the legal
rule. This important observation is not ignored or 
its significance lost by any submission on my part that 
a legal rule is something more than what Hart allows it.
2. To say that a legal rule is form and practice does 
not imply that the observance of the rule is unthinking; 
that, in effect, what people do, regardless of what 
was in their minds at the time of action and decision, 
shows the rule. There is an obvious intellectual or 
critical dimension in conformity to a legal rule; 
simply, one may always choose whether to obey or not, 
in whole or in part etc.
Yet this intellectual' dimension must be qualified# 
One may debate, soul-search etc. whether to follow a 
legal rule; equally, one may, if a keen enough player, 
agonise over whether and how to play a game of football, 
as a sportsman or not etc. What doubt or intellection 
is not logically possible is that doubt which is based 
upon a spurious separation of the observed practical 
instances of a rule and the idealisation or perfect 
form after which all real instantiations are mere 
shadows, perhaps distorted, unreal and only approx­
imations of the real. Stressing the dynamic relation 
of form and practice is calculated directly to scotch 
this fiction; in the science of law and legal theory 
it is as pernicious an essentialisation as it is in : 
the philosophy of language. Nor is this to deny the 
role of interpretation in the law; interpretation is 
intrinsic to the office of judges, advisers, commentators 
etc. Indeed anyone at all may hazard, with more or less 
consequence or credioility, his ovm interpretation 
of any legal rule. What a legal rule may be so inter­
preted and differing constructions imposed on the 
same verbal format is not more surprising than that 
various differing colours may be called "red". Squally, 
that one may not term every piece of legal behaviour an
interpretation at that much remove from the idealised 
rule or prescript is as important as the realisation, 
per Wittgenstein etc.^^ of the fallacy of seeing among 
or above the actual varying reds the quintessential 
ideal hue,
3. To stress practice in the analysis of law as a 
system of rules is not to reduce legal behaviour or 
conformity to precepts of the law to a mere matter 
of habit, either in the sense considered in (1) above, 
where statistician becomes law-giver, or in any sense 
which seeks to obliterate the prescriptive dimension 
of legal behaviour.
Many laws are explicitly imperative. Legal rules, 
for example, which embody complex tax provisions, 
adding the labour of calculations to the injury of 
material confiscation, are scarcely likely to be habit-
forming. It is a logical matter too that a newly pro­
mulgated law sits upon no pre-formed habit • Other 
legal rules, on occasions that can be imagined, may 
be exceedingly aggravating and require an effort of 
conformity which belies any suggestion of their being 
merely the habit of the observer; of any 100 red lights 
a driver passes, one may say simply that some 70 times
he stopped duly, some 20 times with great reluctance,
some 10 times not at all.
Here then is no real case of habitual behaviour, 
but of obedience to a prescription, What induces 
response to the prescription may be variously the 
fear of sanction, a well-disciplined sense of con­
formity, mere chance, a desire to give good example 
etc, not any general inner experience of validity or 
otherwise. It is sufficient here to acknowledge, 
indeed, stress the important prescriptive dimension
in the legal rule, not to consider what the teleology 
or aetiology of that conformity it induces might be* 
Having thus restored the reality of the prescriptive 
element in law, it is not diminished but rather its 
analysis is improved by showing its complementary 
relationship to practice, and this in the following 
manner.
The distinction between the form and the practice 
of the rule should be by now familiar, the form being 
the verbalisation or reference of the rule, the practice 
being what is done and then so described. As it is 
necessary, to know what any word means, to look to its 
uses in its "forms of life" or characteristic contexts, 
so too it must be understood that a (prescriptive) 
rule can only be understood by reference to its actual­
isation in the practice of those conforming, or indeed 
flouting it. This necessary attention to the empirical 
dimension of legal behaviour is not in the nature of a 
sociological exercise; as though when the legislators 
leave the benighted chambers of their parliament to 
see thoir laws flouted or observed, such evidence is a 
mere contingent matter upon the reality as law of their 
enactments; or as though the observance of a rule were 
an epiphenomonon, fortunate or otherwise upon the 
formal integrity of the rule which is not to be im­
paired, conditioned or any way ratified by that observ­
ance etc.
These imaginings cannot be acceptable in so totally 
denying the internal relationship of form and practice. 
Rather the practical extension of a legal rule’s formal 
and prescriptive terms concretise or deliver, if you 
like, into reality the otherwise empty form. Once this 
realisation or actualisation is effected, it is important
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to note that the practice so developed must thereafter 
inform the meaning, of interpretation of and conformity 
to the form of that rule. To example, one may consider 
those various statutes which introduce a new "key" 
term, thus making an almost overt appeal to the courts 
to set about, in the course of the earliest actions 
brought under the terms of that new act, to give 
substance to the emptiness of the new terms in the 
circumstantial and practical data of the cases before 
them. Less immediately, this cross-fertilisation may 
be seen in the not infrequent occasions where a pre­
cedent of some antiquity is cited in support of a 
point of law to be made with reference to some con­
temporary legal relationship. Somewhat outlandishly, 
the duty of alimentary provision owed by a wife to 
her husband imprisoned for civil debt in 1700 might 
be now adduced to support a more modern claim de­
pendent upon perhaps less worthy incarceration, and 
complicated by the appearance of all sorts of welfare 
provisions etc. It can scarcely be alleged that, 
if such a prescription were reapplied, it was in de­
ference to the endurance of Restoration social norms; 
should it not rather be said that the practices and 
contexts of modern society remould the casual form 
of the earlier prescription conformably to modem 
needs and adjudications?
Further exemplification would be tedious; the 
point made here, that a rule is form and practice, 
is, if true at all, in the nature of an analytical 
truth inherent in the grammar and logic of rules and 
not, as such, to be vindicated by empirical example.
If examples, however, may not be looked to for con­
clusive proof, it is hoped that at least they serve to
indicates how the view here argued does not fail to 
do justice to the necessary prescriptive element of 
legal rules.
4. Lastly, and in peril of some repetition, the above
view does not imply that the legal rule, its practice
informing and informed by its prescriptive form, is 
thus reduced to the status of some moral rule which 
the courts of law do no more than occasionally canonise, 
or the statutes of the legislature merely sponsor.
What has here been said might mistakenly though perhaps 
pardonably be interpreted as follows:
- the court creates a rule of law.
- society, in realising it, in adopting it into their 
behaviour and in appreciation of its normative 
character using it as a standard of criticism
etc. (i.e. the internal aspect) alter it in­
dependently of the courts' control.
- the courts thereafter must interpret that legal 
rule in deference to that now manifest social 
practice. They are thus impotent, if anyway
so minded, to restore or re-impose the pristine 
expression of the rule in face of obvious social 
rejection•
- the court must therefore merely canonise, not 
alter or dictate to popular mores.
That this is not so or here contemplated may be made 
clear by the following considerations.
Generally, it should be said that there is, perhaps 
since Austin^^ and positive morality, a rather facile 
tendency on the part of legal scholars to use "morals", 
"morality" etc. as a kind of waste-paper basket for 
what blue-prints for a legal system they find at odds.
with the standard view of law as, classically, courts, 
legislatures, sanctions etc. Any additions to these 
essential elements are accordingly/ viewed as ill leit 
importations.-ofv cohSiderations -of.
' ebhic2S‘ and are,, thus re le g a te d -te -m o  rat.-ipM os op 
This practice is all the more reprehensible in that 
it is done without any regard to what moral philo­
sophers consider to be the elemental matters of their 
philosophy, the role of moral argument, the nature of 
moral terminology etc. Not only are these concerns 
little likely to be aided by the gratuitous addition 
of rejects from jurisprudence but they are, as com­
posing the general part of current ethical theory, 
so advanced in analysis as to convince anyone familiar 
with them that there is a clear divide between moral 
and legal behaviour. Whatever that latter is, it is 
not a matter of personal codes of conduct; no more 
does legal argument or analysis or debate depend upon 
those matters seen to underlie moral argument and 
analysis•
Less academically and with aneye to the realities 
of legal rules in a legal system, the role of the 
courts and legislature in the formation and the 
enforcement of a prescript has no counterpart within 
moral behaviour; .neither these nor the composite 
behaviour or practice of society in the realisation of 
a legal rule are moral agents in any intelligible 
sense. It is surely by now clear that, whatever else 
morality is, it is a thoroughly personal and humanistic 
matter; the importation into its subject matter of 
states, systems, courts etc. however anthropomorphically 
garbed leads to inevitable logical impasse and paradox*
Quite bluntly, courts, parliaments, statutes etc.
are the characteristic specific materials and axes of 
a legal system and legal behaviour* To say that the 
operation of these is complemented, affected, or 
shaped by the practice of their prescripts in society 
is to point out a fact necessary to the full under­
standing of a legal rule as a dynamic and continuing 
relationship of form and practice. These so conspire 
to yield the efficacy of the legal order, and if this 
interaction is appreciated, cannot but give a more 
balanced and realistic account of the phenomena of 
that legal order. This does not imply either that 
law is a mere morality, nor, in showing the mutual 
adjustment of practice and prescript, does it seek 
to exaggerate the import of social behaviour as the 
concretising agent of legal rules or diminish the 
role of the institutions of the law as their pre- 
Bcriber in either case beyond what in fact is the 
case,
3) I wish to conclude this chapter by a brief con­
sideration, not by any means a summary, of the import 
of the various arguments etc. here set forth, and this, 
by way of indicating some further areas of inquiry 
into the nature of law to be undertaken by the philo­
sophy of law as here considered ideally utilising the 
methods of ordinary language philosophy*
7/hat in fact has been shown is how a method or a 
set of substantive doctrines, developed and more familiarly 
seen in general philosophy, can usefully be applied to 
the problems of legal theory* Now given that the acknow­
ledged aim or concern of philosophy, sans phrase, is to 
examine or show how we may understand reality,*
* this characterisation of philosophical endeavour 
is necessary loose, and to be taken only as s 
short reference to my lengthier attempts to 
treat of the matter.
if, too, it provides, when it is applied to the 
service of jurisprudence, a measure of real insight, 
or a greater measure of understanding of its concepts 
than we had before such application, it is now to be 
asked how we may set that knowledge of the realities 
of the law against what statements or dicta emerge 
from the courts, or are set forth, indeed, in 
statutes or codes or constitutions etc* about the 
law. For it is no revelatory statement on my part 
that there has often been, and will often be, a 
discrepancy, not to say "head-on" conflict, between 
the two accounts provided of what is the law or what 
a particular legal phenomenon is.
There is, of course, the additional complication 
in the phenomenon of law and its analysis, that, when 
judges etc. pronounce up)on its meaning or role, a 
part of the very subject matter of the law, which 
our philosophy concerns, is itself affecting to pro­
nounce its meaning. It is as though that usual goal 
of philosophical pursuit the "quarry" of its "hunt", 
has been pre-empted by "judge and coy."
It is submitted that this seeming impasse must 
be resolved, or more accurately, it is necessary to 
indicate at least on which side the resolution of 
necessity must be, if jurisprudence, as a genuine 
beneficiary or part of philosophy, is to be of maxi­
mum use. It is considered, then, that- judges' dicta, 
statutory expressions etc. cannot be taken as ex­
positions of the meaning of the law, but, primarily 
and basically, only as part of its content. It may 
be that dicta of the courts or carefully framed codes 
do, as a matter of fact, accurately reflect truths
acknowledged by philosophy, but neither is this 
frequent nor is it necessary to their being what 
they arc i.e. the content of the law which its 
philosophy then will examine and, if we are fortunate 
go some way to elucidate* We may consider the following 
examples of the conflict and need for resolution, 
generally outlined above. Both philosophy and judges 
and statutes otc, concern themselves with the concepts 
of "intention", "rule", "obligation" etc. and different 
versions or understandings of those concepts are given.
Here we might very briefly consider what J.L. Austin.
65in his article "A Plea for Excuses" says of the 
utterances of the judge and counsel in R . v Finney 
1974 12 Cox 625: "The learned judge's conclusion 
is a paradigm of these faults" (sc. misuses, or mis­
understandings of the usage, of the words "voluntary”,
"inadvertent", "intentional" etd.) 
an
InAarticle by P.J. Fitzgerald on "Voluntary and 
67Involuntary Acts" he concludes his examination of the 
same concepts as used in the same judicial context, 
by advising us^ "...that the correct definition 
of the word 'act' is to be found by looking at the 
use made of the word by lawyers". It is submitted that 
this is just what we cannot do, if that use is a 
"paradigm of faults" Eind revealed as such by philo­
sophical considerations, which are here, as in any 
other matter of analysis, our final touchstone, or 
where we must ultimately resort to for ultimate clari­
fication .
V/e can, of course, understand those practical con­
siderations that lead Fitzgerald to his conclusion.
He is writing for lawyers, he _is a lawyer, and, as a 
counsel of prudence, if not a proposition of truth,
his conclusion is justifiable-* I have here tried to 
argue, and here again will state that it should be, 
indeed, is the business of jurisprudence to supply 
propositions of truth, not counsels of prudence, and 
invigorated by the analytic strength of the methods 
of ordinary language philosophy, it is surely able 
now to challenge or question the rather supine 
attitude it has shovm or acceptance it has too readily 
given, as in the case of Fitzgerald's article, to the 
statements of the courts* Should we not rather demand, 
as philosophers of the law, or provide, a language- 
game analysis of these concepts and their use, 
considering judicial uses, of intention etc. whether 
in cases of strict liability or not, only as one or 
some among many as Austin does? Should we not criticise 
the courts, not for failing overtly to do this but for 
misusing the concepts which should be clear, did they 
but look to the philosophy of their science, or were 
its findings more confidently asserted? And, should 
v/e do both of these things, would we not then be 
fashioning a fuller and more authentic jurisprudence 
as the philosophy of law?
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gHAPTER 3
ORDINARY LANGUAGE - REVIEW & CRITICISM
paying pesoriped, in the firat chapter of this 
thosis, the precise natiai^ e and development of ordinary 
langmge philosophy, and, in the second, considered its 
applications both as already instanced and still farther 
conceivable in extension of these, I think it now appro­
priate and necessary to consider a nimber of criticisms 
that an advooaoy of suoh techniques must inevitably have 
to deal with as constituting serious threats to the over­
all justification of, and the present preference for it, 
as here argued*
These criticisms will be dealt with seriatim. Inso­
far as this treatment must artificially separate in some 
regards, or deal in two places with,what is in substance 
perhaps the same basic criticism, it is hoped nevertheless 
that suoh an arrangement will facilitate a clear and 
comprehensive, if not perfect, consideration of these 
criticisms, albeit at the expense of some repetition on 
my part. I propose to consider, then, the following:
1. The issues raised vis-a-vis ordinary language analysis 
by the new developments of the science of Transformational 
Grrammar, or, the name here used, Structural Linguistics*
Criticisms of longer standing of particular theses 
’ advanced by Wittgenstein, particularly, but not only, 
in respect of his denial of the inner events of the mind 
and his exclusive location of language etc* in the public 
rather than the private plane. Such criticisms are too 
frequent and common to be attributable to any one critic 
as logically or proprietorially "his", but they are most 
succinctly expressed by J.N* Findlay, in his essay,
"On Meaning and Use", on language use in The Theory of 
Meaning*^  To this text and author, then, these criticisms 
will be attributed.
3. Finally, I propose to exauiinr© the ordinary language 
techniques in respect of those "postulates of analysis" 
it can he seen to have in its operation established for 
itself. I will thus consider criticisms such as have 
variously been levelled against it as generally and even 
fatally subjective, fickle, or more accurately, failing 
to ensure a credibility for its insights; these, it is 
alleged, though clever, are the product of what is basically 
the self-opinionation, not of the inoontrovertibly logical 
cogency of their authors.
By way of preface it shotfLd be said of each of the 
above criticisms, that they are aimed at ordinary language 
techniques in general, not merely their application to the 
problems of jurisprudence; the examples here considered 
are, of necessity, of general philosophical importance, 
but, mut at is mutandis* can be seen, without any need on my 
part constantly to provide a fitting jurisprudential con­
text, equally to apply to the philosophy of law. It hardly 
needs saying at this stage that jurisprudence is too little 
concerned, to its own prejudice, with considerations of 
philosophical methodology; that Hart, however evidently 
a linguistic philosopher, is, in jurisprudential circles, 
examined eind reproved somewhat unfairly for the substance, 
not the method, of his doctrines. My resort, then, to 
general philosophy to canvass criticisms of ordinary language 
techniques is therefore necessary.
1. The Oriticlsms of Structural Linguistics.
The growth of this science and the "school" of
structural linguistic theorists, among them most notably
2Noam Chomsky and J.J. Katzj, is yet another instance and 
proof that language, in all its aspects and modes of study, 
has been in modern times looked to for the elucidation of 
the fundamental problems of philosophy.
In an illuminating way, structural linguistics may 
be seen as a convergence of hitherto uncoordinated branches 
of linguistic scholarship. On the one hand, Ghomsky takes 
as his starting point the soionce of linguistics, which he 
saw, in 1950, as in a rather sterile position. On the 
purely syntactical side of the study of language, the 
Indo-European grammarians had completed, indeed perfected 
the scientific toclmiques of analysing a language; the 
semantic side had been neglected, and this neglect was 
becoming apparent from the ineptitude of behavioural 
sciences to explain or even to begin to understand what 
were the "discovery procedures"^ of a language. Chomsky's 
powerful criticism of brute "stimulue-response" pseudo­
scientific experiments on this, among other matters of 
linguistic competence, is set forth explicitly and con­
vincingly in Chapter 1, Language and Mind.^  He argues 
that we should look rather to the general or universal 
nature of language, to elucidate those rules, both syn­
tactic and semantic (and phonological), which alone can 
explain the faculty of speech. These rules, which can be 
seen under the surface (in the "depth grammar") of a 
sentence, act as "rewrite" rules to transform the basic 
data of spoken experience into a myriad constructions 
and creations every competent speaicer can in fact produce. 
Since these rules are not the product of experience, and 
therefore unexplioable by stimulus-responae patterns of 
explanation or the like, they must be in the nature of 
innate ideas, pre-programmed into the human mind. Language, 
then, if successfully and accurately explained, cannot but 
contribute to the solution of problems of an epistemo- 
logioal nature. It is at this stage that his theme and 
philosophic goal is fully consonant with those of Katg.
On the other hand, Kats is led to structural 
linguistics from a consideration, not of the science 
of linguistics, hut of the failure of the logical 
postivists, e.g. Oarnap^, to produce a version of, or 
indeed appreciate the nature of a logical syntax. His 
view of that misunderstanding and his own suggested 
solution to it, on the basis of which he is to direct 
strong criticism at ordinary language philosophy, is 
therefore of crucial importance to my present concerns;
I shall thorefore examine Katz’s argument in more detail 
than Ohomsky’s, having already demonstrated that latter" s 
ultimate identity of purpose with Katz.
It is significant that Katz, like the earlier 
Wittgenstein, commences his argument, in The Philosophy 
of Language. with the words of Frege,^ "...that the 
structure of the sentence serves as an image of the 
structure of thought." He accepts that the inspiration 
of that philosopher, that there is to ordinary language, 
an underlying, but not more or less perfect, syntactic 
reality, was genuine. It was, however, wrong to see 
this underlying structure, one where the ambiguities, 
contradictions or metaphysical aberrations of philosophers 
etc, would be mad© clear as v/hat and how they were, as 
leading to or pointing to an ideal and non-natural 
language. That was precisely the error of Oamap and the 
earlier Wittgenstein. In the latter case, in the Traotatus 
Lo&ico-Philosonhious,? Wittgenstein considered that 
language could be seen as a picture of the world, thus 
setting its own limit of sense; on the other hand, the 
prepositional form underlying it could not be shown.
The former, at first looking for an ideal language in 
which all metaphysics would be by definition outlawed,
thought this oould be done by oreatlug an ideal language, 
one not needing any similarity in structure or any other 
regard to natural languages; those be ignored in a rather 
abrupt and a priori way. Only later, when the construction 
of a logical syntax, his ideal language, became confounded 
In a mass of semantic, not syntaoio, problems, did Oamap 
try to conform the ideal to the pattern of the natural. >
In both instances or essays, the failure of his scheme 
was attributable to a failure to realise the precise 
relationship of the surface manifestations or practices 
of a natural language to our display or characterisation 
of these in an idealised fashion.
This idealisation lies, Katz argues, in the discerning 
via a study of natural languages, what is universal in 
syntax, semantics, and phonology; such a discernment will 
yield a universal grammeir or set of rules which will 
explain, or will graphically, as a model, represent the 
operation not only of linguistic competence or those 
procedures that it consists of, but, of central philo­
sophical concern, suoh traditional concepts as analytic^ 
ality,* oontradictoriness, synonymy etc. In fact, Katz’s 
scheme is in hie own words^ "...(to) formulate his 
arguments (as a philosopher of language) from language 
to philosophy as Inferences from premises about the 
nature of language found in the theory of language to 
conclusions about the nature of conceptual knowledge."
One example of this technique will suffice.
Katz proposes to establish a lexicon for all 
terms of a universal language; each term will 
be indexed and re-indexed with entries for 
synonym, opposite, class inclusion/exclusion, 
truth-value aspects etc. That a sentence, then, 
is an analytic truth will be then an automatic 
result of pre-programmed indexing of its terms; 
similarly, its truth/falsity or nonsensicality 
will be automatically, and a priori,determined.
This pattern is much more direct and one-way than 
Carnap's. Katz sees that an exhaustive critique of 
universal grammar, yielding an account or articulation 
of, for example, synonymy, leads to a solution of 
problems not even expressible at the moment, given the 
paralyzing logomachy that besets any present attempts 
at elucidation; he remarks^ "...unclear cases...many 
of them the most interesting issues in philosophy, are 
relegated to the limbo of endless quibbling."
Carnap, on the other hand, flits pusillanimously 
from logical syntax, to "pragmatic" texts for the 
categories of each and all, and nowhere gives any clear 
or practicable programme for, or indeed characterisation 
of, his idealised language. If Oarnap is found wanting 
in this regard, however, Katz considers ordinary language 
philosophy as equally, though in a different way, mis­
guided .
His principal criticism of Wittgenstein and fellow 
ordinary language philosophers, (though the first of 
these is seen as most reprehensible), is that they too 
readily abandoned the search for an underlying "syn­
tactical reality" below or underwriting its surface 
appearances; in fact, the "depth grammar" of language 
as applied by the later Wittgenstein to the business 
of the philosopher, in examining areas or shades of the 
use of language, was an illegitimate appropriation of 
the terms "depth grammar". His argument is that for 
Wittgenstein to imply or assert that it is impossible, 
not merely difficult, to uncover a true "depth-grammar",
i.e. as underlying, not as merely intricately distributed 
on the surface under the "rubble of language", was quite
imwarranted • Equally so were his contentions that 
philosophy was concerned solely with the misuses 
of language, and that, should anyone uncover 
"cerebral mechanisms" or "innate ideas", these were 
either irrelevant or the concern of neiarophysiôlogists, 
not philosophers* Suoh cerebral mechanisms, of linguistic 
rules or whatever, would not do duty for those "mental
th 6  which as "frauds '
processes" or "inner events"/\Wittgenstein saw it as his 
purpose in, or constituting, his doing philosophy.*
Katz considers on the contrary that, for the reasons 
already stated, an attempt to describe the underlying 
syntactic reality of language the business of philo 
sophy, which has been seriously retarded by the stubborn 
refusal of ordinary language philosophers to theorise 
about what the nature of that might be, in their absorption 
with "dissolutive" philosophy.
To this first and major criticism by Katz, it may 
be retorted that to some extent ho misconstrues 
Wittgenstein* s antipathy towards speculation about ideal 
"logically-perfect" languages. Katz considers that 
"Wittgenstein confuses the attempt rationally to re­
construct languages with attempts to describe their
structure, (and therefore) fails to provide any reason
11why the latter enterprise be renounced..." I do
not think Wittgenstein does so confuse the two matters;
IPhis comments in the Philosophical Investigations 
certainly are in severe, and surely fatal, criticism of 
his earlier attempts (and those of others) to build an
* Here we may agree with Kenny at P.146
Wittgenstein;IQ "Wittgenstein did not wish 
'to '"rule ' but "the possibility of either type 
[sc.neiorophysiological or transformational 
rule-basedjof explanation of behaviour. The notion 
of g mental 'mechaHism^ i^ hich he was the
result of- confusion about languaqe r different 
fnem -eithen-of, the two notions outlined above ... It is 
a-nretaphysical'-fict(.an-;-not a scientific hypothesis. “
-a,
ideal language, which his later*philosophy shows un­
necessary and misguided. Nor, as Kenny rightly inter- 
10prêts, is he against properly scientific attempts 
to explain any unknown matters concerning the workings 
of the human mind. His target is rather that false 
pseudo-empiricism, the falsity of which he characterises 
in the Philosophical Investigations "How does the philo-? 
sophioal problem about mental processes•..arise.«.
We talk of processes and states and leave their nature 
undecided. Sometime perhaps we will know more about 
them ^ we think. But that is just what commits us to a 
particular way of looking at the m a t t e r " , i . e .  
in a mechanistic way, without having been in the least 
empirical. Wittgenstein would not then reject the truly 
scientific researchs of Chomsky or Katz; nor would he 
see their representational model of language on the 
basis of the transformational rules of a universal 
grammar as at all comparable to or to be in any way 
confused with, his own picture-theory of language.
His was, self "-confessedly, a priori; theirs is, and 
they stress it, quite scientific* Indeed,Katz sees 
himself in Linguistio Philosophy^^ as undertaking 
the empirical proving or discovering of th% ^ d  or lying 
syntactical reality of language, as doing for language 
what atomic theorists have done for physics. ,
Of this criticism, then, it may be said that 
ordinary language philosophy may indeed have retarded, 
may indeed still retard, the development of structural 
linguistics, with all its rich promise; this retardation, 
however, is not attributable to it as though by some 
mistaken doctrine it propagated. Ordinary language 
philosophy can still justify itself on its own merits,
regardless of the unfortunate effects Katz notes it 
had upon progress towards a genuine, not spurious, 
science of language. Katz himself acknowledges that 
"ordinary language philosophy made an important cont- 
tribution to research in semantics, indeed far more.... 
than was made by professional linguists in the first 
half of the twentieth century"^^ It is doubtful 
whether, without this contribution in respect of 
semantics, the errors of the logical positivists like 
Oarnap, in trying to construct an ideal syntactical 
language, would ever have been subjected to the 
criticism they now seem so plainly to warrant in the 
light of structural linguistic ambitions.
In sum, if Katz and structural linguistics can 
provide insights by working on the theory, not the use 
of language, and apply these to the problems of philo­
sophy, they will be additional to, not (so far as can 
be ascertained a priori) in contradiction to, any 
insights developed from ordinary language philosophy.
If so much disposes of the substance of Katz’s 
general criticism, he further lista^^ a number of 
more particular criticisms, adduced to prove the superior­
ity over ordinary language techniques of his own professed 
attitude to the philosophy of language.
He states that ordinary language philosophy was 
mistakenly antipathetic to generalisations, and examples 
Ryle’s comment that "in philosophy, generalisations are 
unolarifications»"^^ He goes on to say that its 
emphasis was on acquiring insights concerning the use 
of particular words that could bs applied in philosophical 
therapy, and here by "particular" he means, or intends.
—perhaps trivial or narrow, or something similarly 
"de trop".
Insofar as Katz makes out a reluotanoe to generalise 
and an excessive fondness for dwelling at length on 
particular words and their particular contexts as a 
failing, I can say only that such characteristic practices 
could only appear as a failing to one who has an ulterior 
motive. Indeed Katz is not slow to tell us what his 
ulterior motive is, when he says that these traits in 
ordinary language philosophy prevented the development of 
any systematic theory of language, or of anything for 
that matter* This fact of prevention does not constitute 
any objective criticism, but once again only a personal 
dislike on the part of Katz * In fact, when he tries 
to make this personal rancour more objective, his 
argument, that ordinary language philosophers failed 
to see the operational use of generalisations, as 
correctives and guides, on successful testing or 
otherwise, to reformulations etc., is nothing but empty 
casuistry* Further, it threatens to obscure what has 
earlier been argued as on© major insight of ordinary 
language, namely, the realisation of just how few 
generalisations are legitimate and how much more often 
is it the case that matters will not of their hature 
conform, other than by distortion of the facts, to
a generalisation.
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Katz next suggests that ordinary language, as 
mostly concerned, in regards to its raw material of 
analysis, with current English idiom, is assuming 
without any empirical or absolute right that all 
languages function like and display the same general 
"logical geography" as English. This is of course 
taken for granted, and naturally so in philosophy,
an intellectual pursuit that no one to date has seen 
cpmplioated py a language harrier problem. We may 
note too, that Wittgenstein’s works include Augustine 
in Latin, his own Grerman, and his translator’s English; 
this polyglot collection has, in despite of language 
harriers, been read and understood by all manner and 
language-type of reader. One must suspect Katz as an 
extremely tendentious and prejudiced critic in this 
respect too, since his purpose is clearly to vindicate 
his ovm project of universal grammar at the expense of 
ordinary language philosophy.
Katz summarises these criticisms, saying that it
"unearthed numerous minute details of English usage,
(but) it made no effort to go beyond suoh particular
facts in the direction of a theory of language that
IQwould reveal their systematic structure..." ^; I 
think there can bo seen in that one sentence, in which 
he also summarises the import of the logical positivists* 
programme of construction of an ideal language, the 
substance of Katz’s error. In The Philosophy of Language 
he has presented an impressive statement or impression 
of how he sees the history of the philosophy of language 
since 1920. It is seen to pass straightly and progressively 
through three distinct states of development, i.e. logical 
positivism, to ordinary language, to structural linguistics 
Katz wishes us to see this last as the natural or ex­
pected culmination of the two earlier stages of develop­
ment. To lend cogency to this picturing of the facts, 
he has supplied, as we have seen, criticisms genuine and 
forced.
But his error lies not in the forced criticism, but 
in a misconstrual of the historical pattern of development.
The logical positivists were concerned in a narrow way 
with language and logic, with hopes to give or to see 
the former somehow in the shape of and structured like 
the latter. Katz too is vitally concerned with language 
and its systématisation whereby all natural languages 
may be seen to share a universal grammar. But ordinary 
language philosophers, if they are concerned with or 
use as analytic tools the "minute details of usage" 
are not solely or primarily concerned with facts of 
language per se;their overriding concern is rather with 
those special areas or details of language that repay, 
in terms of philosophical clarification, our close 
attention to them* Ordinary language philosophy is 
epistemology, is moral philosophy, and i^, if you 
like, the philosophy of law, etc. It is the traditional 
problems of these areas of philosophical speculation, 
not the grand schemes of the linguist, that will diotato 
and direct what areas of language it will concentrate 
upon. There is, as yet, from these sources no great, 
or any likely necessary demand, for a "systematic, 
scientific or generalised theory of language", and this 
lack of demand can be a failing only to one who has 
radically or wantonly misapprehended the significance 
of ordinary language philosophy. The method of that 
philosophy is most certainly, indeed vitally, linguistic, 
but its substantial doctrines, as earlier shown, are 
vastly more than linguistic,
In sum, then, this vindication of ordinary language 
techniques against a critic who, if believed, would 
render or pi'esent it to us as some pass© school of 
thought, as dead as the Vienna Oirol© etc., is of 
course no reason against seeing in the more positive
ideas of that critic and his school no little promise.
If struotural linguistics does provide a hotter 
alternative, does produce a more accurate technique 
of analysis, (and nowhere is it here asserted that 
ordinary language devices are "easy", uncomplicated 
techniques in philosophy) these will he welcomed as 
another avenue of insight and understanding, as Katz 
has indicated, of traditional issues in the philosophy 
of mind. Yet the prospect of such developments, as 
great, it may he added, as they are remote, is not 
any reason to disparage ordinary language philosophy 
either as a mere linguistic exercise, or as only an 
era, now waning, of a continuing exercise in linguistics.
The Oriticisms of J.h. Findlay eto,^^
I wish now to consider several more particular and 
specific criticisms concerning certain key matters in 
ordinary language philosophy. It has already been 
demonstrated how the explication or understanding of 
the concept of the rule and the rule-abased practice, 
and the attack upon or extirpation of the inner event, 
which is always to "stand in need of external criteria", 
are central, almost axiomatic ideas within that philo­
sophic method. It is largely by these two vital and 
of course related elements, that most criticism and 
controversy has been stimulated; those criticisms 
here considered have these elements as their targets.
As in all branches of philosophy, it is sometimes as 
difficult and as rewarding a task to identify or to 
characterise exactly what is the idea or error the 
object of the criticism as to provide or suggest a 
solution in virtue of that oritioism; the maxim of
solvitm? ambulancio, or solution by careful description, 
will bore be employed* In order clearly to characterise 
the errors widely but variously sensed in ordinary 
language philosophy, I shall lay out two "seta" of 
criticism, not untypical in themselves of many similar 
but differently ordered or phrased critiques, and from 
both, attempt that important primary task of identifying 
the common and serious objection both "sets" have as 
their object *
J.H. Findlay^^ listed the following defects in 
ordinary langizage philosophy, as represented by Ryle 
and Wittgenstein (For ease of reference, I shall number 
each individual criticism in the series)*
1 * The slogan "Hon’t ask for the meaning; ask for the 
use," (that of Ryle, but closely parallelled in 
Wittgenstein) is deceptive in that it seems, at first, 
to tell us to attend to something clear, simple, 
and pleasantly ordinary* In reality, "use" as employed 
by Wittgenstein, Ryle, and, indeed Hart, is far from 
clear or ordinary; in fact, it includes that denotational 
or connotational use, i.e* meaning in the traditional 
sense e*g, as described by 1*8. Mill*^^ That act of 
inclusion, or suffocation, threatens to hide the truth 
of the matter, which is that use is only explicable 
after these fundamental powers of connotation and 
reference are explained. As Findlay expresses it,
"In saying What is the use, (really) I have to say what 
the denotation or connotation is."
2. Further puzzlement is produced when it appears, 
that the "use" of a word may not ever be used to explain 
a set of circumstances; i.e. when the situation is that 
of a man who opens a drawer, sees three apples within it,
and ©ays "There are three apples", ordinary language 
philoBophy will not allow the facts to explain the 
utterance as a fusion of physical state and appropriate 
denotative words, hut rather sees the whole as just a 
portion of a wider set of uses which constitute the 
meaning of "three" and "apple"#
3* The concept of rule in Wittgenstein, (and,
though Findlay does not mention it, Ryle’s concept of 
’disposition* which is, in Ryle’s terms, "law-like" 
in operation, about which the same criticism could 
equally be made) are despite their seeming simplicity 
and familiarity, in reality extremely vague, blurred 
and unsatisfactory concepts. When Wittgenstein says 
that a rule is something we may (only) do, not think 
about, or debate over, or interpret, but only discern 
from observation of ordinary regularities in ex­
perience, he makes of it that same ineffable sort of 
thing the "propositional form" was in the Traotatus *
4* Ordinary language philosophy gives a totally
incomprehensible and bizarre explanation of inner, 
unseen phenomena, such as dreaming, recollections of 
past sensations, memories ©to. Because of its con­
centration on the external associated facts, it allows 
no other facts to be considered. Thus dreaming becomes 
a tendency apparent in those awakening from sleep to 
tell stories; recollection of sentiments, sensations, 
notions etc. one felt at some time in the past, 
similarly are dispositions to use the language of 
sensations etc. in the past tens© as though, but not 
genuinely, in the mode of recording objective or real 
fact.
5 ' Us©-doctrlnas further forbid all talk of inner 
events, suoh as "thought", "taste", "pain" if suoh 
tall?: is taken to refer to private, inner, or non­
public events. It is unremittingly concerned only 
with the outward verifiable or observable "shows" 
of such inner matters, to the extent of denying their 
inner existence at all; it construes the meaning of 
these words in an examination of the contexts of their 
use, as exhausted by those uses. Findlay on the contrary 
argues for a necessary inter-operation of private and 
public language use, whereby those phenomena which 
are of their nature unobservable can inform and be 
informed by the phenomena and words of the external 
world. To example this two-way "information", or co­
existence of the inward and outward experience, he 
might argue, contrary to Hart, tlaat "guilt" as a 
sentiment or feeling Inwardly existant, does con­
tribute to the common, public meaning of mens rea, 
which is not exhausted by a mere set or listing of 
"exemption" circumstances to be established in the 
public world. He concludes or summarises these criticisms 
by saying that our understanding of these epistemo- 
logical problems will be best provided "by reviving.#* 
connotation and denotation," and "the intentional 
nature of thought;” this last will enable us to take 
a word or a rule etc# and, by a "meaning intention” 
alone, subjectively impart to its emptiness or bruteness 
or incompleteness as a sign, what in fact gives it 
significance as word or rule.
I turn now to a second set of criticisms. J.M.
Hems in "Husserl and/or Wittgenstein"^^ provides a 
severe analysis of Wittgenstein which may be summarised 
as follows. (The same number sequence is maintained).
6. Wittgenstein argues that meaning is exhausted in 
the use. He can allow no "act of meaning", suoh as an 
intendment or intentional consciousness of meaning 
prior to actual use, since this would clearly be 
circular, indeed self-stulifying. If we consider,
Hems argues, the very first utterance of a word as a 
sign or with intention to mean by a child to whom 
that one word is the whole language, there must surely 
be an intention, which alone could differentiate for 
the child, that word as language, and that same word 
as a meaningless noise. Wittgenstein’s reading of 
this situation, as one in which we would be justified 
merely in saying of the child that he/she spoke does no 
justice to the child, and only partial justice to the 
complete phenomena here under analysis.
Y. Wittgenstein collapses the meaning of an act 
with its expression. While his rendering of the meaning 
of a word as its use is perhaps the major instance of 
this "collapsing", it is not the only one. As Hems 
colourfully puts it, Wittgenstein is obsessed with the 
cognate accusative, which he splits down the middle 
and then suppresses, as in the case of the child above, 
the subject term. In simpler terms, to Wittgenstein or 
Ryle, an instance of "understanding", "reading", "seeing 
as" etc. is a fact the analysis of which concerns only 
those aspects of the matter which all can see and agree 
upon, not on any aspect of the individual’s own intention 
or consciousness in so behaving or Intending.
It is to be noted in passing that a phenomenologist, 
as Hems is, will see almost an identity between acts of 
meariing (words) and acts of meaning as "meaning to 
understand", "sing", "read" etc., given that particular 
philosophy’s fondness for interposing between mind and
every point of contact it has with the world an act 
of consciousness or intentionality. Like all universally 
applied notions in philosophy, "polyfilla" notions 
like ’sense-data’, or ’acts of will’ in the Austinian 
sense, on© should he wary of them.
8* Wittgenstein is a behaviourist, as he sees the 
nature of language fully accounted for in an exhaustive 
observation of its functions; this fear of going beyond 
the evidence of observation is basically an unreasoned 
fear of metaphysics# Indeed there are occasions in the 
Philosophical Investigations, w h e r e  Wittgenstein 
seems on the point of admitting a (phenomenological) 
consciousness or a feeling apart from the external 
criteria, when he says that it may be only said of a 
human being that it has pains, hinting at, but not 
enlarging upon, the notion of hmianity in a thoroughly
PR
non-behaviourist sense, or, in Zettel, ^  that poetry 
uses the language-game of information, but is not 
reciting information. But much more characteristically 
and importantly, Wittgenstein has set himself obstinately 
against going beyond the functions of language and the 
external siiecna of behaviour, which he sees as their 
only source and anchor, to any inner or further in­
vestigation of consciousness.
He summarises his criticism by portraying Wittgenstein 
as typical of the would-be scientific modern age, where 
all must lie in the open at all costs, even if it means 
wilfully closing our eyes in horror, anti-metaphysical 
or other, at what beyond may lie unfathomable to any 
analysis on a "scientific" level. It is this same failing. 
Hems argues, that accounts for Wittgenstein’s peculiar
view Qf philosophy as "an end to philosophical cravings 
towards solutions," or as an achievement of a stage 
where, in Wittgenstein’s terms, we may stop, or, in 
Hem’s again colourful terms, commit the suicide of 
philosophy. Doubtless this summary on Hem’s part is 
slightly fanciful, but given the importance of those 
criticisms h© has made, and his biutiing sense of that 
importance, these hyperbolical expressions may be 
excused.
It will be noticed that there emerges from these 
eight separate criticisms a recognisable pattern.
This pattern or residue of solid oriticlsms, i.e. 
in which each single criticism does not represent merely 
an individual facet or instance of an otherwise in­
stanced error, may be extracted by bracketing together 
certain of our eight into a more compact expression as 
follows *
Taking 1 and 2, which is really a special case of 
1 and 5 from Findlay, in which he upbraids the by­
passing by ordinary language of denotative meaning
and the inner acts of consciousness as matters of fact
26and negligible interest, we arrive, as indeed he does, 
at a desideration of "the intentionality of thought", 
which alone could germinate denotative meaning etc.
This bypassing of the "inner consciousness" is explicitly 
noted by Hems, who shows the structural similarity in 
ordinary language philosophy’s treatment of language 
and other human "mental acts". He expands the account 
of this failure by noting as its particular character­
istics, a collapsing of meaning into external expression 
in all cases, aiad a failure to give the subject its 
proper place in epistemology. In Findlay’s terms, this 
is expressed as a failure to do justice to the inner as
well as outward phenomena of language/Which naturally has ' 
baokroomsQontinuous with those opening on the public 
s q u a r e s h a l l  oall this general criticism (A).
Beyond this, on Findlay's part, we have the 
additional indictments, per 1 and 2 that ordinary 
language is characterised by a continual vagueness, 
never defining what "use" or "rules of language" are 
in any precise or non-misleading way. I shall call 
this general criticism (B). Hems' individual criticism 
is that Wittgenstein* s view of philosophy as a way 
of "stopping" philosophy (or indeed more generally to 
include Ryle, Austin etc*, as not of its nature de­
signed to discover anything, but "only to rearrange 
what we know already is a product of a mistaken
desire to put any however inadequate terminus to our 
inquiry rather than suffer the frustration of only 
partial knowledge. I shall oall this general criticism (O).
I shall consider these generalised criticisms in 
their order as above characterised.
A) To say that ordinary langueige ignores or denies 
the existence of inner acts of consciousness, or indeed 
'meanings’, in Findlay’s sense, is simply not accurate. 
Wittgenstein's statement re language use is not that 
in every case, when we ask for the meaning of the word, 
we should replace meaning by the use of that word* Us© 
is not a substitute for meaning; nor is it meant to 
include meaning as Findlay thinks it was, as some piece 
of cunning, or question-begging. Wittgenstein, in fact, 
as early as para 43^^ says only that :- "For a large 
class of cases -, though not for all - in which we 
employ the word ’meaning* it can be defined thus: 
the meaning of a word is its use in language." We may 
presume that by this reservation, Wittgenstein does 
allow a traditional "denotative" meaning. He does not
-»i. ^  k V
dwell upon what that might he, simply because his 
interest, and the interest of the whole of ordinary 
language philosophy, is on those misuses of words 
which have developed a mass of philosophical errors, 
among them, quite vaouous theories of meaning, such 
as the Augustinian name-ohjeot theory.
The message of ordinary language philosophy is 
made equally clear in respect of inner acts of 
understanding, of emotions, of sensations etc. It is 
not denied that some inner events actually do happen, 
are facts etc. Wittgenstein is not going to deny brain­
waves : nor is he inhuman enough ever to deny, in Moore’s 
gq
gnostic terms, that we may know certain facts about 
meaning much more absolutely than we can be sure of the 
premises, insofar as that, in a proper and trivial 
sense, may be taken to advert to a large number of 
oases where a "meaning-feeling" upon use or selection 
of a word, or a "flash" of understanding is felt etc. 
These experiences are too common for any to deny.
Yet, in contradistinction to that set of inner events, 
the real, and philosophically unimportant, there is a 
large class of "inner events", which are fabricated, 
as by sense-datum theorists, Cartesian dualists etc. 
etc., purely to provide a foundation for those wild 
theories that philosophy spuriously produces. It is 
more than excusable, then, to concentrate, for such 
compelling reasons of philosophical relevance and with 
a view to clarifying confusion, upon the nature of 
language use and spurious inner event theories, at 
the expense of ignoring the trivial but real instances 
of pure meanings or real inner events*
Row, it is precisely in the exposition of the 
latter, the inner events, that Wittgenstein, Ryle etc.
would appear most to insist upon the importanoe 
of attending to, or the primacy of, the external 
expression in 'understanding', 'imagining', 'wishing’, 
or 'intending’; similarly, it would appear that, 
when spurious "flashes" or "acts" of understanding 
are dismissed as groundless conjecture, and any 
genuine sensations seen as quite trivial and philo­
sophically irrelevant, the whole act is collapsed into 
the mere external show. This appearance is certainly 
strong hut should not frighten one if it is realised 
that neither Ryle nor Wittgenstein is interested in 
constructing any phenomenological psychology, or 
structure of thought in that mould, put doing quite 
genuine and quite legitimate philosophical analysis.
As was made clear with regard to Katz and his critique 
of ordinary language philosophy, it cannot he re­
proached, as mistaken or misleading, when it is seen 
as failing to accomplish what is not its object, hut 
that rather of its critic*
It is furthermore as yet a moot point whether 
Wittgenstein or Ryle would consider the aims of 
phenomenology, to identify or analyse or male© clear 
the intentionality of thought, and that via a vastly 
more subject-orientated analysis of the nature, and 
"acts" of consciousness, as a valid philosophical 
endeavour, and not just another instance of the chronic 
disease of postulating inner events. On this matter 
it will be here said only that, given a fair community 
of interest in the diverse and ordinary workings of 
the mind, via language, in ordinary language philosophy 
on the one hand, and the same workings of consciousness, 
via reduction etc. in phenomenology, on the other, it 
is hard to see how a solution on the lines of the latter
mode of analysis could he anything other than kindred 
or germane to the themes of Wittgenstein or Ryle,
Doubtless Hems considers, though he never says so 
explicitly, that Wittgenstein does include, among the 
class of spurious inner events of philosophical theory*s 
siring, the phenomenologists *intentionality* . For 
this suspicion I see no warrant, especially when Austin, 
in virtue of that very "kindredness of spirit" I have 
noted above, has with justification, and his characteristic 
verbal acuity, described himself as "a linguistic pheno4 
menologist," Hems is excessively, hut out of an under­
standable eagerness to vindicate his own cause^ need­
lessly antagonistic to ordinary language philosophy#
To justify, however, the emphasis given by 
Wittgenstein and others to the outward expression as a 
valid philosophical strategy, is not totally to ex­
onerate them from the charges here under consideration.
For, though the distinction between inner acts (real) 
and inner acts (spurious) is a valid one, there may he . 
occasions where certain cases are misidentified in 
perhaps an excess of zeal to scotch philosophical 
heresies; here it will be instructive to consider certain 
aspects of Wittgenstein*s argument against a private 
language, particularly those concerning the nature 
of "pain-language", and the question of whether pain- 
words actually name sensations. In the handling of 
theee issues, Wittgenstein is involved in those practices 
of collapsing or denying the "inner", for which Hems 
and Findlay, respectively, criticise him and which he 
is, as above explained, so involved with justification# 
Wittgenstein's whole argument is designed to 
show that the phenomena, physical and behavioural, 
of pain shape the language we use in describing, reporting, 
or sympathising with etc* pain, in short, our "pain-
language"• He argues persuasively and most Insightfully 
that our* "pain-language" does not, indeed oannot. 
arise from a private, inner identification of our own 
pains* We do not in fact "know" pains from our own 
experienoe as we "know" colour, or flowers etc. from 
our own seeing them for what they are, when pointed 
out. The sentence, "I Imow I am in pain", is not 
of the same grammar as "I know where the hall is", 
hut of use only in a very odd context, as a reply to 
a silly question, such as "Are you sure you have had 
toothache?" etc. So too other personal statements of 
pain, as "I am in pain", do not, as though being a 
report of an occurrence, advert to a privileged, ex­
clusive knowledge of an inner act, but are in this 
case mere verbal bits of pain-behaviour. To this 
extent, then, spui'ious inner acts are truly identified 
as what they are. Wittgenstein goes further, however, 
to assert without prejudice to this inner insight that, 
Since no inner act or sensation underwrites or explains 
pain-words, and we logically cannot name sensations by 
a term or terms of a privâte-language, then we can 
never under any circumstances name sensations.
This view is perhaps extreme; as,Strawson has 
pointed out^^ there are distinct oases where, analogically 
we can name and characterise certain sensations, such 
as "burning" pains or "throbbing" toothache. This use 
is of course analogical and, thereby, in part publicly 
generated; nevertheless, it does show scope for, indeed 
gives an instance of that profitable exchange between 
the outward and inward use of language. Nor is it a 
possibility that Wittgenstein can rule out by his earlier 
arguments where he showed rightly that all attempts on 
the individuals part, without any reliance upon a
ooimnon language, to identify a sensation, using his 
memory or a manometer to measure hlocft-pressure eto. 
must logically be futile. For in this case, the 
analogioal use of pertain words, as "bwning", 
"throbbing" ©to. to describe pains or tastes or 
other hidden, inner sensations, or thoughts for that 
matter, is anchored or based upon a use sanctioned 
and stabilised by common agreement. In this instance, 
it is perhaps the case that Wittgenstein suffers from 
the old verifioationist horror of the inward, unknow­
able, and unverifiable. Yet the effect of that "horror" 
is so marginal, the damage to his overall insight into 
the problem of sensations etc. so little as a result 
of thie lapse, that, far from totally substantiating 
what Rems or Findlay say in criticism, it merely turns 
their criticism into a general caveat against too 
zealous an ignoring of the possibility of inner acts 
informing outward expression or, at least, too easily 
applying a powerful insight to oases or instances it 
is not directly relevant to. It is further to be 
noted that the case or example of "pain-language" 
is a special case, by no means typical, of the class 
of inner phenomena languages, which are so uniquely 
and characteristically in need of external criteria. 
The peculiar quality of pain-language, i.e. our 
apparent use of a variety of specific words or de­
scriptions for u type of sensation just as we have 
a similar set of particular descriptions of colours 
or shapes, or other externally sensible matters, seems 
to suggest (though on examination wrongly) that it is 
based on the same principles, i.e. ©ense-data, or 
empirical observation of one’s own case*
'^4, ^ 4,' ^
Whie analogy oy aaemiUig parallel doea not exlat 
In the oaae of the lan^age-gamee of "intention?* ^
"imderatandla^g", '♦wlehing«, 1»meaning;” etc., and 
Wittgenstein» a lapse la tlaua only In the restricted 
area of paln-rlanguage and its analysis; In no way, 
for the ahove reasons Is it to he thought of as general^ 
isahle throughout all cases of ”Inner act”, to allow 
after all the existence of private, Inner events, i.e, 
in no way a loophole to allow the criticisms of Hems 
or pindlay in this regard to oonvinoe.
3) I pass on now to consider the allegation that the 
fundamental ordinary language concepts pf *use* and 
! rule» are so imprecisely and misleadingly oharaoterised 
as to he, in fact, of no real explanatory use*
How, insofar as this allegation,of useless vague­
ness opnoerns "use as meaning”, I need not repeat other 
than for form» s sake what I have said already in regard 
to ordinary language philosophy» s attitude to de^ 
notational or oonnotational meaning vis» that it ddes 
not deny its existence, hut considers it philosophically 
unimportant » What is of genuine philosophic importance 
is rather the need in examining any concept or word to 
give an account which comprehends all uses or aspects 
pf that concept* It is necessary, in fact, to oorahat 
or restrain a strong "essentialislng” instinct, which 
wants a compact, unique answer to everything, or, in 
the case of a word, an essential meaning* $hls is simply, 
e»g* in the case of games, or the rules of law in Hart» s 
Qonoept of law for that matter, eto. not possible; for 
the purposes of philosophy, a looser meaning-as-use 
serves us quite adequately poth tp comprehend the variety 
of meanings or roles a word may have, and to act as a 
prophylactic to "essentialising” . These two objects are
t
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sufficient justification for a ""family-resemblanoe” 
unity among various uses of a word, indeed epeoifioalXy 
desiderate or constitute it, and can seem reprehensible 
as vague only to one, like Findlay, who misunderstands 
that philosophy’s objects or still hankers after an 
essence, in this case, a pure "kernel” of essential 
denotational/oonnotational meaning,
In respect however of the allegation that "rules” 
as characterised in Wittgenstein are vague and almost 
mystical etc. like the prepositional form of the 
Tragtatus* there lies a different sort of misappreoiation. 
Here, before taking a closer look at what was, in the 
first chapter of this thesis, admitted a complex and 
subtle doctrine, i.e. that of rules as a practice, it 
will be instructive to examine why Hems, the phenomena- 
logist, who shares much with Findlay in criticism, does 
not advert to rules as an instance on Wittgenstein» s 
part of "collapsing" an act, composed of "inner act" 
and "outer expression. That is precisely the criticism 
Findlay puts when he says^^ "if grasping a rule (i.e. 
inner aot^author» s insertion) is a function of following 
(i.e. outer expression-author»s insertion) then the 
whole activity of following dissolves in mystery." 
Findlay’s use of the term "dissolves" is surely tant­
amount to Hem’s use of the term "collapses". ■
The reason fo r  th is  n o n ^ p ara lle l between the two 
c r i t ic s  is  th a t Hems re a lis e s  th a t ru le-governed be­
haviour is  lo g ic a l ly ,  o f i t s  n a tu re , an e x te rn a l pheno­
menon, one o n ly  susceptib le  and r ig h t ly  so to  a be­
h a v io u ris t an a lys is  o f i t s  ex tern a l m a n ifes ta tio n s , 
and to inc lude a concentration upon ru le s  as an e rro r  
o f "co llaps ing" or "o v erly  s c ie n t i f ic  beh av io u ris t
malpractice in eplstemology is exactly like accusing 
a spade for being a spade. It is precisely this error 
that Findlay’s criticism discloses. He equates the 
logical category of a rule with that of "meaning” 
or "sensation", etc, where a consideration of the 
role of the subject is an important, almost primary 
one, albeit likely, if the introspections the subject 
provides in that role are evaluated, initially to mis­
lead, In contrast with this category of concept, rule- 
governed behaviour is a public matter, constituted by 
many subjects and by the synergy of those activities, 
in agreements of practices and judgments, a thing 
not reducible to the sum of the individual acts which 
it comprehends, but the nature of which it transcends 
in its operation or function on a different, i.e. 
public, sphere.
Given the importance of the correct appreciation 
of the nature of rule-governed practices and the central 
position it occupies in the exposition of important 
issues in jurisprudence, I shall now consider closely 
what Wittgenstein says on the matter of rules, by way 
of showing at length the error Findlay is above shortly 
described as making, Wittgenstein’s treatment of rules 
is, as indeed of other key concepts, dispersed throughout 
the Philosophical Investigations. To simplify analysis,
I shall firstly assemble en bloo the major elements 
pf his theory of rules there put forward, paraphrasing 
as convenient:-
Para 2oi.
"There is a way of grasping a rule which is not an inter­
pretation.”^^
Fara gOg.
Hence "obeying a rule is a practice and to think one is 
obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not 
possible to obey a rule privately.”
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Para 217.
"Hp w am X to obey a rule? - If this is not a question 
about causes, then it is about the justification for 
my following the rule the way X do# If I have exhausted 
the justifications, I have reached bedrock. Then I 
am inclined to says ’This is simply what I do.’ ”
Para 219.
"When X obey a rule, X do not choose. I obey the rule 
blindly."
Para 208.
"X shall teach him (i.e. the learner of a language and 
the rules of the use of its words) by examples and 
practice. And when X do this, I do not communicate less 
than X know myself."
Para 198.
"X have further indicated that a person goes by a sign­
post (an example (f nonverbal rule-following) insofar 
as there exists a regular use of sign-posts, a custom."
Para 199.
"Is what we call ’obey a rule’ something that it would 
be possible for only one man to do, and only once in 
his life?" (This rhetorical question is obviously to 
be mswered in the negative.)
These excerpted statements are, of course, in their 
context obviously exampled, the above being merely 
the positive conclusions to a general examination of 
various instances of rple-bound behavious of which there 
is no small number. Vet it importantly emerges that 
there are two dimensions of a rule’s being a public 
thing. Firstly, per paras 198-199, the phenomenon of 
following rules is explicated by Wittgenstein as not 
just a sum of similar practices, but something fundamental
tp PUT humanity, dust as lions, tigers eto. are 
carnivores, or cattle are herbivore, so a trait 
or part of our humanity is that we use rules, or 
our behaviour as what we are discloses rules. This 
rule-dependenoe is thus as fundamental to all of 
us as language, in which of oourse it figures in­
dispensably, and is, in fact, constituted by human 
behaviour. The truth of this insight is that it is 
inconceivable that one man could invent a rule, 
because the purpose, object, eto. of the rule, in 
fact, that rule’s being a rule could not then exist; 
the realities of a rule are inseparable from shared 
social behaviour. No act of intentionality or’mean­
ing’ by doing JXZ eto. to establish a rule could 
ever, logically, create a rule.
Secondly, and in consequence of this first 
dimension of a rule’s being a public, not a private 
reality, a particular already established rule cannot 
be appropriated out of that public environment, where 
it alone is generated and operates, and reserved to 
any individual’s arbitration or deliberation on 
whether to follow it or not* This is simply a logical 
impossibility; if he changes it unilaterally, he will 
when following” it, not be following it; conversely, 
if his deliberation or Interpretation or choosing or 
intending to follow does make him, in fact, follow it, 
then all these processes are shown as quite vacuous 
as he follows the rule any way. It is this that makes 
Wittgenstein say, at para 219, that I obey a rule 
blindly.
The same conclusion is reached by a consideration, 
at para 208, of how one teaches a rule. Olearly, one
can teach a rule or a word of language and Its rules 
of use only by playing the game, or citing examples of 
the word’s use. It is absurd to imagine that, when 
one teaches another to play chess, for example, that 
one proves to him, or reasons with him, or persuades 
him etc, that a bishop moves in a certain way, Neither 
do the rules stand in need of the individual’s advocacy, 
nor does the learner in that situation need it to 
master the rule. Still less is such advocacy needed 
in the case of learning the use of a word. It is 
precisely this lack or absence of anything beyond the 
examples in the teaching, and the practice in the 
following of a rule, that Wittgenstein notes, at 
para 217, when he explains talk or debate upon rules 
as, if anything at all, mere justification which, when 
exhausted, still does not affect the being or existence 
of the practice pf the rule in question. This is not 
of course to say that there can be no place for de­
liberation, debate eto, in cases of prescriptive rules, 
as of the law or morals, as to how they should be framed, 
or, more specifically, what goals they should establish, 
or standards of performance they should prescribe.
Nor is it to say that deliberation or doubt about a 
rule is impossible in dubious marginal cases, 
Wittgenstein explicitly considers this possibility of 
d o u b t , w h e n  he admits that a sign-post, for example, 
may point somewhere not exactly N or NW or NKW etc. 
but perhaps equivocably and debateably, so allowing 
scope for difference of opinion etc, i.e. "It some­
times leaves room for doubt and sometimes not." Vet 
thi8 doubt is not about the nature or the being of the 
rule as what it is, i.e. not to be reformulated or
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reconstituted by the individual who doubts it into 
a certain rule; it merely represents a practical 
difficulty about a rule which is vague but never­
theless serviceable as such. Hence, to use Wittgenstein’s 
own words, he concludes with the statement that "...now 
this ( sc. that it sometimes leaves room for doubt and 
sometimes not) is no longer a philosophical proposition, 
but an empirical o n e . "33
As for the case of the prescriptive rule where, 
of course, debate is clearly relevant, not only to 
clarify vagueness but in the very creation or con­
stitution of the rule, Wittgenstein is not concerned 
with such rules; olearly, the rules of language, which 
are what ordinary language is considering or looking 
at and to for clarification of concepts of philo­
sophical importance, are not prescriptive but a matter 
of practice. This does not imply, however, that a 
prescriptive rule does not promote or give rise to, 
or in fact describe a practice in a certain way, or 
inflect its existing operation marginally; elsewhere 
this complex relationship between rules of practice 
and prescriptive rules is given appropriate and close 
attention. Further, it should be noted that, in any 
case, when Findlay wanted or lamented the lack of 
the "inner" act of "grasping" a rule in Wittgenstein’s 
account, he made no mention of, and we have no reason 
to imagine he based his strictures on a consideration 
of, prescriptive rules.
Having thus, by an analysis of Wittgenstein’s 
powerful insight into the nature of rules, at one, 
articulated or shown the precise nature of the error 
underlying Findlay’s criticism of Wittgenstein, and
given, the fuller aocpunt earlier promised of Wittgenstein’s 
views on this matter, among the most difficult in the 
PhilosQphlcal Investigations, I propose to consider lastly 
Hem’s final criticism.
0) Hems, it was earlier noted, alleged that Wittgenstein, 
Hyle and indeed the whole behaviourist and reductionist 
programme of ordinary language philosophy are misguided. 
This tendency, to see philosophy as merely a means of 
putting an end to the tiresome task of inquiry, or, 
in Wittgenstein’s terms, as a therapy, is particularly 
marked in Wittgenstein, although Ryle states, (and this 
statement would equally meet the censure of Hems) that 
his task, in The Poncent of Mind is not to state any­
thing new, but only to reohart the logical geography 
of what we already know. In Wittgenstein’s case, the 
parallel view is given by his "statement of intent" in 
philosophy as, in very eloquent metaphor, "to show the 
fly the way out of the fly-bottle."
Now I have already characterised in an earlier 
chapter of this thesis that author’s concept or view 
of philosophy, and thus Hems' criticism will give us an 
opportunity to reconsider the validity or utility of 
such a view, both as generally tenable, and whether 
attributable, basically, to the horror of the unknowable 
or unvorifiable beyond.
Wittgenstein was fully aware that his "dissolutive" 
view of philosophy would meet with much disapproval; 
indeed he anticipates such disapproval when he considers 
the imaginary rebuke of such a oritio;-
"Where does our investigation get its importance 
from, since it seems only to destroy everything interesting, 
that is, all that is great and important?"34 "great” 
and "important" we are meant to understand all manner
":r
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pf oherished, but now to be demonstrated as empty, 
notions in philosophy, such as "meaning”, ”aot of 
understanding” eto. and all such essences. Not only 
is philosophy, at least as it is viewed by Wittgenstein, 
ioonoclastio or simply bad-sportmanship, but will be­
come dull, in that, as Wittgenstein says^^ ”If one 
tried to advance theses in philosophy (sc. done after 
the fashion of Wittgenstein - author’s insertion) it 
would never be possible to debate them, because every­
one would agree to them*
Olearly, these messages are very bitter pills to 
swallow, and ironically, it is from that very source 
of error or philosophical "disease”, i.e. a desire 
to solve at all posts or essentialise etc. that these 
counsels are designed to cure that these antagonisms 
against their cure arise. Old habits die exceedingly
The problem is basically, though not purely, a 
methodological one. As made clear earUer, to see 
Wittgenstein only as a ”therapists or only modestly 
as stating the obvious without advancing any theories 
of his own discerning (which are certainly not obvious* 
e.g. his theory of rules) is only to see a part of his 
philosophy. It is a measure of the greatness or the 
breadth of his thought, however, that Wittgenstein 
is supreme both a® a methodologist and a creative 
contributor of new insights, to the extent that, 
in considering one facet, it can so totally occupy 
our attention as to obscure the other.
Insofar as his work, and indeed that of the whole 
of ordinary language philosophy, is therapeutic, (and 
I here make a gi^atuitous but by no means necessary
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concession to its critics in allowing that a view 
of philosophy as a "therapy” is only of methodological 
relevance, and not in itself a substantive doctrine) 
it can he justified as such only by looking to the 
facts themselves. One must ask what scope or justi­
fication there is within philosophy for therapy, what 
amourit of malaise or unrest or disquietude does in 
fact lie within it, given that this measure of dis­
quietude is directly in proportion to the dissatisfactory 
doctrines etc. that have produced it.
The answer to such a question must surely be that 
therapy is needed, and Wittgenstein"# works are indeed 
a description and demolition of those fallacious doc­
trines, cancerous growths upon the body of a clear and 
perhaps unsensational view of things thus uncovered. 
Ryle’s project.is likewise if characterised in a 
different metaphor, one of rather boringly unadventurous 
"recharting" as exciting as any other draughtsmanly 
pursuit, but nevertheless of extreme importance if it 
will henceforward spare us the anguish of being lost.
It is of course not to be denied that, as regards 
the permanence or the continuing nature of the practice 
of philosophy, merely to give therapy or to reohart 
etc. camxot be our constant or only aim, and to that 
extent, we may fix some temporary limit to our seeing 
philosophical endeavour as primarily therapy, beyond 
which it would be inaccurate to call the results of 
Clip investigation merely "therapeutic". It is precisely 
this limit that Wittgenstein himself, despite his 
overt statements to the contrary, transcends when there 
muet be recognised true discovery, not mere therapy.
Here we may consider what Ryle says of W i t t g e n s t e i n .3&
It is submitted, then, that the therapeutic role of 
philosophy as emphasised by Wittgenstein is not yet 
played out, nor, given the inherent resistance to 
its curative counsels and the possibility of re­
cidivism of the same errors of thought, is there any 
reason to presume that repeated doses of the same 
therapy may not be needed. Besides that, I think that 
an accurate appreciation of Wittgenstein and ordinary 
language philosophy discloses a large measure of novel 
insights which, if only recognised, would dispel any 
criticism that presents us with a mistakenly unambitious 
or simply innacourate view of philosophy as therapeutic*
In regard to Hem's other criticism re this thera­
peutic role of philosophy, that not only is it un­
tenable in a general sense as defining philosophy, but, 
in Wittgenstein's case, arises from a horror of the 
unvorffiable, I think that this may now be seen as the 
result, or a particular manifestation, of that general 
tendency mistakenly and narrowly to see Wittgenstein as 
only a methodologist. In certain regards, Wittgenstein's 
philosophy poses a dilemma for one trying to character­
ise or categorise it. As we saw above, the choice between 
"therapeutic” or "creative" as the right term is not 
easy or certain one. It dépends from which angle or 
with what interest one looks to Wittgenstein for 
inspiration.
By the same token, when Wittgenstein does offer 
a reductionist account, a similar dilemma may suggest 
itself, and the ohdice made of the characterisation 
will be informed by the prejudice of the critic.
It is therefore open to Hems to say that Wittgenstein 
is, when reductionist, only in horror of non-verifi- 
able entities, it remains, however, for him to prove
45%,
this to us, and it is submitted that, in that aooount 
I earlier gave re *intentionality’eto. neither Hems 
nor Findlay has shown at all that "acts: of meaning" 
are as important, if they exist in the shape these 
two propose for their existence, as they suggest.
To base upon such flimsy possibilities of ’intention­
ality’ etc. which future generations of phenomenologists 
have still to reveal, such savage criticism of 
Wittgenstein as beset with some neurotic fear of the 
unknown (the phenomenological or existential "angoisse" 
or "délaissement", we are to suppose), is not at all 
justified.
This misconstrual, however, does not need but 
certainly is most clearly shown in a phenomenological 
setting* It is a measure of the care needed by, and 
here shown to, the writings of Wittgenstein that such 
an astute commentator as Strawson can similarly mis­
interpret as verification!St in its inspiration, a 
submission on Wittgenstein's part based on entirely 
different premises. This may be illustrated by con­
sidering the Philosophical Investigations^^ where 
Wittgenstein considers the attempt of an imaginary 
person to identify his own pain, as sensed and then 
identified with a particular reading on a manometer 
which measures blood-pressure. As Kenny rightly points 
put, in W i t t g e n s t e i n s the conclusion to this para­
graph, which repays plose consideration, i.e. that 
the ritual of the "scientific" checking of inner 
sense and objective, but non-linguistio, recording 
device, is just an empty "show", is not because one 
cannot trust one’s memory - that would indeed be a 
yerificationist*s account, and indeed Htrawson
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#0 argues, in his interpretation of this paragraph,-'^
Wittgenstein's conclusion is has ad upon an examin­
ation of what exactly is going on or achieved by the 
apparently scientific test. On examination, it ia a 
total sham, and one which does not at all depend upon 
the fallibility or non-verifiable nature of the memory 
of the would-be scientist. In summary then it may be 
said that both fail to see to what extent Wittgenstein’s 
philosophy as a whole is therapeutic, and^to vindicate 
it against accusations of errors it still retains from 
that verifioationist background it developed needs only 
a careful, reasonable and, importantly, non-prejudiced 
reading or understanding of its real and fundamental 
submissions, however complex and difficult in analysis 
these might prove.
3. 1 now wish finally to consider the third and last
major criticism of ordinary language philosophy, as 
set forth at the beginning of this chapter, namely 
that it was, in the last analysis, not only vague 
but of its nature merely the subjective opinionation 
of the ordinary language philosophers themselves; 
this entails that their description of any matters under 
analysis could never profess to be based upon any 
objective appeal to our beliefs as true and unique 
statement of reality. I may characterise this alleg- - 
ation, or defect, in perhaps a clearer or more useful 
way, and at the same time show that ordinary language 
philosophers are already apprised of this "rift in 
their lute", by quoting J.b. Austin’s own statements 
in recognition of this haaard inherent in the venture 
pf ordinary language analysis.
Re says there, by way of a prelude to an examination
of excuses, voluntary and involuntary, "There are... 
snags in linguistic philosophy.,,The first is the 
snag of the loose (or divergent or alternative) usages 
and the second the crux of the tost word."^^ His own 
response to these "snags" is briefly to argue that a 
disagreement over two possible descriptions or 
analyses of a loose concept, however vexatious in 
itself, still "can hardly fail to be, on explanation, 
illuminating", and to assert that, even if ordinary 
language philosophy cannot ever hope to provide a 
categorical aooount of an unequivooable reality, it 
is, and should always, be the first word. Such a 
short reply to criticisms does not do anywhere near 
full justice to them, nor afford other than a pointer 
to where we may in fact find a satisfactory answer.
I do not of course intend by this any serious criticism 
of Austin for "short-changing", that now very modish 
philosophical malpractice; for it is his purpose in 
the article here cited to offer an example or explain 
the method of ordinary language philosophy, and that 
too, as applied within the area of moral philosophy.
In relation to a consideration of critical values, 
it may well be said, indeed there may be no more to 
pay than that, if x thinks ABO and y thinks BEF etc., 
then that "loose usage" or alternative mode of 
description illumines or discloses a fundamental 
difference in values; there our analysis ends, at 
least in so far as it is merely an analysis of different, 
but applicable or possible, descriptions of the same 
situation. It ie indeed this ethical concern on his 
part which has led him to select the matter of excuses,
for ways in whtoh the study of excuses may throw 
light upon ethics. By the some token, once we have 
exposed underlying vaiue-struotures, we may proceed 
only via their examination some way towards the last 
word.
For epiptemology and other non-primarily evaluative 
philosophical oonoerns, a more thorough vindication 
is needed. The problem of human action, for example, 
is not purely, or even primarily, one of moral philo­
sophy or jurisprudence; it is not to be elucidated 
merely by considerations of how we wish in any type 
situation to apportion responsibility, or otherwise 
pragmatically to respond to situations where it is 
importantly in issue whether x or y did ABO eto,
Qn a more general level too, ordinary language philo­
sophy is concerned, as we have seen with the concepts 
of 'meaning', ’thought*, * rule' eto, in the characteris­
ation of which one surely wants more than the first 
word, and nowhere pretends to seek an evaluation#
One wants to  be o b je c tiv e ly  successfu l, o r, i f  th a t  
goal is  poss ib ly  too id e a l is t  or e lu s iv e , a t  le a s t  
so to  examine one* s method to  re fu te  any suggestion  
th a t ab i n i t i o  such an id e a l is  not te n a b le , I  
th e re fo re  propose now, more c lo s e ly  than A ustin , 
to  t r y  to  a r t ic u la te  or id e n t i fy  what in  fa c t does 
emerge from a ty p ic a l o rd in ary  language an a lys is  
scheme, or how ra th e r  i t  so emerges and exerts  a 
le g it im a te  c la im  upon our b e l ie f .
V/e want, in fact, tp see what sort of thing 
Hart is doing, or how his readers are persuaded, 
when he says, for example, rules are not always 
imperative; the gunman situation is not that of all 
laws, and all obedience to them, or rules have an
internal applicability to us, as bound by them, or 
playing the game in question, not a merely external 
one, as though we were observers* We want to see 
why it is or what there is in this explication that 
we should prefer to aooept it, for example, rather 
than Hoss"^^ who says the "internal sense" of a rule 
is not one of being a part of it as practising it, 
but feeling literally and imperatively bound by it#
Other similar differences of explanation and our 
preference for one or the other are endemic in 
ordinary language philosophy - should we see, as 
Ryle would have it, in The Qonoept of Mind, that we 
use the terms volimtary/involuntary only, or most 
characteristically, when it is a matter of blaming 
somebody, or Feinberg, in his article "Action and 
Responsibility" where he argues that they are used 
in "acts of accrediting" (i.e* a praise or blame 
Situation), or Austin, who, in "A Plea for Excuses", 
contemplates a much wider frame of reference for the 
same words.
The explanation of these diverse accounts, and 
our ultimate preference for one particular as superior 
or inpre accurate can only be provided by a consideration, 
stage by stage, of the construction of such descriptions. 
In the following suggested schématisation of the "Oompare/ 
contrast" method of ordinary language philosophy, 1 
am greatly indebted to E.T* Gendlin’s article "What 
are the grounds of explication,"^^whioh, however 
tendentious a solution it offers, at least recognises 
and faces up squarely to, as seldom done, an important 
problem*
We may see the following stages, or component 
"elements" in the typical ordinary language analysis;
/  I ‘
1* We examine philosophioal oonoepts as used in the 
world, with no a priori assumptions guiding or con­
stricting our examination #
2. When Wittgenstein etc, describes a situation by 
showing it as somehow to be contrasted with another, 
he adverts only by implication to a quality or aspect 
implicit in the one situation, not the other* No
assertions of inner processes eto. are 
, nor indeed are they possible.
3. These hidden qualities are not formulated in any 
precise statement of identification; in fact, the 
words used to describe a situation are clearly in no 
"name-objeot" relationship to the elements of the 
situation described. Our recognition of them as a 
true or acceptable account is based on how they appeal 
to us, whether we "feel" they are right.
4* The descriptions offered are, of course, couched 
in the words of their author, and in fact, necessarily 
autobiographic of their author’s own "feelings".
b* In having this personal "feeling" of, and recognising 
by sympathy or coherence with the feeling of 4., we ! 
thereby are led on to seeing, via the implicit adverting, 
what fundamentally is or exists in a situation. It is 
in this seeing "more" or "more deeply" that ordinary 
language analysis is genuinely a heuristic device, 
a device of philosophical explication which operates 
by rendering us conscious of the full and correct 
appreciation of philosophical concepts by implicit 
evocations, in the philosopher*0 description of them, 
of a full import which hitherto we did not possess.
Haying thus set out the persuasion sequence of 
the typical ordinary language philosophy analysis, 
we can see exactly where the allegation of sub­
jectivity threatens the basic validity of the enter­
prise. It seems to be the case, per 3 and 4 above, 
that basically it is a question of feeling (subjectivity 
on our part) and a choice of particular presentation 
(subjectivity on the philosopher’s part), agreement 
of these is in itself no proof of objectivity, as 
though mere consensus rendered feelings objective.
At this stage, two solutions may be offered to 
this dilemma. Much previous mention has been made of 
the therapeutic role of ordinary language philosophy, 
and already I have made clear just to what extent this 
therapeutic role is useful and valid. It might now be 
suggested, as the solution, that this happy congruence 
of feeling really is enough to justify ordinary language 
philosophy. Inst as psychoanalysis operates at an 
implicit level, surmises in very general terms about 
the uartioularlv coloured or framed neuroses of the 
patient’s disorder etc.i so too does philosophy about 
its concepts etc. It is irrelevant to both, so the 
argument goes, to unearth exactly or make explicit 
what that neurosis is, because, the aim being therapy, 
peace of mind or congruence of feelings about philo­
sophic problems is the object of the exercise. In 
both cases, we are ridding our subjects of compulsions, 
whether to wash one’s faoe or seek essentialist 
solutions eto.
1 feel bound, especially in view of what I have 
already said on this issue of the therapeutic role of 
philosophy, and no less upon the merits of the matter,
tP pay that this solution, ip not the best or fairest 
solution that can be offered. To provide this, it is 
neoessary to consider again the stages of the e%- 
plication-sohema of ordinary language analysis as 
set out above, where it is noted that, firstly and 
fpremostly, the examination is an empirical one, with 
an eye to the facts as they are. It is necessary then, 
so far from seeing the whole exercise as merely 
the evocation of "feelings", to see what the relation­
ship of those same feelings is to the world of be­
haviour and experience, the description of which 
evoked them, and it is precisely a consideration of 
this which will show why ordinary language analysis 
can claim to offer an objective explication of the 
subject matters.
Firstly, the distinction between philosophical , 
analysis, or rather, the sort of experience or activity 
that it is, and our experience in the world must be 
appreciated; here it is perhaps not surprising that 
the phenomenologist’s terminology is most readily 
suggested, where the former concerns the reflective, 
or thetic, and the latter, the non-refleotive mode 
of consciousness* In these terms, the genuine con­
viction of a theory operating via an inexplicit 
adverting to things in theory, whose reality is 
explicit in behaviour, is achieved when the two 
converge and mutually inform towards a ^ore fully 
experienced and correctly perceived reality. In 
terms of ordinary language, this conviction is not 
ths product of a logomachy, where real descriptions 
fight in the "lists" of philosophical journals, but 
achieved by a comparison and an application of these 
descriptions to actual experience, a comparison process
which must constantly continue and transcend the 
period of their precise temporal formulation. It is 
the case, simply, that one believes Wittgenstein eto. 
to be right, or that one generally recognise# Hart’s 
insight, re rules of law, as correct, not because we 
read it in his book, but in virtue of a continuing 
application of those suggestions to, and in, our 
experience.
This relationship of theoretical account or 
description, and empirical application is a re­
ciprocal or mutually informative one, in much the 
same way, to cite more mundane example, the theory 
of accounting, or football **4-2-4" strategy is 
related to financial or football practices. None 
would say that the practices awaited a theory- 
rather they pre-existed it; equally none would deny 
that the practices as now informed by the theory are 
what they were.
3o too, when philosophers do contribute to the 
elucidation of a concept, make it more fully appreci­
able, that insight and its validity consists in ex­
tending not just our appreciation-of-the concept, 
but extending the conoept-as-appreciated, which latter 
extension, it is submitted, cannot be the product, 
as alleged, of mere subjective opinionation on the 
part of ordinary language philosophy.
Summary$
It will be useful now to summarise the defence 
above provided for ordinary language philosophy.
That synopsised apology oan then be applied to, and 
its universailseable value qua apology assessed 
against, yet another formulation of these criticisms.
As earlier said, with reference to Hems and Findlay,'*'^ 
these are rather the exemplars than the sole proprietors 
pf a set of common criticisms more differentiated by 
their particular expression than their genuine sub­
stantive content; this difference has been seen to 
spring in the main part from those ulterior motives 
the critic entertains. Here will be considered the 
criticism offered by Ernst Gellner in his Words 
and Things.
In sum then, it has here been argued
1# That structural linguists have misconstrued the 
course of the linguistic emphasis in m odem philo­
sophy; their accusations against it, of being trivial, 
anti'-généralisâtion prejudiced, and an apparent obstacle 
tp the underlying structural reality of language are 
thus unfounded. .
2. That ordinary language philosophy is not, in 
fact, simply therapeutic or dissolutive in intent 
or effect; it is a genuinely heuristic exercise in 
philosophy, and is a set of substantive doctrines.
3. That it does not deny the inner or private event, 
or "collapse" the subject etc. as a reductionist be­
haviourism would do.
4* That it is still less a mere dissolution of philo- 
sophioal spéculation, or, if you like, a "terminal" 
philosophy. These allegations oan he made good neither 
by an ad hominem attack upon Wittgenstein as neurotically 
or yerificationistioally in fear of the new, or dis­
covery, or being misunderstood, eto. or by any accurate 
consideration of the substance of its doctrines. Neither 
Wittgenstein nor any fellow linguistic philosopher 
commits the suicide of philosophy; their findings leave 
philosophy, if not perfectly well, at least very aliye, 
and it is a suggestion too facile for belief that any 
philosopher practising the techniques etc. of that 
philosophy imagines nothing remains to solve.
5. Finally, I exhibited a schématisation of the method 
or mechanics of the heures!s of the insights of that 
philosophy which shows these latter as objectively 
valid and beyond reproaches of subjectivity or 
fickleness etc.
In considering the work of Gellner, there will be 
heard a repetition perhaps more polemical and tart in 
its expression but little different in substance from 
the criticisms earlier reviewed, and, if the length 
of the work be any reliable yardstick, certainly as 
well considered. While it is my general purpose to 
demonstrate the universality of the defence here 
offered, it shall be my particular aim to reveal that 
aspect of criticisms of Wittgenstein earlier noted, 
that, too prominently, his critics wish not so much 
to comment upon his views as to use that commentary, 
suitably coloured, as a vehiole of their own philo­
sophical ideas. It needs no lengthy recital of the 
earlier caveat, that, like the Greeks and their presents, 
we should fear philosophers and their critiques of
Wittgenstein#
Gellner’# criticisms, briefly lest their repetitious 
familiarity be tiresome, are aa follows?
Ita foimder, the later Wittgenstein, "was obaeaaed 
by the inevitability of being miaunderatood...the good 
work for such philosophers to do in the future is.,., 
euthanasia of philosophy...or endlessly protracted 
prophylaxis...this is the Night Watchman theory of
philosophy."47 of. Hems.
"Evasiveness is implicit in the ideas and in the 
practice of ordinary language philosophy^®...It re­
duces communication to a blind ritual.."49 of. Findlay.
- Ordinary language philosophy is the "refusal to 
grant philosophic l ic en ce" so. to  go beyond the 
expressions of ordinary linguistic usage in quest, 
it is easily inferred from the context, of "meanings", 
"discoveries" etc. Again of. Findlay’s grievances.
r- It treats generalisatiqns "with utmost reserve, 
if not with contempt...generality per se is treated 
either as an index of falsehood or at least harmful 
in philosophy."
It is an attempt "to undermine and paralyse one 
of the most important kinds of thinking, namely 
intellectual advance through consistency and unification.."^^ 
One here has a very strong echo both of the complaint 
and the specious pleading of Kata (q.v.)
In essence, "it is a naturalism propagated as a 
mystic revelation."This accusation, is yet another 
reference to that pernicious stylistic sophistry that 
allows Wittgenstein so to beguile us, like some philo­
sophic poylla on to the shipwreck of our philosophical
endeavours. Again, Hems and Findlay.
These statements not only make Gellner* s low 
appreciation of ordinary language philosophy obvious 
but mark it, in substance, as little different from 
those earlier considered and reguarded. To consider 
now the arguments adduced to mount these criticisms, 
Gellner tells us this philosophical approach suffers 
from "disastrous defects"; this may be shown by con­
sidering what he calls, with that tartness, or perhaps 
more accurately, philippic tone of mockery that 
characterises his work, "the Four Pillars of Ordinary 
language P h i l o s o p h y . " ^4 These are;
1, The argument from the paradigm case.(APO is
Gellner* s own shorthand.)
2. The generalised version of the Naturalistic Fallacy. 
3* The contrast theory of meaning#
4, polymorphism.*
He argues that each of these "pillars" is, in 
fact, structurally unsound.
Firstly, the APO goes as follows; a word’s meaning 
i# its use - we use the word "table" - therefore tables 
exist or, in the case of free will, since we use terms 
such as "doing"'xy« of one’s own choice", thef*efore 
free will must exist in those terms. Of this character­
isation, or rather caricature, of the "oompare-and- 
contrast" method logical devioe of ordinary language 
philosophy it will here merely be said that it is a 
massively simplistic distortion of that devioe, as 
here exemplified. Of Gellner’s desire so to character­
ise it to argue that the APO, as such, is inapplicable
* It is interesting to note the vast difference between 
his selection of the four cardinal elements of ordinary 
language philosophy and those four suggested by the 
writer in 0hapter 1 of this thesis.
. . f .
to "philosophio theories about the nature or very 
existenoe of a whole c a t e g o r y " I  shall later return.
Secondly, ordinary language philosophers perniciously 
argue out of usage a norm* Their constant ploy is to say 
that whatever i^ the usage must be and should be the usage; 
all other usages or construals arc either wrong or logic­
ally impossible. Indeed, if fact and norm are equated, 
these two terms are anyway indifferentiable. Of this, 
it is again to be said that, simply, it is not true»
There is a clear and by now unoontroyersial distinction 
between a use as competent, and a use as {evaluatively) 
improper. There can be, in a language, for example, 
a competent i.e. well-formed sentence, which is never- 
thelcss, in terms of grammar or propriety to the occasion 
eto. a bad or socially unacceptable use.
How it is oonceded by linguistic philosophers (Gellner 
quotes Urmson and F l e w ) t h a t  this distinction may have 
been on occasion overlooked, and this concession surely 
does pot invalidate the distinction, but helps, if any­
thing to demarcate it. Of Gellner*s rejection of this
concession on the basis that "virtually All philosophic
>  ...
problems are problems of value" ’ I shall say here only 
that ho is quite mistaken, and return later to its further 
consideration* ,
In regard to the third "pillar" of ordinary language 
(wisdom, the sarcasm is intended to suggest), Gellner 
says that it argues that all terms have meaning insofar 
as there are some things referred to by the term end, 
equally indispensable to the meaning, there exist some 
things which are not referred to by that term* He con­
tinues to say that "the model underlying the attraction 
of the contrast theory of meaning suggests that language 
falls neatly into games, systems that are fully determinate....
the W t t % m 0teihim. app^QGO# (Ip Qhe pf) thought 
Qoueistiug ot mpvee withlu pre-^exleting 
$hte l3 a hrutalty inadequate and inaccurate aooouht 
oi ordinary ianguage theories of meaning? and in 
direct oontraat to what aooount has here, in Chapter 
1 and elsewhere, been given of the meaning of a word 
being its use, and the looseness of the boundaries of 
Ïlanguage-games», rules eto; it is further rather 
suspioiously out of aooord with other oritioinms of 
the same oritio, under the head of polymorphism’’ 
that linguistic philosophy is evasive and obfusoatas 
the matters of its analysis.
Again, to the reason for this distortion on his
part, i.e. to introduce his own submission that, far
from neat predetermined linguistic headings, *’a far
truer piotvtre of the progress of thought associated
with hogelianism (is wanted)»', I shall later return,
Finally? on polymorphism dellner argues that ordinary
language philosophy disastrously eoaggerates the
variegation and diversity of linguistic usage. Ha
does concede that these qualities are in the nature
of logical and empirical truths of language which
^consists of a variety of activities and contains
60
elements and tools of different types." Underlying 
the e^caggeration of these truths? Qellner discerns 
two fallacious ideas, firstly? the possibility of 
»! an idiographio science" and, secondly? the possibility 
of conceptual neutrality.
Of those two alleged fallacies? it may at once 
be said that dellper exaggerates th© extent or 
significance of dootrines such as »family-rosemblanoe» 
of» •’hanguage-.gfimos* etc. as composing some form o.f 
» supor^nominalism» . fhis is not so, as can be seen from 
the number of commentators who, on the same data? argue
that Wittgenstein eto. is in faot reintroducing the 
categories or oonoepts or universais of an orthodox 
realism. One has even argued that those notions should 
he seen as, or may usefully he interpreted as, a 
solution hy synthesis of the nominalist^realist debate.
Of the second matter, it ia hardly surprising that 
one who confesses to seeing the problems of philosophy 
as problems of value must emphasisethis particular 
criticism of polymorphism; it is perhaps oonvenient, 
at this juncture, to consider, as promised, that general 
view of philosophy held by Gellner which so obviously 
informs and intrudes upon his criticism of ordinary 
language philosophy. ,
'basically, Qollner is a philosopher of the traditional 
or ’'grand» school. Philosophy he sees as composed of or 
concerned with questions "about categories as a whole, 
about the viability, possibility, desirability of 
whole species of thinking." He considers that philosophy . 
if it is to be linguistic, is to be concerned "with 
the valid use of a term, fhat is what philosophy has 
always meant and this is precisely why cast philosonhera ' 
WÈre not temoted to be nhilolo^ists or lexioogranhers." 
(Gfellner’s stress). It is this grand view that induces 
in him inevitably an immense contempt for what he calls 
the apotheosis or idolatry of ordinary usage, too hum^ 
drum for this patrician of philosophers. He sees the • 
"cult" of ordinary language as an affront to this exalted 
pursuit. When linguistic philosophers suggest that ordinary 
usage be authoritative, they trivialfse, they demean, 
they try to commit the euthanasia of philosophy etc. 
dellner sees "the job of philosophy as perhaps to unravel 
presuppositions of old contrasts, or to discover con­
trasts where hitherto none had been p e r c e i v e d . T o  
such a view, there cannot be countenanced any view of
philosophy as merely dissolutive. Wiore importantly it 
may he remarked that ouch a prejudice is responsible 
in Hellner’0 case for seeing only, from ©yes clouded 
with the anger pf th© affronted Hegelian at th© lese­
ma jest e of Wittgenstein and his too too ordinary 
usage, a dissolutive and not the equally prominent 
innovative role of his philosophy.
Gellner sees philosophy further "as a reassessing 
of our terms, reassessing the norms built into them.."^^ 
and its discoveries as tending" to be the establishment 
or discovery of a new kind of more satisfactory , more 
suggestive or more perceptive language...a discovery 
or construction which generally foliov/s on criticisms 
of existing use."^^ Doubtless we can be excused from 
presumptuousness if we infer that h© would consider 
Hegel as an example of orthodox, not only ideal, 
philosophy. Ihese two tasks, innovation and reassessment 
of inbuilt norms, he sees no doubt to be effected or 
effect that "intellectual advance through consistency 
and unification, through th© attainment of coherence 
and the elimination (by synthesis?) of exceptions.
divan such a view of philosophy, and one so anti­
thetical to ordinary language philosophy, it is scarcely 
likely that Gfellner could be other than dangerously 
antipathetic to the dootrines of that philosophy.
When he says that that latter is a naturalism pro­
pagated as a mystic revelation, he is not making a 
mere stylistic censure, but almost lamenting the faat 
that it is not the philosophy it is propagated as.
He imagines wrongly that the innovative and evaluative 
dimensions of philosophy cannot be reached via 
ordinary language but are along accessible by the old- 
fashioned approach, lhat this is not so must surely 
be apparent from what has been seen of the genuinely
new insights widely recognised be suoh in the works 
of Wittgenstein and others, in moral philosophy, e.g. 
that of Feinherg (q.v.), or Hare, eto.( 67)achievable 
by the devices of ordinary language philosophy.
lhat Oellner should be so blind to this and in 
consequence offer so exaggerated, unfair and dis­
torted a criticism is clearly to be accounted to 
that author*s manifest prejudices and preferences in 
philosophy.* It has here been shown how the bare sub­
stance of his criticism i.e. tloat it is anti-generalis­
ation, merely dissolutive etc. merely echo others from 
which that philosophy may plausibly be vindicated. It 
has been shown too how the manner or the styling of 
these criticisms on the part of Gfellner is directly 
related to his philosophical predilections, and, 
frankly, on their merits, prejudices apart, cannot 
persuade anyone who prefers an objective standpoint to 
sharing the critic's prejudice. Gellner's argument, on 
a strictly logical assessment, is shallow, simplistic 
and contrived, qualities which perhaps are inevitably 
the hallmarks of polemical writings.
That this is so is justification for stressing 
again that the consideration of criticisms of ordinary 
language philosophy, a philosophy whose business is 
so centrally the criticism of past philosophical errors 
that it necessarily must overturn many cherished idols,
* Ihpse views held by Gellner, that philosophy is about 
conceptual systems or is a matter of the norms inbuilt 
in our language etc. cannot here receive any full 
account or assessment; the criticisms of ordinary 
language philosophy is anyway, for Gfellner as much 
as for the writer, an unlikely context for such an 
assessment •
is a task needing careful attention not only to the 
merits, but also to the provenance of the critique 
in question, further, it may likewise be stressed again 
that, contrary to the submissions of Gfellner, inter alios, 
ordinary language philosophy is no simple, final or 
unequivocal philosophical statement; in respect of the 
doctrine of rule-governed behaviour, for example, or 
meaning-as-use, or the still quite undetermined problem 
of the relationship of language to the ontology pf the 
world, or the problems of humam action etc., the insights 
presently offered by this philosophy are far from the 
last word, either in fact or in profession.
In view of this partial indeterminacy and equivoc­
ality, there is need of a careful and objective attentive­
ness in evaluating it both as a method of philosophy 
and as a set of doctrines formulated by the application 
of that method.: These two qualities could otherwise 
offer too easy an avenue for the introduction of ulterior 
and misleading considerations. It would be unfortunate; 
that the services of this method of philosophy, here 
put forward as genuinely and objectively heuristic as 
much as therapeutic, should be lost by too tenacious 
and stubborn retention of those prejudices it was 
designed if not to remove, at least to mellow*
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In fairness, it must be recognised that Clellner 
could not, in 1959, have the benefit of this 
work, it must surely dispel forever any notion 
that, in moral philosophy, ordinary langu8,ge 
philosophers must argue norms from usage. The 
major purpose of this work is to show precisely 
that the nature of moral language and argument 
requires., indeed poetulatee a freedom of etliichl 
commitment quite unoiroumBcribed by common linguistic 
usage or any other matter. Nor is this to argUe the 
reality of free will in moral behaviour; Hare's 
point is rather that all, whether freewill theorists 
or detei'minist, must, if they are at all to be 
moral agents or morally principled, subscribe to 
standards of rationality i.e. the consistency and 
coherency of conduct which are implicit in the 
Universalis ability which Hare argues is the 
logical property of moral judgements and principles.
CHAPTER 4.
JURISPRUDENCE - AH' ALTERNATIVE APPROACH,
Up to this point of my investigation of juris­
prudence, its problems, and how they may be best 
approached, I have concentrated on ordinary language 
techniques, considering in turn,
1. their philosophical foundation, or warrant,
2. their application both as seen in the writings 
of Hart etc., and as allowing yet further scope 
of application in correction and extension of 
that wi'iter’s contributions to jurisprudence, 
and, most lately,
3* considering anew the propriety of such a method
in the light of those grave criticisms it has 
attracted »
It is no'w proposed, therefore, to relieve this 
otherwise too exclusive concentration on my part, by 
considering, by way of contrast and the lessons that 
may emerge more clearly in the conflict of comparison, 
an alternative view of the problejns of jurisprudence.
This will be that, principally, of Olivecrona,^ who 
may be introduced shortly as realist; one instantly 
sees him, thus labelled, as a very different juris­
prudential species, insofar as "party" or"school" 
nomenclatures are significant, from Hart, who has already, 
in the Concept of Law pronounced strong criticism on 
doctrines of one type or another loosely grouped to­
gether as realist.
It may well be asked, them, why, of alternative 
"camps" or theories, of jurisprudence, should I select 
Legal Realism; secondly, of the large and diverse set
of views held by many still properly termed Realists,
2why should I choose Olivecrona? Gould not Kelsen, as 
an exponent of normative legal science be chosen, or
u  fp-
less esoteric, some American vindicator of modern 
revived natural law^ doctrine, or the newest of neo- 
Hegelian*^ dialectical state-will theorist?
To the first question, it may be replied that a 
number of factors make Legal Realism a good choice 
for my purposes of comparison:-
1. It currently enjoys no little favour within that 
small community of the public to whom a good, or 'sound* 
jurisprudential account is, in fact, a desideratum.
It is thus well-documented, widely taught, however 
superficially, perhaps owing this popularity to the 
basic appeal it makes to common-sense, or 'business­
like* attitude; it gets if you like to the médias res 
in which all good lawyers since Cicero like to see 
themselves.
2. In terms, too, of its development, the Realist 
schools are relatively new arrivals on the stage of 
jurisprudential debate. From our present position in 
1978, v/e need not strain our eyes in hindsight looking 
merely to the late lyth century to observe its earlieat 
germination. It thus affords us a 'handy* closed micro- 
cosmic view of a complete school of thought and its 
development and adjustment via various trials, criticisms, 
and refinements, its ramification into various sub-schools, 
in fine, its consolidation in maturity to a jurisprudence 
of weighty significance. This admittedly purely contingent 
virtue, i.e. one that should not, though may well, have
©o ipso won anyone’s allegiance to it, is not one we 
can, for obvious reasons, find within the Natural Law 
School,^ however many other 'virtues' Plato, or Aquinas 
or Grotius etc. care to discover there; still less can 
it be found within schools of positive law whose history 
and documentation are coterminous, and as daunting in
scale, as that of post-renaissance society.
As to the intrinsic merits of a realist account,
I shall not adduce these at this stage, hoping that 
they will, as here examined, speak in their own 
vindication.
To the second question, my choice of Olivecrona, 
it is not disputed that others, for reasons just as 
persuasive, could have been considered; notwithstanding, 
I consider the following facts sufficient justifications-
1. Bearing in mind that schools of jurisprudence are 
not like sets of chess-men, etc. where membership is 
a definite constructive relationship of one to its neigh­
bour, Olivecrona is a member of the "Uppsala group" 
of Scandinavian Realists.^ Without prejudice to fuller 
explanation at a later stage, it may safely here be 
said that this branch of Realism represents the most 
vigorous and well-rooted development of that philosophy; 
while American Realism has clearly long descended from 
its apogee, maybe even burned out into a rather life­
less behaviourism of jurimetrics, and the many doctrines 
it maintained, and other wilder realist notions, e.g* 
Nazi doctrines of Pree-Lav/,^ have expired or been seen 
as children only of their times, Scandinavian Realism 
has survived beyond the teething stage, and its genuine 
contribution to jurisprudence, far beyond the empty 
sensationalism of the original realist ’message*, is 
now recognised beyond effacement.
2« Just as a relatively junior school of philosophy 
proclaims its parentage, or makes it easy to discern 
its ursprung or philosophical provenance, the works of 
one of its seminal writers do afford a transparent view
of their soirrces, and casual, periodic additions culled 
from various other influences,
Olivecrona's works, dating from 1939-71, allow 
a commentator to see within them what basic, raw matters 
he has fashioned into his ovm submissions. This is no 
accusation of shallowness, in the perjorative sense
being
of/^transparent or plagiarism - the heritage of juris­
prudence is no one person’s possession - rather this 
manner of composition is to be expected in the nature 
of things. It will be borne in mind that one who tries 
to establish a new school of thought may amend, try 
again or retract, and these too with our encouragement 
rather than censure. In later consideration, then, 
of Olivecrona’s development as a thinker and theorist, 
and, to some extent, that of Alf Ross,'a fellow realist, 
a consideration made easier by its youthfulness in 
terms indicated, there will be seen among other matters, 
no small alterations in their opinions on vital problems 
of jurisprudence; it is my point that it is this very 
growth of ideas albeit erratic or episodic, and the
4»irm, ■n.intjnnu.u.» f
insight we may easily have into them, that justifies 
hiw now being singled out for examination.
The Writings of Karl Olivecrona.
Olivecrona is readily identified in the popular
mind of jurisprudence as a writer belonging to the
Scandinavian School of that discipline. It is common,
therefore, to see him bracketed in treatment with his
7fellow members of that school, Alf Ross, Lundstedt,
7
and their common mentor, Axel Hagerstrom; so much is 
this so that until a certain level of jurisprudential 
research is reached^ Olivecrona's individuality, as 
are the others', is somewhat obscured by the generalised 
treatment that such a categorisation as a school of 
thought naturally induces.
ï/e thus have one reason for the determination 
here made to give him individual attention, but an­
other more complex may be added;- it is that the 
views of Ross and Olivecrona have each developed, 
possibly in a meandering fashion away from the source 
motivations of Hagerstrom, to whom alone Limdstedt 
remains close. Charting such meanderings in an en bloc 
manner is not only likely to obscure a correct under­
standing of the individual's standpoint in a welter 
of ill-differentiated details, but likely to divert 
us from a labour of individual analysis which is 
burdensome enough and rewarding enough for our direct 
and undeviating attention. To example the shortcomings 
of an en bloc treatment, one may consider G «MacCormaok®s 
not uninformative synopsis of "Scandinavian Realism."
The article, as it stands, is helpful, does apply some 
cogent, if summary, criticism of the thought of the 
school, but is marred by the author's desire, doubtless 
for economic reasons etc., to get from the A-2 of 
Scandinavian Realism, all ideas and personalities 
concerned in it in a mere.. 20 pages*
I will therefore postpone until a later and more 
strategic stage any comparisons of Olivecrona's work 
with those of other members of the school, and commence 
rather by considering another formative influence upon 
his work, that of the ’writings of Leon Fetrazycki* The 
name, and the theories of its bearer, are by no means 
familiar in jurisprudence - in fact, references to 
his work in the common run of jurisprudence manuals 
are exceedingly rare, and it is Olivecrona himself^ 
who briefly, in one paragraph, mentions that author 
"the remarkable Polish-Russian Philosopher", as 
providing one of the earliest non-voluntaristic 
accounts of the efficacy and validity etc. of a legal
system* Such short mention is surprising, given that 
Olivecrona is hy his own profession committed to the 
project of providing such a non-voluntaristic account, 
and had already in 1947 published^^ a lengthy critique 
of that philosopher’s theory*
One later finds however, from Timasheff, the editor
11of Petrazycki's major work Law and Morality, which
provides us with a comprehensive version of his view of
a legal system, in the introduction of that work, the
following illuminating observation* .There has
arisen a new school of law (sc. Scandinavian), the
so-called Uppsala School...(concerned with) the problem
of a realistic interpretation of law on a psychological
basis* They try to replace the objective "ought to be"
(belonging to the realm of ideas) with the subjective
experience of right and duty* This is very close to
1 ?Petrazycki’s theory***"*
Like Olivecrona, them, Petrazycki, sees as the 
cardinal problems of the science of law, as a genuine 
fulfilling academic discipline to replace the jejune 
strivings of contemporary and earlier jurisprudence,^^ 
the discovery of the origins and development of law 
within society* In an anti-metaphysical manner, with 
continual emphasis upon the facts, likewise to be 
shared with Olivecrona, he will clear the table from 
the outset of all empty notions of natural law, 
positivist sovereigns, state or general wills, and 
all such traditional cant and jurisprudential humbugo
Giving himself thus a fresh start, a new "cue for 
action", he embarks upon the fabrication of a (then) 
quite innovative theory, which, in its time, caused 
that rare academic phenomenon of packed leoture-halls 
as his theories captivated in their novelty and appeal 
the attention of the whole university of St* Petersburg, 
not merely its Law Faculty* Among the elements of this
-J.U4'
theory, there can be seen many notions of central 
importance which I think can be seen rehearsed, though 
re-applied, in Olivecrona’s writings. Lest it be 
thought from the specialised treatment or attitude 
here shown to Petrazycki, however, that his work 
repays our attention to it only as an aid to under­
standing Olivecrona, I should add that Podgorecki in 
Law and Society, g o e s  so far as to date the beginnings, 
or at least, the earliest positive préfigurations of a 
modern sociology of law as apparent within Petrazycki's 
seminal writings of I69O. We do well here to reflect 
upon the clear sociological strains in Olivecrona*s 
work to the effect that law and language are tools 
alike of social utility; this reflection will make it 
appear less than surprising and much less than fortuitous 
that there is such close similarity between their re­
spective uses of ’psychological ideas’, 'legal imper­
atives’ both of which concepts Olivecrona will utilise 
in that synthesis of legal causality. This he professes 
to be his main object in Law as Pact, or in his own 
terms the "nature of law in the community"
The Imperative-Attributive Theory of L. Petrazycki.
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It is his aim to replace the inadequate theories 
of the jurisprudence of his day, which Petrazycki found 
as dissatisfying as, he says, Kant found that of his 
times. The following are the major articles of his 
theory.
1. He laments the lack of a properly scientific 
method; he remarks that "the principal - though not 
the only - obstacle to the successful construction 
of the sciences of law and morality, is the lack of a 
proper scientific methodology..." ' These two matters,
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law and ethics, he sees as closely comparable, to 
be distinguished as being respectively, imperative- 
attributive, i.e. postulating, or dependent upon the 
postulation of, a reciprocal right-and-duty on a personal 
level, and, in the case of morals, simply attributive*
2o To provide that scientific method of analysis for
these matters, he introduces a scientific theory of
the psychology of human action; it is submitted that
the operative causes or motivation of human action,
as against that of other lesser animals, on the
legal, moral and aesthetic value-planes, are 'impulsions'
17He defined these as a bilateral blend of passive 
sensations of lack, and active sensations (adpetitus, 
urge, aspirations being synonyms) of desire. It is 
in respect of this bilaterality this between-and- 
betwixt of control by and control of our desires, 
that man's unique situation is defined.
In the ethico-legal situation, an appropriate 
impulsion would consist in its passive aspect of 
the cognition or appreciation of a situation, com­
porting its morally or legally exigent phenomena or 
indices; in its active aspect, it would consist of a 
sense or image of an action appropriate or possible 
in those circumstances to fulfil the requirement of 
the legal or moral duty therein implicit. The re­
sultant actions on the legal plane of the host of 
an impulsion, are the precipitate then of the store 
of sensations or impulsions in the mind of the actor 
himself, not the result of any externally posited 
commands, of either a natural lav/, or supreme 
sovereign"who is habitually obeyed"; the reality of 
law is therefore psychological, not physical or 
material.
With this extremely individual and novel concept 
of human behaviour, which only a Pavlov, and his theory 
was at this time still to be developed and publicised, 
could rival, Petrazycki continues
3. To define those categories of law he will establish 
to facilitate its comprehensive analysis; again, his 
division stands in total contrast to the existing juris­
prudential treatments of the same matters* He will divide 
law along two axes, the former, the official/unofficial 
law axis, the latter, that of intuitive/positive law; 
the four resultant classifications, i.e. official/ 
positive, etc. etc. are in each case shown as basically 
manifesting the operation of impulsions within the 
individual; e.g. a positive law is re-interpreted as 
a ’normative fact', which the individual, in virtue 
of his training to respond to it in a certain dutiful 
way, perceives in conjunction with the situation it 
applies to, and accordingly observes. A law proscribes 
theft, there is an occasion where X has the opportunity 
to steal or embezzle the moneys of his trust (the want 
passively felt) but actively honours his stewardship etc®
4® The cogency of this analysis, or its comprehensive­
ness in applicability to the very wide varieties of 
observable legal behaviour is then confirmed by Petrazycki*a 
observation that legal or moral images and impulsions 
necessarily must be shared as a common ethico-legal 
heritage. Given too that such impulsions are of their 
nature felicifically orientated (i®e. pleasure- 
maximising in the utilitarian sense) they are universally 
disseminated and promulgated and reinforced^^, in the 
behaviourist sense, by their bénéficient effect or 
occasional sanction. Law, therefore, appears to Petrazycki 
in this teleological sense, a device of social utility®
This whole theory is perhaps more attractive than 
accurate. Its author shares with Kant, not only a 
jaundiced opinion of contemporary efforts at juris­
prudence, but a similarly categorical concept of morality, 
by which moral duty is seen as owed to or analytically 
related to the freedom of the self, not conditioned by 
the hypothesis of fear or gain or like self-prudential 
counsels. This Kantian standpoint is not so much beyond 
criticism that it can be arrogated by Petrazycki, as
some unquestioned donna, to his own devices and ends*
One might further agree with Podgoreckiwho, 
from the viewpoint of the sociologist of the law, 
and with his interests at heart, considers this theory 
much too narrow and Pavlovian as dealing only with the 
individual, to be extended away from that unique en­
vironment or "testing-ground" to provide any useful 
assistance to the examination of complex situations of 
group-intenaction in a multilateral society. It is now 
a mere truism to note that groups are not just congeries 
of units, the sura of their parts, and no a priorlst 
assumption that "what's good for one person", vis-a-vis 
psychoanalysis etc., is "good for all", is in ordinary 
circumstances legitimate.
Further, the ontological status of an 'impulsion*
or 'ideal image' of an action is never made clear by
Petrazycki. It should be remembered that he lived beforé
that age where 'inner processes', especially cerebral
ones, are immediately suspect* On this dubious 'inner
20process', the impulsion, I shall later enlarge, but 
it may be said here that, if it were conceded that 
such talk of impulsions etc. is, as it were, a pictorial 
manner of representation the sense or direction of 
ethico-legal behaviour and its dynamics, not in truth
intended to pin-point actual mental occurrences, it 
is undeniably, in an instrumental manner, a useful 
explanation schema.
Further dissatisfaction with Petrazycki*s account 
might be felt at this extension of the boundaries of 
legal behaviour to fields of intuitive or unofficial 
behaviour* This would lead, in easily imagined ways, 
to a situation where 3 or more 'laws*, gotten of 
various impulsions, could in mutual contradiction 
claim to be law, with no ready method, so far as 
Petrazycki is our guide, for discerning which is i^ ie 
law. He nov/here pretends to provide or ever even 
concedes the need for any hierarchic taxonomy of his 
various laws. These criticisms, however justified, 
should not be too discouraging; for, like Podgorecki , 
we hardly look to the late Victorian age for ultimate 
answers to anything, never minding jurisprudence, but 
for préfigurations, or early traces, or first attempts 
along modern lines, of problems that are always with 
us* Notwithstanding the import of the noted criticisms, 
then, it must be admitted that the scheme of explanation, 
that Petrazycki offers holds forth certain undeniably 
attractive insights, which figure largely in later,
(sc. Olivecrona*s) jurisprudence * These are, in summary 
form;-
1 * He locates the dynamics of legal behaviour firstly 
on the psychological level - legal facts or acts are 
the product of imperatives suggested or put to the 
mind by images or ideas implicit in the physical 
situation as observed by the actor*
2, The nature of law is imperative, but not in the mode 
of being a response to externally issued commands of a 
sovereign or persuasive legal will of the state etc®
The command is almost impersonal.
3# Legal behaviour, its uniformity and its develop­
ment depend on popular consensus upon, or common owner­
ship of, ideas of the 'right' or 'good' action in any 
situation, and the instruction of society on these common 
norms of correct conduct*
4* The basic guidance or criterion of framing used 
in the form of an impulsion, as publicly to be sponsored, 
on a ' trial-error-reinforeement’ basis, is the social 
and personal utility to be derived from their observance 
and existence.
5* Given that, by 2 above, the commands are almost 
impersonal in operation, and by 4 they are in effect 
self-justifying, the role of the state in the legal 
cosmos can only be ancillary to it, not responsible for 
it* It v/ill function as the index and co-ordinator of 
what is already law in society, a role which Petrazycki 
considers, on occasion, necessary both to secure the 
efficacy and ensure the pedagogy of laws, or 'normative 
facts' but not beyond achieving those ancillary ends, 
indispensable. (His conviction in this belief is helped 
by another of his beliefs, i.e. that in intuitive law, 
which of its nature could not be explained as brought 
about by state command and sanction)«
When I pass on to consider Olivecrona I hope to 
show how he has engrafted each of these above listed 
elements into his own theory of law. It will be borne 
in mind, however, what I earlier said of his writings - 
and, indeed, the whole material of Legal Realism, i.e. 
that they readily exhibit their sources and past phases 
of development in their self-presentation at any one 
time. Olivecrona's theory, as given out fully in Law 
as Fact is eclectic, not only as offering a modern home 
to the now orphan ideas of Petrazycki, but accommodates, 
perhaps not all too easily, other notions culled from
diverse developments in 20th centen'y legal philosophy.
These properly ought to be identified or introduced 
before plunging into out main task; indeed, it is no 
exaggeration to say that Olivecrona’s purpose in 
Lav/ as Fact, to illumine what really legal acts and 
facts are in society and how they function, how, 
in fact, legal language and all manner of words about 
legal phenomena, "supra-sensible" things in the author’s 
parlance, are related or register on the physical and 
observable world is a task which only could be seen 
as to be done, viz. an opus faciendum, in the philo­
sophical climate of the 20th century.
To explain the new exigence of this task, Olivecrona*s 
interrogation of or interrogator’s reference to the pro­
blems of jurisprudence is of the same type of that of the 
philosophers of science apply to the matter of the 
physical sciences in a branch of philosophy which î?as 
been a development of modern times* Though Petrazycki 
has some vague, naive scent of ’the science of the law’, 
and indeed suggests to us some possible experiments 
we may care to perform on the nature of impulsions, of 
’counteraction’, 'provocation', and of 'self-observation* 
etc. in the course of Law and Morality, his empirical 
counsels such as field-study among primitives, observ­
ation of revolutions or children's games etc. are 
quaintly and quite unscientifically Victorian.
The appreciation of a truly scientific method of 
analysis of such phenomena awaited the development of 
a genuine philosophy of science he did not live to 
witness. The principal problem of that philosophy 
is met before and apart from the stage of empirical 
research; it is rather the problem of how to formulate 
propositions of a true and reliable nature, in language, 
about one's science, whether it be physics or law*
-lyjL
In physics, then, the critical question is how Is 
a general law related to the phenomena it purports 
to describe; this question may appear in other 
modalities as the problem of induction from a general 
law, or the criterion of 'testability in principle' 
or the distinction between theoretic and pre-theoretic 
language etc. Once this question is, if never settled 
in any determinate categorical fashion, at least faced 
and the hitherto unsuspectedly tenuous links of language 
to reality more accurately characterised, only then may 
an explanation schema or laboratory experiment or a 
universal law be accepted for what they pretend to be*
The target of all this scrutiny will be all those non« 
testable, metaphysical fabrications of 'phlogiston* 
or 'corpuscules' or whatever, the expurgation of which 
will leave us possibly less cosy, but better advised* 
Scientific theory and explanation will no longer 
affect a simplistic clarity but rather go so far in 
conceding the inscrutable distance that separates the 
language of theory from reality, as on occasion to 
offer bridging laws to transmute accurate but cryptic 
explanation schemata into terms of ordinary and empirical 
understanding.
In like terms, then, a "scientist" of law, or a 
realist, will interrogate the standard propositions 
of jurisprudence to chart the relationship of legal 
language to legal reality. It is clear that the initial 
shock of such brute analysis upon the traditional terms 
of jurisprudence was ferocious; terms such as 'right*
PI
'duty', 'obligation' and like members of the Begrlffshimmel 
of earlier conceptual jurisprudence were quickly seen 
to be empty of real signification. Whereas it is no real 
revelation now to be told that no name-object relation­
ship subsists between concept and its name, this re­
velation came as a shattering insight to the realists.
whose critical "objective" eye was seen as just what 
was needed to relieve the conservative, myth-ridden 
edifice of jurisprudence, and mai-ce it a habitation 
fit for modern minds. The problem now facing juris­
prudence, thus shorn of any objective respectability, 
is how to account for the existence of concepts, or their 
employment in propositions of fact about the law or 
descriptions of its operation which really signify 
nothing. Posing the dilemma in another way it is how 
to characterise or account for the relationship of a 
set of non-tangible norms ve duties, obligations, 
rights, ownerships etc., to those physical dimensions 
or objective realities obviously but not directly 
related to them.
Three possible solutions to this impasse of norm- 
iaor preseru tnemaelveeiona- o: The jeorisoning of 
the norms, exampled by the American Realists (1); 
that of concentrating, to an almost exclusive extent 
upon the norms exampled by Kelsen (2); and finally, the 
via media somehow to accommodate both, the solution of 
Olivecrona and that of Scandinavian Realism, by providing, 
as G.MacCormacK says an explanation of law, both in its 
normative and factual dimensions, in terms of psychological 
and other facts. I shall consider each of these solutions 
in turn.
It will serve as a common preface to each solution 
that those who provided it felt themselves conscious of 
the fact (indeed stressed it) that they were adopting 
a scientific approach to the analysis of the law, and 
that their work was in the nature of discovery in the 
typical scientific use of that word% the true nature of 
legal matter would emerge from such a critique as the 
realists would subject it to in the same manner as an
Einstein would unearth relativity and its theorems
o
from bruter and baser stuffs*
2 21) The American Realist Movement*
It is not unfair to say that, of the three solutions 
offered, this is the most superficial, and I shall dwell 
but briefly upon it* In short, when it became apparent 
that legal concepts were not "real", that the rules of 
law were not after all founded on objective roots, they 
became utterly sceptical of rules e.g. Llewellyn, Franlc 
etc. etc. and looked rather to the factual consequences 
of the courts etc. beyond and in despite of the imagined 
consequences of rules.
The movement is characterised by an immense cynicism, 
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such as Holmes' dictum "The prophecies of what the 
courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, 
are what I mean by the law," and a rather non-progressive 
and noisy iconoclasm. »Yhat is salient, however, and must 
be observed, is that, contrary to the more mature and 
level-headed treatment of the Scandinavian Realists, 
this cynicism and iconoclasm stemmed from the American 
Realists' misinterpretation or mis-diagnosis of the 
raison d' être of empty rules i.e. as a "plot‘s om 
the part of the establishment, with chief conspirator 
Langdell, Lean of Harvard, as a myth to keep the legal
o p
profession well-fee'd etc; or, as Thurman Arnold 
would have it, a necessary opiate, like religion, 
to the masses who must have in law an image v/ith no 
clay anywhere.
In the midst of this cynicism, and "hunch" theories 
etc., all genuine scientific headway was stifled, and, 
as Rumble observes, it was left to a successor movement, 
more behaviourists than realists, to apply scientific 
methods with any professional competence, and, as yet 
with little noticeable success.
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242) The Jurisprudence of Hans Kelsen.
Kelsen provides a direct or almost inverse contrast 
to the American Realists. He equally imagines he is at 
v/ork in the science of law, hut defines that science 
as a normative science relegating those facts etc* 
which obsessed the interest of the American Realists 
to the philosophy or sociology of law; this division 
is succinctly made when he informs us:-
"(I confine) jurisprudence to a structural analysis
of positive law etc. so as to attain to a purity of
2 5method." This purity, which gives his theory its name 
"The Pure Theory of Law" means in effect that Kelsen 
will concentrate on an analysis of norms which are ought- 
statements not to be governed, as such, by laws of 
causality, but the relationship of imputation upon which 
no factual matter can have any bearing. His version, 
then, or his resolution of the impasse of norms and 
facts, is then no real solution, merely an averral that 
the two operate on different levels, bridged only by 
the grundnorm,the base or pinnacle of all minor norms. 
This constitutive norm is not like any others, which are. 
alike imputed in hierarchic series all the way to the 
sanction; rather it is imiquely a necessary fact of 
existence that our very mode of having and needing and 
using norms is proof of. Its existence is not in virtue 
of that imputational genesis that other norms Eind 
sanctions share. In short, and in non-Kelsenian. terms, 
facts will not, logically cannot explain the nature 
or operation of normative matters.
3) The Scandinavian Realists.
I have postponed until this stage any lengthy 
consideration of Olivecrona's fellow-thinkers and hope 
that this stage will prove a more effective introduction 
In contrast to 1) and 2) above, the Scandinavian
Realists believe, Olivecrona among them, that their 
ex%]lanation of legal phenomena takes account of factual 
and normative matter. Such a profession or promise is 
worthy of a more detailed account of the school, and 
will moreover provide further matter which can be seen 
as an important incorporation into Olivecrona’s theory.
The prime power of this realism is agreed by all 
to be Axel Hagerstrom^^ It is significant, in view 
of what earlier has been said of the close proximity 
in developments in the philosophy of science and that 
of law, that Hagerstrom was, both as academic and writer, 
primarily a general philosopher, and his interest in 
matters legal was as one philosophical matter among 
others equally worth his attention. His shibboleth 
for universal application in philosophy was
27censeo metaphysicam delendam esse", and we may render 
this, anglice and somewhat interpretatively into the 
following canons of analysis:-
1. All metaphysical terms, those not signifying 
real, objective facts, must be purged from the law,
or at least replaced by an examination and explanation 
of how those terms actually work.
2. An explanation of a legal system will not be 
acceptable if it imports or relies upon non-real 
elements, such as ‘general wills', 'sovereigns'; the 
criterion for acceptance of any term will be that of 
factual verification, or consistency with the facts*
Further starting theses on Hagerstrom's part are
that :
3« After Kant, law and morals alike function empirically 
in a categorically imperative manner, and
4* The realm of the 'real’ will include, for all 
purposes, explanatory and descriptive, psychological 
"facts" such as ideas, feelings, instincts, beliefs etc*
It will readily be noticed that 3 and 4 above are 
nearly identical, equating "impulsion" to "idea" with 
that Petrazycki premissed in his theory. The major 
difference is the overriding concern shared by the 
Realist movements to attack metaphysics almost as an 
evil in itself, not specifically as an obfuscator of 
a clear legal view. Of 4 above, it may be said further 
that this arrogation of "existent and real mental 
processes" is almost indispensable to one wishing, as 
Hagerstrom does, to give a causal account of the law, 
and at the same time forswear the temptations and 
pitfalls of a metaphysical standpoint.
To example, then, the application of these canons 
to legal analysis, we may consider some views of 
Hagerstrom. He never, in fact, gave or indeed intended 
to give a full exhaustive theory of what, or how, 
a legal system is; his analyses, however partial, 
are adequately illustrative of his attitude to the 
law.
He suggested that 'duties', 'rights' etc.,
not
being not real terms (i.e.^signifying objects) operate 
rather on the level of magic, and sought to prove 
this by considering the Roman Law institutions of 
mancipatio, stipulatio etc. There is a plausible case 
to be made out for seeing such rituals, with their 
heavy religious overtones, as primitive and magical. 
Indeed one need not be any lawyer or jurisprudent to 
see a great number of Roman institutions as thoroughly 
weird and redolent of a civilisation a thousand years 
behind that of their Greek neighbours and supposed
forebears Anohises etc* Hagerstrom is no idle antiquarian, 
however, for he argues that in modern times too, duties 
and rights are "felt" as forces upon the individual 
in the forms of powers over or powers upon things 
pUd persons*
In a more modern mode of psychology, he attempts 
to explain the same functions, i.e. duties and rights, 
as "objectivated" on to the material things they mention* 
A duty to rear a child, for example, seems observable 
or objectivated, "reified", to use an easily suggested 
existential term, in the physical features of that
child. This theory is very similar to those of pheno-
28menological gestalt psychology. On a more general 
level, he suggest that we should see law deriving 
from a survival-instinct, and here, by "instinct" 
he means an actual matter, alive within society, which 
from generation to generation teaches its children 
conventional ' rights and duties by conditioning their 
feelings towards articles of legal propriety etc*
This repeated conditioning yields a collective instinct 
towards right conduct, a solid conviction in an almost 
objectively warranted legal-order, whose rights, 
rules and duties etc. all commonly, in virtue of the 
human facility of 'Reification', appear as objectively 
existent.
This common psychological development to appreciate 
matters legal as "objects" is at once what really makes 
a legal order efficacious, not state sanctions, and 
accounts for the otherwise vacuous myth of meta­
physical dissemination that "rights" and "duties" etc* 
name objects* The ideas of Luidstedt, one of Hagerstrom's 
proteges are similar; his principal, indeed, almost 
sole theme is an attack on the popular notion of "equity" 
or "sense of justice". This is widely supposed, in
solicitors* codes of ethics or advocates' rules of 
practice and so on, really to rest, pure and in­
vigorating, at the core of the world of law. His
message, delivered with characteristic fulminations
29in Law and Justice, is that to see equity as the 
source of law and the inspirer of legal rules etc. 
is to get things totally the wrong way round - the 
rules of law, which are formed only for the ends of 
social utility or survival of society, themselves 
produce, in virtue of that same "reificatory" power 
as Hagerstrom adverted to, a sense of the existence 
of equity. This is then doubly spurious, as "sub­
stantive", and "causative" of the rules of law.
Finally, we shall consider Ross, who, though 
never in fact a protege of Hagerstrom, is universally 
recognised as a leading Scandinavian Realist. Ross 
sees too that 'rights', 'duties', etc. signify no 
real matters: he therefore, as in his article "TÛ-TÛ"  ^
shows how they are simply shorthand devices for en­
capsulating an otherwise intractably numerous set of 
legal rules and inferences in one simple statement®
As for the binding force of a legal rule, he sees it 
as arising from a psychologically experienced compulsion 
to obey which is triggered by the directive, or pre­
scriptive force implicit though not always apparent 
in legal language. This sense of obedience and the 
explanatory reliance Ross places upon it are consistent 
and enduring throughout his work ; it is not here important 
or relevant to mention that he at one stage saw legal 
rules operative only upon judges, and now later sees 
them as universally sensed, though in a fuller sense to 
the former. Certain secondary rules, as of interpretation^
or recognition are addressed, of their nature, only 
to judges who will obey them not for reasons of 
avoiding a sanction etc. but, Ross argues, "out of 
a pure sense of justice." Primary rules are obeyed 
for the following reason as said in Directives and Norms 
"Rules addressed to citizens are felt psychologically 
to be entities which are grounds for the reactions of 
the authorities...applying our definition of the 
existence of a norm, primary rules must be recognised 
as actually existing norms, insofar as they are followed 
with regularity and experienced as being binding"
This psychological feeling Ross terms "the experience 
of validity".
The pattern, then, of Scandinavian Realist analysis 
should now be clear. The pattern is a two-step move­
ment: a realisation of the emptiness of the referential 
meaning of 'right* and 'duty' as real objects prompts 
a recourse for the entities of legal causation and its 
analysis to psychological facts or entities; the clue 
to this psychological world is the fundamentally 
imperative nature of the legal language of rules.These 
two elements are conveniently joined by the handy 
phenomenological device of reification which, as I say, 
accounts for magical elements in Roman Law, our seeing 
or sensing rights etc. as things, in metaphysical 
fashion, and other like consequences of reification.&
It will do no harm to consider the phenomenon 
in strictly phenomenological terms, however 
much these are, on the part of Hagerstrom, 
only intuitive glimpses of gestalt theories 
of perception. Reification is of its nature 
a mode of the non-thetio consciousness, i.e. 
not self-reflective, and therefore for some 
time, what is, in Ross's terms, an inner sense 
of compulsion, will not immediately be dis­
tinguished from that aspect of the external 
world it enables us to conjure up.
If we are to accept their account, that is, simply, 
agree that their two-step pattern as above set out 
proves stronger than those criticisms to be levelled 
at it with especial reference to Olivecrona, it 
would seem that this school has made good its promise 
to preserve the unity of jurisprudence, as an ex­
plicable or articulated blending of both fact and 
norm* We will now consider, the groundwork or back­
drop of formative influences now sketched, the works 
of K* Olivecrona. His broad purpose is, as Petraaycki, 
to provide a non-voluntarist account of the phenomena 
of legal science, in realist manner he will preserve 
the ordinary vocabulary or stuff of traditional 
jurisprudence, and characterise the peculiar and 
specialised operations of legal reality on a psycho­
logical level in virtue of which they are directly
to be related to the plane of observable social 
behaviour•
K. Olivecrona - Law as Fact.^
He begins this work by exposing the poverty of 
both natural law and positivist jurisprudence. One 
cannot disagree with his early expose of the myths 
of "general will" or other anthropomorphic states or 
deities underwriting a legal system, and that, in 
short, our need is for a non-voluntarist, non­
personal explanation, which will at the same time 
accommodate the necessary imperative dimension of 
law. He proceeds to seek this in the twin concepts of
the rule and the imperative, and it in the analysis of
these that the influence of Petrazycki is unmistakeable.
To Olivecrona, a rule of law becomes a combination 
of ideatum and imperantum. The ideatum is the content
of the rule, and is in its turn composed of an
the course of action envisaged by the rule, and the re- 
quisitum, the presence, that is, of those environmental 
or situational elements which constitute the mise-en- 
scene, or which make the rule eligible for application.
The imperantum is the force or imperatival tone 
which establishes the addressee of the rule, or the 
observer, in a specifically imperatival relationship 
to the situation "ideated" by the rule ; e.g, a rule 
of law say, "No parking on double yellow lines" conjures 
up images of cars on kerbs, yellow lines, certain times 
of the day etc. and its force forbids us from parking 
etc., or prescribes other routines for us to follow.
As Olivecrona says, the imperantum is that part of the 
legal rule which operates upon the volitional side 
of our being. Further, the ideatum and the
are, singly and jointly, as flexible as necessary 
to cover the whole gamut of legal prescription. The 
former may vary in content from rules of action to 
rules of construction, or rules of interpretation for 
judges’ use, or that of individuals etc. - indeed the 
agendum, or reguisitum of one rule may depend upon 
a constellation of various other rules. Similarly, 
the imperantum, or imperative force, may make itself 
manifest in may ways, dependent upon the vehicle 
contingently used to convey its force, whether formally, 
it is framed in a statute and is explicitly mandatory 
or it is implicit merely in a customary rule, or 
rnunciated by judges etc. etc.
In sum, then, what we have here is a relocation, 
and slight reassortment of Petrazycki's concept of the 
impulsion, defined already as the passive observation 
or perception of a situation, and the active sense of 
actions necessitated or desiderated by that situation in
response to ethico-legal sentiments or sensed obligations. 
In both cases, correct or appropriate legal behaviour 
will be seen as the yielding, in Olivecrona’s case, 
to the force of the imperantum, and, in that of 
Petrazycki to the impulsion.
One sharp difference must be conceded, in that 
the former locates the operation of legal rules via 
their imperative force in the realm'of positive law; 
he allows that, of course, popular varieties do exist, 
but only as parasitic upon or secondary growths upon 
legal rules proper. By contrast, Petrazycki sees no 
difference between the rules (impulsions consequent 
upon the normative facts) of positive law, and those 
which are intuitively formed by individuals to form 
unofficial law etc.
Still, importantly in common is the location of 
the binding force of a legal rule or the efficacy 
of a legal stipulation in the imperatival force with 
which it registers upon the mind of the individual; 
according to this scheme of explanation, one has a 
perception of a situation, one reads of its legal 
dimensions, and accords, at once dutifully and 
cognitively, with the legal prescription relevant 
to that situation. Unfortunately for this explanation 
Olivecrona never says whether he intends us to in­
terpret ideata, agenda etc. as images really present, 
like Berkeley's cat, in the mind’s eye, or whether his 
schématisation of things is intended only as a model 
to allow for a more articulate or profound analysis 
of the multi-faceted concept of the rule. It is not 
possible here to give him the benefit of the doubt and 
excuse his account as a handy instrumentalist account 
of legal behaviour. He intends us to accept ideata
etc., as any other Scandinavian Realist would intend, 
as real inner sensations, as real as Petrazycki 
unquestioningly believed his "impulsions" to be.
This conviction on our part will anyway be reinforced 
by what Olivecrona has later to say of ’consequential 
ideas', as causal factors in legal efficacy.
It must now be stated that this artificial 
fabrication of inner mental events cannot really be 
acceptable; indeed Olivecrona has spent the first 
hundred or so pages of his analysis in putting to 
flight a host of anthropomorphic fictions, sovereigns 
and the like, in search for a non-voluntarist ex­
plication of the nature of law and its binding force; 
he has had now to indulge in fictions of his own 
creation to replace the gap. None doubt the dynamic, 
imperative role of language, but this certainty is 
not any sure warrant for constructing a mechanistic 
account of the cerebral processes, etc. involved in or 
facilitating this dynamic operation of the imperative 
language of rules of this myth. Of the inner process,
I have earlier, re Wittgenstein, made mention and shall 
not at this stage enlarge further.
Quite apart from this ontological problem, a 
mechanistic severance of the content and the practice 
(or observation) of a rule, imperative or otherwise, 
does not do proper justice to the complexity and 
subtlety of rule-bound behaviour. What of a rule which 
itself specifies, or postulates, in its supposedly 
contentual matter, already a directive to see that 
content in a certain unequivocal manner? e.g. "women 
and children first" already assumes or predicates that
women be seen as the weaker sex, and thus worthy of 
prior consideration, that children be identified 
by reference to standard or orthodox social practices 
re schooling, dependence etc. etc. In short, any attempt 
to analyse a rule by separating brute contentual matter 
as supposedly unequivocal and unmistakeably described 
from, on the other hand, prescriptive or imperatival 
forces, cannot realistically be undertaken. Nor will 
it help here to say, as Olivecrona does say, that 
there can be rules upon rules for this would just 
lead us into an infinite regress with no grounds 
for hoping ever to find a "non-loaded" unequivocal 
rule whose contentual matter is purely descriptive*
It may be said in further criticism that, in 
so exclusively concentrating on the binding force 
or function only of a rule, Olivecrona overlooks an 
important distinction between the function as command­
ing, and the content of a rule; simply, an enumeration 
or identification of the function of a statement or 
rule does not exhaust or account for its whole meaning®. 
It is a matter of fact provable by a simple examination 
of one* s own attitude to rules that one may understand 
XfZ as a rvile without needing, with this understanding, 
to feel personally or psychologically a binding force*
It is a failure to make this distinction that leads 
Olivecrona into trouble when trying to account for the 
nature, as part or not of law, of a rule which, in 
virtue of obsolescence or habitual flouting, is no 
longer obeyed.
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Ross, whom I have already mentioned as offering 
a similar analysis of the binding force of legal rules,
i.e. basically in virtue of the psychological feelings 
induced or provoked by them in the minds of citizens or
judges, the "experience of validity", to some extent 
offers a loss naive and one-eyed analysis of legal
rules, in two important respects.
Firstly, he recognises that the nature of a 
rule as specifically and dynamically a legal rule 
depends upon its being part of a legal system.
This relationship of dependence is, in the logical 
sense of the term, i.e. not Ross’s own sense, an 
internal one, insofar as each term related conditions
or bears upon the being or essence of the other. As
Hart has importantly o b s e r v e d , t h e  statement that 
a rule is binding implies a system of rules, among 
them, doubtless, rules of recognition etc. which 
underwrite the validity of the primary rule we are 
concerned with.
Secondly, Ross includes in the psychological 
force that a rule exerts upon those governed by it 
not merely the imperative force Olivecrona is alone 
interested in, but also the regular observance of the
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rule; he says that "rules are recognised as existing
i.e. binding and in force, insofar as they are followed 
with regularity and experienced as binding." This 
perception that there is in observing a rule, a 
necessary behavioural element, a practice of its 
being observed which is logically constitutive of its 
nature as a rule, is much subtler analysis than Olivecrona 
offers. In fact, it really could allow Ross to dispense 
if he were not such a committed or "dyed-in-the-wool" 
Scandinavian Realist, with his earlier exclusive 
reliance, in Towards a Realistic Jurisprudence, of 1934, 
on psychological currents or facts in explanation of the 
phenomenon of legal rules. As we shall see further 
exampled later vis-a-vis Olivecrona, old allegiances
and dependences die hard, and the hallowed precepts 
of Hagerstrom etc. are still exhibited albeit in now 
redundant juxtaposition or coexistence with far 
subtler and more advanced analytical shifts. Having 
made these criticisms, one can therefore treat his 
account of legal rules as imperatival, and as un- 
relievedly or unadulteratedly imperatival as 
Petrazycki saw them, as only in effect capturing a 
part of the whole truth or complex nature of what 
a legal rule is, and how such rules are to compose a 
legal system. Olivecrona seems to imagine that the 
imperative force of a series of rules, all homogeneous 
and imperative, is all there is to the binding force 
of the law, and that whole series is a legal system* 
This is simply not good enough, and his account, so 
far, is acceptable and not unilluminating only as a 
model or graphic and articulate analysis of the never 
here denied imperative dimension of a rule. This 
dimension, while importantly to be recognised and 
explained, is not the only ohe.
Having dealt then with legal rules, Olivecrona 
pauses^ again to sketch the nature of jurisprudence’s 
dilemma, and examines the concept of 'right*, before 
fully substantiating his stand upon independent 
imperatives of psychological force etc. as the lynch- 
pin of legal explanation. He is fully aware of the 
precepts of the legal scientist-realist-anti-meta- 
phycists who have seen, as well as the emptiness of 
the myths of natural law, the emptiness of legal terms 
such as 'right', 'duty* etc. Olivecrona rehearses his 
reasons for rejecting such terms, seeing the problem 
facing him as "the word 'right' lacks semantic 
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His solution is not to reject them out of hand, 
or debunic in the fashion of the American Realists, 
still less to argue as the more extreme member of 
Hagerstrom’s school, Lundstedt, once did, that the 
terms be expunged from the vocabulary of jurisprudence. 
As earlier said, it was the aim of that school, in 
its non-extreme projects, to effect a compromise 
explanation which would retain conventional legal 
language and terminology, but fitted sanew and correctly 
to the facts of the social observance of law. His 
project is now, having considered the nature of 
rules, to consider those elements which rules are about
i.e. the ordinary stuff of legal rights, duties, owner­
ship etc. To this same question or problem, in the first 
edition of his book Law as Fact,^^he suggested^ which 
he nowhere here denies, that "right" etc. were hollow 
words; that, in fact, when he loosely mentions such 
terms, we really refer shortly to a nexus of legal rules 
and inferences or implications implicit within them.
To say that "x had a right" licenses its hearer to draw 
appropriate inferences as to past transactions in fact 
giving the right its existence, and as to the legal 
consequences or implications for the future etc.
In the later edition of the same book, and indeed 
in 1 9 6 2 , in Essays in Jurisprudence in Honour of Hoscoe 
Pound,^^to wiiich Olivecrona was a contributor, he 
incorporates a new linguistic dimension into this 
earlier analysis. This is none other than J.L. Austin's 
notion of the performative use of language,^^ which, 
for reasons that will be obvious, has a clear attraction 
to one who has independently arrived at an appreciation 
of the value of independent imperatives in legal ex­
planation •
Austin's theory, briefly, is that a sentence, in 
addition to having a sense as a whole and, in its words,
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a reference, has another dimension of meaning, in that
it accomplishes an act on the part of the speaker, and,
on occasion, brings about an effect upon the hearer*
These two forces, or •speech-acts', he termed illocutionary
as "done in speaking", and perlocutionary/'done as a
result of speaking/'It is no place here to mention that
Austin's theory has been widely criticised insofar
as these acts (whose reality or actuality none would wish
to deny) do not seem capable, at least in Austin's
elucidation of them, of being combined into any refined
or accurate analytical instrument for the dissection
42of a sentence. As Strawson points out, as do Searl© 
and other commentators, illocutionary meaning shades 
off indistinguisnably into perlocutionary etc; nor 
does speech-act analysis help, indeed it rather com­
plicates, the elucidation of what synonymity or 
translation of sentences can be and likewise obfuscates 
rather than clarifies the analysis of the use of words* 
Olivecrona is intimately aware of these difficulties 
and flaws in Austin's theory, indeed is quite familiar 
with them, as references and passages quoted in these 
pages show.^^ He concludes, from a survey of authorities, 
and in this conclusion I have no criticism validly to 
make, with an agreement with the consensus prudentium 
in this case being A. Sesonke, A* Ross and Max Black, 
that are quoted "(there) are three classes of relation­
ship between persons in which language plays a vital 
role and in which an utterance can alter the relations® 
These are psychological, generative and formal* An 
example of a formal relationship being altered is the 
marriage c e r e m o n y I t  is thus not fortuitous that
Olivecrona both in Essays in Honour of Roscoe Pound 
and in Law as Fact uses this as the paradigm case 
of the performative utterance.
It is significant to notice that he seems unable 
to shake off the heritage handed down by Hagerstrom 
of the magical forces implicit within the workings 
of the law. vVhile he admits that modern law and its 
observance is not basically an instance of belief 
in magic, still he sees in speech acts a ready 
universal explanation of some of the phenomena of 
modern law and the rituals of more primitive society, 
such as mancipatio or stipulatio etc.
I cannot understand this double concern on Olivecrona'£
part, or indeed his denying Hagerstrom*s precepts, on
magic, and his immediate "rehabilitation" of them
sub specie of speech-acts, other than as a disclosure,
here quite transparent, of his being subject to such
a strong developmental influence that, when given every
reason for sloughing off old ideas now obsolete, he
still drags them with him. This loyalty we shall now
see is to mar even his use and oonstrual of speech
act theory in explaining the genesis and effect of the
word ’right*, or rather 'the idea of right* . He wi^l
apply the notion of performatives not to concretise
the word 'right*, which he has already, since 1939,
considered as "hollow" but to prove to us the existence
of the "subjective ideas of right" - which he has
4 5earlier introduced as being facts, not to be excised 
from the law in the sense of law as fact. His full 
argument may be schematised as follows, and we may 
assume, as Olivecrona does, that what justification 
is given to cover 'right' will, mutatis mutandis do
for ’duty’, 'tort', 'ownership’, 'obligation' etc*
1, The word "right" has no name-object relationship 
with any sensible matter.
2. We use the word "right", indeed would find life 
very difficult were we to dispense with the use 
of that term.
3* Words are "tools" - we use words for their social 
utility, not because we are fond of or given to 
a%Dplying words or patterned phonemes to non­
existent entities.
4. We therefore look not to the word "right", but 
rather to its use in conjunction with "the idea 
of"; we do (and here is the hallmark of the 
Scandinavian Realist approach) have it as a 
fact that there are ideas of rights.
5. These ideas of rights are common possessions and 
operate on a psychological level, stimulated by 
the observation of legal rules and legal acts, 
in particular, performative acts such as 
marriage etc., and executory acts of judgement, 
and legal effects to which these ideas are 
appropriate.
D. A performative speech-act, for example, represents
a use of language which gives rise on a psychological 
level to ideas of right, i.e. when x says, "I give 
you this", no physical change is wrought upon the 
article given, such as a mark of ownership, but 
the act of giving generates within the mind of 
those concerned consequential ideas of the rights 
of possession of the donee, ideas which operate 
by causing us to see a new set of legal rules 
applying in virtue of the act of giving.
7* A performative utterance operates just like a
rule of law; it addresses itself in the jussive 
mood of "Let xyz be".
I cannot pretend but that I find this part of his 
thesis the most obscure and pi'ecarious, and am here 
conscious of having to a considerable extent to 
straighten out what on his part is a melange of poorly 
differentiated factors and issues. The above synopsis 
will suffice as an accurate enough account of 
Olivecrona's basic propositions from which he draws 
the following inferences:-
1 * There are tliree levels of legal causality
legal effects proper e.g. judgment, imprisonment, 
diligence etc.
- psychological effects, e.g. the stimulation of 
"ideas of rights" insofar as a new thinking-set 
of ideas is believed to apply to the same 
actuality*
- actual effects; on a physical level of causation,
they condition contingently or of themselves,
the application of legal rules e.g. rei interitus
or accretion etc., the physical observable
phenomena, the holding of a chattel etc. as 
against the ownership of it*
Even this three-fold stratification is rendered 
obscure by Olivecrona's affirmation on that psychological 
ideas of right actually occur in the minds of people 
subject to a legal system. Are we to presume that we 
need only await the technological development of an 
accurate and explicit encephaloscope to conjoin the 
second and third strata of those listed above?
2. The mode of operation of a speeoh-act is supra- 
sensible * To say that one owns a house is a legal 
phrase conjuring up assumptions that such is, in 
fact, the case, and suggesting ideas of rights of 
ownership and the potential application of appropriate 
legal rules.
3. In contrast to the supra-sensible non-physical 
mode of operation of ideas of right is the actual 
physical world which exists, as a sort of solid but 
useless backdrop to legal acts and effects in the 
foreground.
In this handling of the ordinary language techniques 
of J.L. Austin, I can only suspect a grave misunderstanding 
on the part of Olivecrona* As earlier remarked, the legal 
realists noted a non-correspondence or non-immediat© 
connexion between language and the world; a proposition 
would be true/false only as verifiable or only as having 
an actual reference; as an antidote to this rigour, it 
was suggested, by Wittgenstein, and, among others, 
notably J.L. Austin, that this over-strict demand
of an object for every word stemmed from a mistaken view 
of language. On closer examination it could be seen to 
function not wholly or indeed primarily on the pro- 
positional sense of true/false, but had other diverse 
uses in various contexts, quite divorced from actuality; 
as chess-pieoës are not signs or references of anything, 
such as Queen Y, or Bishop B etc., nor are they bits of 
wood - as their being or use is wholly enclosed by and 
exhausted in the rules of the game, so too with the 
words of language.
It is in exactly in that manner that J.L. Austin^^ 
suggests v/e treat the promissory speech act i.e. the 
speech-act is the promise, the gift-act is the giving,
the married man is such precisely and solely in virtue 
of the utterance of plighting his troth etc. We stop 
looking for a shadow inner actuality, behind these 
external form.s, and spare ourselves the frustrations 
of a proposition %)opulated language, ideal or other­
wise, of verifiable matters*
Not so Olivecrona; he seems to see behind legal 
acts not only inner mental ideas, but a still in­
scrutable reality, whatever it may be. He sees a legal 
ownership constituted by rules as applied in and to 
formal acts, yet looks further to the psychological 
level for ideas of right generated by these constitutive 
acts, and still further to the thing "owned" to see 
v/hether it is, in fact, owned*
This cannot be acceptable; we cannot accept the 
ontology of ideas of rights as factual occurrences in 
the mind, never minding their consequential relation­
ship to legal acts or judgments. We may as easily
accept Austin's unnecessary invention of * acts of will*
47preceding every movement that is voluntary* (I refer 
here to that Austin the follower of Bentham) • No more 
can we accept that legal terms such as * owning*, 
'negligence', 'gift', etc * really have any actual 
physical or contingent dimension of being beyond that, 
or independent of that, they possess in virtue of 
their use or contextualisation in legal rules and 
propositions. I can attribute these errors, or mis­
interpretation of language-in-use, to the still 
persisting influence of Hagerstrom and, it may be 
here added, Petrazycki, which joint influence I think 
can be made here clearer*
Olivecrona has attempted to fashion out of ideas, 
legal acts, and physical observable matters a causation
Chain to explain how the law registers on the physical 
world. To example:
X buys ABC from y; the formal acts of offer and 
acceptance are performed (speech-act); x takes ABC 
(physical) and believes (idea of right) that ABC is 
his; others see x hold or in control of ABC, and 
believe (ideas of right) that x ov/ns, and that certain 
legal rules etc, will operate to vindicate x in this 
possession if it is called in question by y or anyone 
else. Now it does seem plausible to expect that this 
causation schématisation could well be confessed to 
by people vdaen it is suggested to them that they hold 
such ideas and apply them in the above manner. They 
will admit to holding views or ideas of what legally 
is or should be the case. Researchers may so question 
and even find a large ethical or legal agreement of 
common opinion on matters which are obviously of basic 
social importance. But to extrapolate such "ideas" 
acknowledged in such narrow contexts and to fashion 
of them a universal causation scheme underwriting 
or implicit in every perception of x as owned, or y 
as married, or 2 as negligent is just not a realistic 
or, for that matter, true explanation of these phenomena 
If Olivecrona*s treatment of his world of legal 
phenomena is not acceptable, no more is that picture 
he offers us of the actual world, the "backdrop" to 
matters legal or suprasensible, He seems to be of the 
opinion that the assumptions of law, e.g, that x owns, 
or y is the heir etc. are alone precarious as only of 
an assumed and not more secure nature, whereas all, 
on the level of actuality, is genuine and real beyond 
doubt or possibility thereof. This is simply naive 
realism to imagine the owning of xyz as less certain
Win*.... ^
or uncertain, or category-wise, a differing form of
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reality from the matter xyz in itself.
This error on Olivecrona’s part is all the more 
surprising in that he is apprised of, indeed gives a 
good account of the need to apply to legal language 
the canons of correct/incorrect, not those of true/ 
false. What he does fail to notice, however, is that 
the first alone are to be applied; one should not 
reserve the true/false test for partial use as 
Olivecrona does in one of his fabricated strata of 
legal effects, but rather recognise it as wholly 
inapplicable. There is no coexistence in legal language 
of these tv/o dimensions of linguistic rectitude; if, 
for example, the court convicts x of murder, he is 
therefore a murderer unless the correctness, not the 
truth, that is, the due formal observation of the 
rules of evidence, criminal law etc., of that trial 
is challenged. There is no place for assumptions as to 
whether x really murdered; no distinction into legal 
assumption or factual knowledge is here logically 
possible.
This tenacious retention of ideas of right in the 
minds of observers of legal acts etc. might be under­
stood by remembering Petrazycki’ s notion of law, 
conflating as it did both positive law and intuitive/ 
unofficial law; the latter category reposed in, or 
sprang from the individual’s owi mind, untutored and 
unabetted by state promptings in legislation® To 
Petrazycki, these were nonetheless law. Now, as seen, 
Olivecrona has located law solely in the positive 
domain of courts, statutes, custom etc. thus to 
secure a definitiveness or certitude, both of legal 
rules and types of legal act, performative, executory 
etc.; where, in fact, he renders ’intuitive legal 
impulsions’ is in the establishment of these very ideas
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of rights, ancillary to and parasitic upon the legal 
rules of positive law, hut of a worth, as a necessary 
link in a chain of legal causation, quite equal to any 
statute etc. of positive law. Both authors, in a word, 
see a large and vital role in the effective existence 
of legal rules and systems to be played by the popular 
consciousness of what is right and therefore taken 
naturally and without further question as being the 
law.
However this functional similarity may be, despite 
the dissimilarity of terms used and mode of introduction 
into their respective syntheses of the articles of the 
legal world, Olivecrona's conclusion to Law as Fact 
having completed his examination of legal rules and 
rights, is certainly a parallel to that of Petrazyoki 
namely that state sanctions are not the ruling "esprit 
de la loi". He tells us^ (speaking of force as necessary 
for keeping up respect for the rules). "This is not to 
say, of course, that the threat of force is the sole 
reason for rule observance." Such a conclusion would 
be manifestly v/rong.^^ The state is thus, to Olivecrona 
as much as to Petrazycki, only the reinforcer of legal 
rules of origins too diverse and of operation too 
intricate to be seen uniformly and coherently as 
the commands of a sovereign or state, backed up or 
indeed constituted as being commands by his or its 
sanctions. Indeed this conclusion on Olivecrona®s 
part, as the logical precipitate of his prior arguments, 
is as briefly stated as it is evident to those who 
have attentively observed the consistent tenor and 
direction of his treatment of the law.
I think it now appropriate to try to summarise the 
matters here under discussion. Firstly, an estimation 
will be attempted of the value of Olivecrona* s work 
as a heln or otherwise in the elucidation, of the
■ZJ. I
problems of jurisprudence. Secondly, I shall suggest 
what conclusions may be drawn from the contrast this 
essay has, as intended at the outset, enabled us to 
draw between schools, authors, and results of the 
Realist tradition in jurisprudence, and those of that 
methodology argued in earlier parts of this thesis as 
the ideal, Granted the validity or the relevancy of 
those criticisms passim addressed to it, we should 
ask what remains intact and insightful in Olivecrona* s 
work •
As earlier said, his work is not unexpectedly 
eclectic, a synthesis of insights or inspirations of 
diverse provenance, and one measure at any rate of 
any synthesis is how seamlessly or harmoniously it 
has been accomplished.
Interrogated in this regard, it cannot be conceded 
that his synthesis is a happy one; it has been shown 
how he misinterprets, indeed distorts Austin's ideas 
of performative uses of language, and how, on numerous 
occasions, his adherence to doctrines of Hagerstrom* s 
propagation, now redundant, is at cost both to the 
simplicity and clarity of his account, and to its 
fundamental intrinsic verisimilitude,
I suggest that the following insights yet remain 
useful from Olivecrona's essay upon his professed 
task, (and one so grand that to have achieved a less 
than total success is surely no sort of criticism in 
itself), It was that of composing an alternative 
exposition of the law to, on the one hand, "reductionist" 
theories which would reduce the law from a hybrid of 
fact and norm to one or the other, and, on the other, 
theories which would invent or hypostatise state 
entities or sovereigns or other suitable metaphysical 
means of explanation.
1. Rules of law, as he suggests, may in one 
dimension of their operation, be seen as imperatival 
in function; that is, analytically, what a mandatory- 
directive is. Not all rules may be seen as being of 
this nature.
2. The analysis of v/hat rules of law are mandatory 
may well be instrumentally accomplished by an 
explanation schema of ideatum, composed of agendum 
and requisitum etc., in the same way as, perhaps 
more prosaically, contract law is tardily recited
as the eight or nine etc. rules of offer and acceptance
i.e. Olivecrona offers us a representational device, 
an analogue but not anything that may seriously be 
taken as a representation of real mental processes.
3. His analysis of a speech act, albeit adulterated 
by spurious additions of 'consequential ideas' etc. 
(which application could only appal Austin as a 
prostitution of his theory) is a good and pioneering 
rendering of speech-act theory into the field of legal 
theory. Given too that the doctrine is not uncomplicated 
and in many regards downright dubious, the careful 
sifting by Olivecrona of its hard grains of sense away 
from the chaff of its controversial and tendentious 
content is of no little use to jurisprudence.
4. While what he says or believes of ideas of right 
is unacceptable, I consider that behind or underlying 
the text or expressa verba of his analysis or heuresis 
of these entities, he has a sure and correct sense 
that there reposes in people's behaviour, just as much 
as that of the courts or the legislative etc. (sources 
of law too exclusively attended to) a large measure
of what indeed is the efficacy of the law. It is this 
appreciation of the popular (or vulgar in the literal 
sense of that word) sense of law that leads Olivecrona
to put the same emphasis, and for the same reasons, ■ : " - 
as Petrazycki on the pedagogic dimension of the. 
law. Both see the need or scope for agreement upon, , 
given the fact that such is possible, witness common 
* ideas of right', and imiformalisaiion of certain ; '
beneficent rules of legal behaviour. In the authors® 
own terms, Petrazycki in Law and Morality, says, 
epitomising his work:
"There were two errors (in jurisprudence) to be corrected
by the development of a psychological theory..«and the
creation of a science of legal p o l i c y . " H e  defines
legal policy as being on a national scale, what early
moral training etc. is on a child, i.e. "the evolution
in the masses of a 'citizen' type*..depends on...the .
direction of legal p o l i c y . " -
Similarly, Olivecrona concludes in a forward
looking manner, "respect must be kept up for the rules
of law...Many other factors besides the threat of ■ ■
force (upbringing, ethical teachings, habits, pro™
paganda etc.) are required to build up the state of
51mind conducive to rule observance." Is this not a 
plea, again, for a science of legal policy, or at least 
the implementation of its likely precepts? Certainly, 
it is a recognition that law as a body of rules^is, 
in one important and necessary dimension, a matter of 
popular practice. This observation, paradoxically, 
leads us back finally to adverse criticism of Olivecronao 
He has concentrated too exclusively on the Imperative ^ 
nature of rules and too little on the practice which \ 
is their observance. Many rules may be imperative; : »
many are simply practice. Some may at an early stage :■ 
e.g. when fresh on the statute roll, be, or may well 
need to be stridently imperative e.g. "Don't drop litter", 
or "pay VIA.T.", but to see such rules as always and V; 
monotonously imperative, and ever sensed as sharply ‘ 
as an instant vocal command is just not realistico
One takes V.A.T., income-tax, court-sentencing etc. 
not as repeated rounds of orders - responses etc., . 
but simply as facts or practices.
There is a need, in short, to look not only at 
the structure of legal rules, but at the phenomena 
or experience of "learning a rule", "desuetude of a i 
rule", in just the same way as, for example, the ; - 
linguistic scientist would examine these matters. . 
Olivecrona has failed to advance to that stage o%" 
maturity in his analysis of legal rules.
2. Stylistic Contrast.
I wish now to present, briefly, an overall com­
parison, of the Realist approach, as here instanced,; ■ 
described and criticised, with that earlier suggested, 
as ideal. Clearly, given those criticisms made above, .
I cannot pretend, indeed would not want to affect , 
any unprejudiced comparison. Indeed, I have already 
made such explicit criticism of Olivecrona, Hagerstrom 
etc. that here it will suffice briefly to describe the 
flaws implicit in the Realist tradition and method . :
of jurisprudence nakedly in terms of that ordinary f
language inspired methodology here favoured *
Olivecrona and his fellow-members of the Scandinavian 
school exhibit, and their explanations are the worse, fo# ' 
this exhibition, the very vices that I argued or showed 
were the linguistic method’s targets: his ’ideas of 
rights’, his ideatum are palmary instances of inner , ‘ 
processes. His desire to achieve, like a scientista. 
universal and mechanistic solution is likewise the very 
characterisation of that vicious propensity philosophers 
have towards a monistic solution at whatever cost «
Further, the crucial weight or reliance he places . .
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upon the imperative nature of the rule is again the . ^ ;
very exemplification of a "one-sided diet" in philosophy, 
where we feed too much on only one kind of example^
His approach or method is insufficiently empirical; 
he takes it as needing no argument, a matter of common 
knowledge, that rules of l#w and their observance in 
every case are always of an unique type and can there­
fore be submitted to the same pattern of exegesisc He ' 
nowhere pauses to examine the phenomena at close 
quarters, where alone, in particular instances, all 
manner of particular differences or types of rule™' 
observance could be noted, ranging from the aensately 
or acutely imperative to the merely regular or automatico 
His work, then, is a very catalogue* of those errors 
I set out as it were to crusade against at the commence­
ment of this thesis, and it is hoped that Olivecrona*s 
errors, as earlier described and so, in this conclusion 
merely labelled in terms of my earlier established \ ; ■ 
criteria of philosophic evaluation, are salutary lessons, 
and as such justify this lengthy analysiso
Hbr should this stark opposition to, or grievous 
discrepancy with, the lessons or precepts of ordinary 
language methods on Olivecrona* s part be greatly ' t' , ; 
surprising. I have spent some considerable pains to , 
show how his theories derive more or less directly from; . 
philosophical antecedents now of some antiquity. I. think:; 
it may be said that such foundations are no longer ; 
secure enough to base, in more modern and advanced times.
* The same comment, however, could be made 
against numerous texts in jurisprudence 
and in so inveighing against Olivecrona,
I mean not to make him the worst, but only 
one instance among many.
any philosophical theory, he it of law or language 
or whatever. By looking so far hack for one’s in­
spiration, one is precluded from or severely dis- •
advantaged in respect of utilising at least thirty ■
years of philosophical development, particularly ■ , 
ordinary language philosophy. It is thus nearly tragic, : 
but surely not to be unexpected, that Olivecrona'should, , 
having received the "message" or seen the light, yia, I:;./'.. 
J.L. Austin's works, have made such sad use of it. ,
Sadder still might be that one error in his ways, ' 
or, for that matter, the ways of Legal Realism, which ' 
so inheres in or permeates their general attitude to.  ^
the study of law that in my criticism of their particular 
errors I have not as yet had opportunity or leisure , 
explicitly to characterise it. It is almost as though 
their aim in the philosophy of law were to solve some™//: 
thing, to give a complete "all-purpose" explanation, 
such that one reading their work might thereby obtain i 
a distinct entire theory of the law, which may or/ 
may not be correct, but is undeniably a complete
theory. This he can accept and become a Scandinavian ;
Realist too, by accepting "the complete package*"
They seem, in short, oblivious to any approach to ;
legal philosophy on a broad level where one looks
at the phenomena of law to see them clearly if one - v ' .
feels any or many matters obscure, not for a theory*
To Gzcpress this another way, it is as though they .. 
seem unable to distinguish philosophy (of law) from '- 
the provision of a solution to its traditional problems? . 
as if these matters were co-extensive. It is submitted > 
that, if one were, as a school or writer of juris™ 'i' 
prudence to adopt a broad approach, as above, and were 
in fact conscious of the above distinction, one would .
produce a book which might persuade its reader not■ 
to become a Scandinavian or other Realist etc., ; 
but rather to do legal philosophy, or set about, 
with the book's example before him, doing legal 
philosophy for himself. It is in this important 
general respect that, more so than in any other 
merely particular matter, legal realism is wanting, 
and ordinary language methodology is providing.
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CHAPTER 5
A SHORT EXERCISE IN JURISPRUDENCE*
It might he said, by way of general comment upon, 
the fore-going arguments and conclusions based upon them?b 
that the prevailing tone of this thesis has been methedo™,, 
logical* It has sought, indeed has been intended? to 
outline a method for the philosophy of law, to show what . 
should be the tools to use or what objectives should be 
held, and what sort of satisfaction in terms of a.realistic 
approach should be desiderated, given those methods a,nd.'- 
objectives. In this manner, I have been content to conclude 
each chapter (I hope without any appearance of presumption 
or arrogation of illicit pontification on the subject™;. , , 
matter of jurisprudence) with counsels of a "better" ^
philosophy of law, a "more authentic" jurisprudence and 
a more creative and individually fulfilling approach /’ lb / 
via the techniques of ordinary language philosophy to 
the traditional, not to say hackneyed., problems of / ///. -
jurisprudence. i, '
Like the cook, then, whose preachings on the methods 
and utensils etc. of his culinary art have perhaps tired 
his audience if at the same time whetted their appétiteb . 
for a taste rather than a recipe of the productions of, ;  ^
his range, it would be as appropriate here now to 
provide, by way of conclusion, at least a sample or ' b.b l' 
illustration of the application of the counsels h e r © . ,. . rb-bb 
set down. Again like the master-chef, who sends his ■ bp 
class away rather with hors d* oeuvres or petit-fours 
or other appetisers than replete with heavy dishes, I 
shall consider at this stage not the whole corpus of 1';. - y 
jurisprudence but select an area which will ideally . '. ; '
allow an opportunity to bring together certain matters ;  ^ / 
perhaps too diversely distributed among the foregoing .,1/ 
pages; it will be my aim to show how these methodological 
considerations may be cumulatively and effectively applied, 
however much their exposition and advocation necessitated
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an individual and separate treatment*
To rehearse these briefly, it has been argued a t . 
length and principally:
lo That it is of primary importance in any philosophy 
that the first examination be that of the language used 
and the diverse facts reported by that language»
2. That the aim of philosophy is rather to provide a . 
clear view of the facts under observation, to "rechart 
what we know already", to "show the fly the way out" ' 
of the fly-bottle", than to make discoveries of the ' 
hitherto unseen or, still less, invent the hitherto 
non-existent. It has, of course, been stressed that? 
even in recharting along the lines of (1) above, 
there is inevitably a measure of innovation® This 
innovation will differ and be preferable? however? 
to the "essentialising" or "theorising" innovation . 
earlier reproved by the circumspection that (1) above 
incorporates into jurisprudential method; it acts as ;. 
a safeguard against the errors of too precipitates* or b , 
a prioristic theorisings, and to some extent as a ’ ■ 
justification in advance of the conclusions it reaches»;
3» That, more substantively, the concept of the 
rule as a practice must be of fundamental, even central 
importance in the explication of the law* ' ■ , ■
To exhibit the combined application of these three, 
themes, it is proposed now to examine and compare the ' 
rules of municipal law, on the one hand, and, on tha;b. ■; 
other, those of international law. Now it is not un™ 
familiar, perhaps not unfashionable to conclude an 
essay upon jurisprudence with a short look at the . - :
matters of that area of law, by way of acknowledging . \ 
its existence* It seems to stand in need of at least 
some attention, however brief, or, like the poor 
relation of the family of law, to deserve at least a
formal invitation to legal theory. Such cursory and ■ , - 
shabby treatment generally results in the fitting of ’ 
international law, by analogical devices, into a . 
conceptual garment, whether of tacit commands? or ■
grundnorm theories, fashioned for municipal law;^ 
these sit upon it as distortingly and grotesquely 
as can be imagined, the circumstances being as they 
are. It is perhaps this sad fact that accounts for the 
massive divergence betweem what is written of or seen; 
as important problems in international law in temt ,
books of jurisprudence, and what, widely different?,
are more accurately seen as present vital concerns, both
of theory and practice, in the writings of the authors ; 
of that discipline itself. Those concerns are naturally 
in the modem epoch those of a fast changing world? where 
the realities of international events, practices and, b; 'b 
patterns of state action are constantly in flux tod :
fast for any traditional or conservative theory of ", r /;-
jurisprudence to account for them. At the same time? /
they are too complex and demanding in analysis or ' ^
comprehension to allow their commentators to dwell 
upon the "binding nature" of a rule of that law, or ; /■ ; 
whether pacta sunt servanda is the grundnorm etc» /'bb 
These current concerns of international law a r e ' 
summarised by W. Friedmann in Changing Patterns of . b^b;,: 
International Law, where he suggests five major trends , 
in that body of the law: " / ;b/b''1/
1» The widening of its scope through the Inclusion
of new subject-matters formerly outside its sphere» '
2. The inclusion, as participants and subjeots of 
international law, of public international - b ' 
corporations.
3. The "horizontal" extension of international law»,»/■ 
through the accession of non-Western groups of 
states, ••to the legal family of nations*
4* The impact of political, social and economic principles 
of organisation on the universality of international 
law.
5* The role and variety of international organisation 
in the implementation of the new tasks of inter™ 
national law. • ' ^
Given notice of these new developments which pro­
claim ex facie their incompatibility with the analybioal 
categories of conventional legal anaylsis, it is hoped, 
that it will not be suspected that my present designs / 
upon international law are to fit it to any alien ' 
conceptual framework. Rather it will be seen that the , 
schématisation of legal rules here set forth will * .
allow, indeed is itself conditioned by^  the oomprehensiom 
of the present situation and developing issues o f ' ' 
international law, as set out above « Having thus scotched 
this perhaps pardonable suspicion, I propose to commence, : 
this exemplary examination by a linguistic consideration 
of
1* THE CONCEPT OF THE RULE. '
Just as it has often proved helpful in non-legal, 
philosophy to commence a short essay upon an aspect 
of a ramified and important concept by an exposition 
of the various aspects that concept has? by way of : 
identifying beyond confusion what particular aspects ■ 
are of instant concern to the author, so now I wish to 
draw attention to differing usages of the word 'rule® 
within jurisprudence* "
It has been seen how Hart particularly has seen ', 
a legal system as a set of rules. It is not material 
to the present argument to consider, even to reject?- 
his refinement of rules into primary and secondary;
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it is pertinent only to remark that, beyond that , , . , ■
differentiation, Hart makes no other within the class 
of rules, nor does Olivecrona whose view of legal , ‘
rules has already been considered* It is submitted ... 
that both these authors neglect the possibility a n < d ? ' 
of course, fail to derive the utility of the following / 
distinction between.
a. a rule of law and
b. a rule of law as a ruling
This distinction is proposed as a necessary one for the 
purposes of analysis, not as the only one that could be ■ 
made. One could, for example, further distinguish the :. .
'rule of law' in the sense intended by Austin, or '
' judges' rules' as semi-formal, or rules of court as 
(almost) domestic law, etc. The present distinction is^ V 
here considered merely as vastly more salient and / i
fundamental.
The distinction between rule (1) and ruling ( 2) 
may best be characterised by considering a not dis™ ■ '■
similar differentiation made by Searle,~^ between 
statement (1) i.e. used to refer to the content of 
an utterance or the matter reported by it, and state™ ' 
ment ( 2) used to describe the act of uttering or .report- 
ing. The distinction is in both cases complicated firstly 
by the fact that the same word is used to "label" both',,. ' , 
meanings. (I have, somewhat contrivedly, tried to avoid 
this homonym situation by using ' rule' and 'ruling®-)'» ' : \ 
Secondly it is further complicated by the fact that there . 
is a functional and sometimes inseparable unity of the. ■ 
two uses. In normal cases, that is, when a sentence is 
spoken, both statement (1) and statement (2) are en™ ■ ■
compassed; one could, however, imagine situations? é»goh 
of statements in Chinese, or statements lacking a main ; 
verb etc. which would fail in one or other respect' of ' •
being both statement (1) and (2). : '
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So too with rule and ruling* By ' rule’ is meant? ■ 
for example, the rule of substantive law that one 
owes a duty of reasonable care to whoever one has , 
admitted to one's house, or business premises, or , 
that one drives a car with due care and attention for,-;.', 
the safety of all concerned, or that one intends, \ 
generally, the consequences of one's actions. Or? 
to give examples in the negative, as I do not intend / 
that rule(l) be seen simply or too facilely as only ' : 
positive practices or patterned behaviours, such rules 
might be that one should not be cruel to or neglect 
one's children, or sell off the furniture of a '
furnished let etc., or open other people's mail® . ,
By ruling (2), I wish to refer to what is con-.; 
oeptually a quite different but oft^n coincident affair
i.e. the utterance of a judge or a of such 8; , \
rule (1). Now it is clear that a judge etc. may well' 
state that "one owes a duty of reasonable care etc." ' . 
and his words may be an exact echo of the rule ( l) ; 
this is just that second complication noted above in ': 
the case of statement i.e. that in many istances, . 
rules (1) and (2) will go hand-in-hand, albeit ; . ' ; q,
different aspects of speech behaviour, just as state­
ments (1) a n d / 2) are often coincident. , ■ ■/ '
Yet this mere temporal or situational coincidence 
does not affect the logical reality of the distinctiono 
A rule (1) is a formulaic description of a set of ‘ ;
behaviours which do or can conceivably conform to or 
constitute the rule. A ruling (2) is an utterance that 
the behaviour in question e.g. as disclosed by or 
instanced by the facts found in a case, falls under that 
rule (1). A further and equally important distinction / 
is that by ruling (2) a characteristic speech-act is 
accomplished; a judge, for example. Bo stating a - rule/
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of law, as appropriate or otherwise to the instant , .
case, is involved in an ascriptive role in that he;,is 
characterising the behaviour or facts of the case? 
which are legally speaking equivocal . before judg­
ment, as being of one or another distinct nature? 
whether negligent or reasonable, or otherwise in de-; 
fault or innocent* This speech-act could be accomplished 
with or without citation of a particular rules indeed; 
it is never the case anyway that all the rules of law 
relevant or material to the judgment are cited; some 
are perhaps tacitly assumed or too obvious for citation? 
or not needing in the instant case any explicit verbal-',/; . 
characterisation* ’/■'■•
Yet the facts that a rule of law need not be . ,/' 
verbally rendered in a judgment and that such a lack 
does not hinder the effective making of an effective. ■■ 
judgment does not mean that, when a ruling (.2) is ,; . /
made, it has no important consequences. One can.here/ 
usefully consider certain notable areas of the law. / 
where, in fact, such a ruling has been for some time t /, - 
wanted on a matter currently felt to be somewhat ' ' 
obscure or in need of positive elucidation by a • ■ '
"strong bench"; or other cases too which raise such
important issues that they are reserved for a full 
bench, as of the Court of Session, for an authoritative 
and final ruling- The consequences of such a ruling (2) 
are that the rule (1) which it embodies will there™ .' '
after be considered certain or its terms of reference ' . 
clearly demarcated, and lawyers and barristers and : . 
text books will be able to cite it with confidence'and 
case-authority*
In sum, then, a ruling (2) is logically pax't/of an 
ascriptive speech-act insofar as its citation? (or? if it
is a new ruling of a newly discerned rule (1)? its/
original verbalisation) is promoted by the exercise On ; 
the part of the judge of discretionary and ascriptive ; 
function of his office as judge* It is empirically 
not simply a very useful thing for lawyers etc® to 
have provided by their courts, but more fundamentally .t..; 
an integral part of the role of the courts in any legal ; 
system. A rule (1) is per contra what was earlier argued 
as the verbal rendering or form of a practice; a;rule : 
of law, that one shows reasonable care etc. in terms • 
of an occupier's liability to one's guests or business 
associates, is not merely the statement or form of ; ' 
that rule, but the myriad practices that concretise 
that rule sufficiently to allow that description which 
is the form of the rule (1). -''.' I ; ■
Hoping that this distinction is now clear, it 
would be useful to consider two other matters in terme? ' 
of this same distinction, namely the articles of a /h/ 
atatute, and the non-forensic, non-authoritative ■ 
statement of a rule, and consider to which category, ' i-- 
rule or ruling, these may be attributed. Now it would 
be too much of a coincidence and would anyway dlsolosë 
contrivance, or cause suspicion of the same, on my y.// 
part if it were now shortly to be said that all articles,
«ÜSESîtiHTaEtiS» ' .. '
of every statute are rulings (2) and that all non- 
authoritative citations were merely observations of 
practice, i.e. rules (1). . ;
Of the articles or sections of a statute, it is./v. '• 
necessary to consider the text in question; clearly, 
a consolidating act, which unites in expression a 
body of well-recognised rules of law, will be a mere 
recitation of rules (1) as facts of ordinary accepted ' 
behaviour in that area of law there being consolidated©.. 
Equally clearly, at the other extreme, an Act of ' . .
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Parliament, prompted by the need to overturn some 
recent and embarassing decision of a perhaps too 
courageous count, is clearly a ruling (2). That 
this is so, that statutes may be hybrids of rule and • 
ruling, should not be discouraging as it is submitted 
that the distinction made above provides sufficient 
criteria, in terms of ascriptivity and expediency, v 
for identifying in each case which, of rule or ruling? 
it may be.
Of the non-forensic statement of a rule, by the 
application of the above criteria, it may be said 
that these cannot hope to have the same practical 
qualities or efficaciousness which are implicit in 
the utterance of a judge or the words of a statute? 
however much they may be logically of an ascriptive / 
nature. A ruling (2) comports a situation of authorit­
ative utterance. ■ ■
Having made and confirmed the distinction, and
provided criteria for its application in abstraction 
from those examples that served to introduce it, I 
wish now to consider the relationship of a rule to 
a ruling. It was earlier remarked that, like stata- b' 
ments (1) and (2), these may well coincide, and that ' 3 
this coincidence is a matter of temporal or situational 
contingency, not one of logical necessity. Given the 
discrete logical identities of rule (1) and ruling (.2)?.. 
there is no reason why their separate existences : ' 
should not be acknowledged and indeed confirmed by a ■ 
practical consideration of the rules of the law and the 
court's etc. enunciation of them. In Chapter 2 of this ' 
thesis, I outlined a relationship of mutual information 
between the form of a rule, whether this be that of a r
ruling of a court, or the statement of a rule of
etiquette, and its practical expression or realisation . 
in the conduct of those governed by and exemplifying ■ 
that rule. In enlargement of this earlier proposition? 
it is submitted that the relationship of rule and ' 
ruling must be, among other things, one of inter­
information. It is not the case, in short, that the 
whole story of, or all there is to the rules of law? 
is what the courts or the statute-book give, them to 
be. That error comes from a failure to make the dis™ ' 
tinction between rule and ruling. It may well be the 
case that a rule of law, as a pattern of conduct . ' 
manifest among the citizens of a legal system, may 
exist for a time without being the subject of a ruling 
of a court. Indeed there are certain areas of the 
law where the court literally refuses to decide upon / 
or admit to their consideration matters brought before 
it, leaving the rules of that area of law in the - 
shape in which they have naturally developed unaided .', 
by their rulings e.g. pacta illicita, "gaming" con­
tracts, university matters in the field of academic 
tutelage etc. It may well be the case too that a 
ruling, as a statement or pronunciation on the part : 
of a judge, mis-states a rule of law and is recognised, 
as it is, and overturned, reversed or distinguished ■ 
on some future opportune occasion . That it is "bad . ', 
law" is perhaps an inaccurate, or at least a rather \ 
quaint expression suggesting that pro tempore an 
area of law has turned soiur and languishes in this sour 
state until sweetened again by a "good" court. In fact? 
it is merely an instance of a phenomenon that, if the 
nature of a ruling be appreciated, should not be . ' ' 
considered "bad" or aberrant or otherwise difficu].t 
to accommodate; it is simply a mistaken appreciation 
on the part of the judge of the rule or pattern of 
conduct on which he is erratically making a ruling » ■
Gases of "bad" law are fortunately rare, and it 
would be better to consider the ordinary case where an 
area of law is built up or developed over a series 
of case decisions and/or statutes; this might be 
presented not, as suggested by the metaphors of 
"built up" or "judge-made" law as the unaided fabric­
ation of the courts out of the womb of Justice etc® - 
but as exhibiting, more prosaically, that two-fold ' 
interoperation of rule-as-practice and ruling. I 
propose to consider the history of development of , ,
the modern law of occupier’s liability in respect of 
the duty owed to airespasser; it is hoped that? once 
exampled, the analysis or schématisation here suggested; 
may be mutatis mutandis applied to any other span 
of development of legal rules by the court or statute* 
There will emerge from this analysis a clearer appreci­
ation of what exactly is the role of these agencies ; ■
in making a ruling and to what extent a rule of law ' 
depends upon these for its existence as a rule of 
law; once this matter is determined, we may advance " 
to a more informed criticism of international law 
as a body of rules without a formal mechanism, either 
authoritative court or legislative body acknowledged 
by all countries, for making such rulings.
The development of the law in respect of the 
particular area selected may be briefly recited as . ‘
folio v/s;
(The cases here selected all relate to child 
trespassers; as said, it is not vital to my argument ■ ■ 
that any special set of cases be used to demonstrate . 
the point to be made, but it may be said that these 
cases on children, and the obvious relevance of 
"allurement" to the occupier's duty, if any, to protect 
against unseen or concealed hazards, bring out most ; 
clearly the central issues and principles of this area 
of the law.)
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1. ROBEHT ADDIE v DUMBRfiCK 1929 G  ■ /
A child trespassed on to the appellant’s land and 
was killed on being caught up in some machinery® 
ruled by the court that the occupier had no duty to, 
protect a trespasser even from a concealed danger® ;
2. EDWiÆDS V RAILWAY ËXEOOTI7E 1952.
It was ruled that a child who trespassed upon 
the land of the railway and there was runidown b y  a.-, 
train had no claim against the company* Though there -. 
had been gaps in the surrounding fence, it was shown 
that the company had always been quick to repair these';*
3. OCCUPIER’S LIABILITY ACT (30.) 1960^ ';
Though Scotland had Up to I960 been oibliged to ' : 
follow the lead of English courts, i.e* that of ADBIE 
it was ruled by this Act that, consonant with what had ' 
been the law of Scotland prior to the influence of ! ', ; 
the House of Lords, "the duty of care owed to any 
person is such care as in the circumstances*«*is needed 
to protect any person entering that property**" The . / ,
OCCUPIER'S LIABILITY ACT 1957  ^made, for Englandp : / :
no similar extension to the duty of care beyond what\.
ALLIE had decided; indeed, it was considered that'the ..' i
wide terms of the Scottish Act would become some ;,.
"trespassers’ ohartep."
4. CQM MisSiOKigR For RAILWAYS v QO im l a ,K) 1964 (A o S tr a h a h ) '
The ru le- m AbME was approved. '
5* VILEAH V BRITISH TRANSPORT CQMISSIONER 1964 r
A station-master's son was killed when he fell bn 
to the line in front of a train. Lord Denning ruled' ' ' r, 
that the test to apply was one of foresight? that it';';/ ' 
was not the case, simply, that there was no duty at all '
as ruled in AIDIE. Lord Justice Pearson added that^ if. , 
the presence of a trespasser could be anticipated^ then . 
the duty of care was that of common humanity « This, : 
duty was of especial importance in the case of child 
trespassers.
11
6• BRITISH RAILWAYS BOARD v HERRINGTON 1972^^ .
This case effectively brought English law into line 
with Scots law as of the I960 Act (see (4) above)@
It is, in effect, merely the last stage in what can be ■ 
seen as a steady convergence of the two laws on this : ' 
matter. It was here ruled that a duty of care was owed 
where a trespasser* s presence was known or reasonably ■ 
to be anticipated by the occupier, or where he knew / 
of facts which would lead anyone to conclude a tres-. 
passer's presence. This duty was that of "common ' .
humanity"; this would entail, in cases similar to those 
above, no obligation to repair, protect or survey but^ ■ 
within reasonable or practicable limits, to reduce or;. ' 
avert the danger. '
ALLIE was, of course, pronounced to be "bad*® ].awo
We have ■ then a series of rulings, both on the part 
of the courts and parliament, which shows a large . ' ■ y 
measure of progress and refinement from the earliest to
the latest state of the development of this area of..law<i
It might be seen as, using the convention of legal ;\1 ' 
scholarship, "judge-made" law, as though the whole lawi 
of child trespassers, the whole matter of the practice, 
morals, customs and habits of children, occupiers% 
guardians etc. as legal behaviour were encapsulated 
into these decisions. ’
It is submitted that, simply, this cannot L e a f
realistic analysis or view of these matters* Law, as . 
a complex or system of rules, is more than a complex''
of rulings. It may well facilitate the professional . 
practice or academic study of the law to see wide \ 
areas of social behaviour as, in terms of being la,Wp, 
a network or chain of cases and statutes. ïndeedp in .. 
like manner, a grammarian might see, given his interest 
the English language as beginning and ending on the ■ ’ ; 
first and last pages of the Oxford English Liotionary •
which is, in the terms here used, an alphabetic series' 
of rulings (2) on word usage. To such a grammariang y 
the ordinary uses, practices, speech-acts etc.p in ' 
fact the whole gamut of non-philological linguistic 
practices would not need, for his purposes, either 
to be considered or even acknowledged to exist®*'
So too with the law; for professional needs, one' , ■ 
may well see marriage in terms of statutory provisions ; 
re children, divorce, testamentary provisions etc® : ; ,
One may equally see the body of the law as radically, 
altered, for practical purposes, by each instant  ^ .
decision of the courts. Indeed current techniques or 
conventions of reporting recent decisions which do 
"alter" the law do actually sponsor the view that new 
law i.e. new legal rules is made overnight® how, ■
* In regard to the academic study or the teaching u
of the law, it might here be instructive to ;;  ^ ■
contrast what is meant by the teaching of law, ■ 
used most commonly to refer to what goes on 
within the law faculty of a University, and the 
teaching of law as the education of children (ôr -
others lawless?) in correct legal behaviour® In 
this secondary sense, the teaching of the precepts 
or rules of law as forms of acceptable legal b e - , 
haviour has clearly little to do with what a court 
has decided; it is instruction by example, by 
imitation and by practice. Indeed a consideration- [' 
of how one has arrived at a mature sense of legal .
behaviour long before if ever law books were looked 
to must confirm that law is a set of rules of practice 
learned and exemplified and constituted by human, 
behaviour®
That this is so is not a matter merely of the socio­
logy of law, but one intrinsic to the essence or 
nature of a rule of law, and of vital importance 
to seeing how a legal system may be seen, non- ' 
mysteriously, as effective insofar as it is the 
actualisation or operation of these rules'®
'243'
however convenient such a view of legal rules may ■ 
he for practical purposes, it cannot he taken at face ■ 
value for jurisprudential application, where it will % 
inevitably produce a narrow and distorted view of .- 
the reality of legal behaviour. By this is meant tile 
traditional view that law, or a legal system, is h 
effective in whole or in part because of the sanctions 
or authoritative force that a court or other coercive 
agency may exert to enforce its decisions. ' ;■ ■■
Implicit in this myth is a confusion of rule (l) 
and ruling (2), or more accurately a confusion of the ■ 
effectiveness of a rule and a ruling. It is appropriate 
of the latter only to say that it is effective because 
of the availability of sanctions. Rulings, such as ". ' , '
those considered above, are most certainly efficacious;, 
the judgment, damages or acquittal from negligence 
etc. is in each case an effectuation of the oourti s 
ruling. The rules, however, of human behaviour,disr: « .
closed by or contemplated by the facts of these same 
cases surely cannot be the product of mere court ^ 
decisions. To be asked to believe this is to be invited 
to believe that none take consideration for childrenp . 
none repair broken fences, none safeguard machinery, . 
that neither common humanity nor reasonable foresight, 
exist unless it be that a court ordain these practice^ 
or qualities for those subject and responsive to its ; 
ordinances. ' *
Clearly the above practices, as those of the 
family, marriage, tradeotc. do pre-exist the rulings, / 
of a court and their existence is nonetheless that of. 
rules of law. It is their existence, as observed, 
conformed to, practised and promulgated in ordinary v. 
human intercourse that constitutes their effectiveness 
in quite the same manner as the English language exists
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as such, without needing the warrant of any dictionary . 
to effectuate its existence.
It is this set of rules of law, a continuum of 
behaviour and practice, that in fact allows a court 
to make its ruling and further allows those same , ,
rulings to advert to such matters as "common humanity" 
"reasonable standards of care" etc. When such references . 
are made, it would be an error to assume that the judges 
are referring to extra-legal matters as though what is 
reasonable for occupiers or manufacturers or parents etc® 
are qualities of morality or some other undifferentiated 
or nameless social practice; what they are referring to ,■ . 
is ordinary legal behaviour which their reference may, ' 
on the occasion of the case, temporarily hypostatise. or 
apophthegmatise in some handy verbal expression or 
legal dictum. In no way does this reference transmute, 
if you like, base (extra-legal) behaviour into pure 
legal rule. '
Having distinguished rule and ruling, and seen 
how the nature a.nd effectiveness of each must be ' * ’ v ' 
separately considered, it must be recognised that this, 
logical non-identity does not entail any functional . ■ ■ ■ , 
separation. It is clear that a ruling of law is, ‘‘1 
effective not solely in allowing a decree in judgment ■ 
of a case. As a speech-act, whether one considers the , 
ruling of a court or the act of parliament, there is ■ ; 
frequently and can always be the possibility of EL. -^-1 ': - 
manifest perlocutionary force, when, for example, % ■
“IP ' ■
the Heevlth And S.afety At Wùrk Act 1974 rules that ' 
premises should now conform to new standards of reasonable 
in respect of matters laid down in schedules to that act*' 
naturally, occupiers will set about directly to ensure 
their own conformity to those newly established standards® 
Or, when a court rules that, for the purposes of ensuring
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a divorce on the grounds of desertion, a wife must, • =
demonstrate her willingness to adhere throughout the 
triennium by a demonstration by writing to her husband 
of that continuing willingness on her part, lawyers ,.:- ' 
will sedulously and attentively write those letters®
In such cases, especially the former, such perlocutionary 
effects must be engrafted upon the existing rules 
practices) of the law, whether as substantive elements, 
or evidentiary requirements, and so become in this . ' ■ 
sense genuine rules of law. Again it must be said that. \ 
the fact •’that there can be made no definitive or un- 
varying separation of what is, on the one hand, a 
perlocutionary effect of a legal ruling, and on the 
other, a rule of legal behaviour, does not render the 
distinction as an analytical device of no value; it 
rather emphasises or illustrates the functional or,:,,,; ./ 
dynamic interaction of rule and ruling* To return 1 ; 
to that analogy already used to assist in the character­
isation of these two concepts, that of the dictionaryg.
I may conclude this analysis by suggesting that the ; :. : ' ;
rulings of a legal system be seen as a lexical system 
of reference, as one should use a dictionary, for 
determination, arbitration, correction, certification 
and instant characterisation of the articles of tha " 
general corpus of that legal system. Such a lex3-Con,,. 1* . ■ 
will prove useful in teaching the law to its pro-,.: ■'
spective practitioners in providing an instant re- ,
ference on any aspect in issue etc. but surely cannot ' 
be considered as either the whole extent of what is 
meant by the law as a system of rules, or what under-..p 
v/rites or explains the effectiveness of that s y s t e m ® '
2. International Law,
It is perhaps the most obvious fact or characteristic 
of international law that, in contrast to municipal law
it lacks an authoritative coixrt and any universally 
recognised or sovereign legislature. Its lack in these p 
regards has led to widespread doubt as to whether it 
really is law, whether its rules exi.st as law or ar&. 
not rather some kind of international morality or r 
merely politics masquerading under the empty forms 
of legalistic or pseudo-legal behaviour* It is perhaps 
to dispel this doubt that so much effort has been - •
expended by Kelsen and others to offer an account of 
this law on the same lines as municipal law; indeed 
even beyond such analogical explications, there is . 
another mode of "saving" international law as law 
which starts by a consideration of the relationship of 
international to municipal law, particularly in the  ^. 
light of the recognition accorded to each by the ' 
other's courts- A plausible argument is then made out 
for a "monistic" treatment of the phenomena of the law - 
and a grand legal cosmos of laws municipal and inter- ■ 
national is suggested as a solution which at last gives .
a secure legal character to the rules of international . 
law*
My present concern is not to examine, still less 
to disparage such endeavours, but rather to consider .-: ' 
international law as a body of rules lacking in either 
court or legislature any agency capable of mal^ :ing rul,ings ( 2) 
Now it has been explained just how specialised, and re­
latively small, a part is played by those agencies in 
the formation and perpetuation of the legal rules and 
behaviour of municipal law. In fact, by comparison with 
the traditional and unduly narrow view of the court ' . 
as the fount of legal rules, a view which exalts the 
formal statements of the law into its very and only . ' 
substance, the account offered above considerably .1.,:..
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discounts the importance of these agencies as con­
stitutive elements of legal behaviour; this latter has 
been argued to be a continuum of regular practice on, 
the part of the subjects of a legal system*
It is suggested now that these difficulties that 
have been seen to beset international law stem from 
the application or importation to its analysis of 
that same narrow view of municipal law. Theorists 
are perplexed by the facts, for example, that the 
rulings of the International Court are flouted; they
worry when the articles of the Geneva Convention on ''
the Law of the Sea 1958 are neither observed by the
non-signatories, or signed by enough to malce them i 
anyway worth observing by anyone, signatory or no * .
further consternation is added when it is seen that 
certain central concepts such as recognition, de facto 
or de jure, and their consequences seem confused and 
contradictory insofar as their formal or academic , 
analysis seems to conflict irresolubly with the 
practice of states. The United States, for example^ 
did not recognise the U.S.S.R. or, until recently '
at any rate, China, but covertly conducted trade re­
lations and others more or less diplomatic via a 
consular office in Warsaw etc*
Nor is there any shortage of such incompatibilities 
between the theory and the practice of international law® 
The concept of neutralisation, whereby Switzerland? 1 
Belgium etc- are supposed in theory to be forever 
free of involvement, actively or passively, in any 
war, is made a nonsense by the realities or possibilities 
of modern large-scale warfare. Similarly, the key eon-v. 
cept of the territorial sovereignty of a state supposedly
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in theory inalienable is compromised irreparably by ' ■ 
the modern emergence of supranational defence treaties? 
such as NATO, SEATO and the V/arsaw Pact*
These difficulties not only beset the would-be 
explicators or theorists of international law but are 
no less irksome to the very judges of the international. . 
courts and tribunals. Friedmann has frequent occasion 
to criticise these for failing to adopt, in various ' . 
matters, a more realistic attitude towards these 
new developments he sees as of central importance to . 
any understan.ding of modern international law. It is 
to be concluded both from this conflict or apparent 
non-congruence of the theory and practice of international 
law and from the advice offered by Friedmann to con­
centrate upon a realistic appreciation of new develop- . 
ments rather than sterilely to retain old and now 
redundant conceptualisations that basically the error ; 
giving rise to this conflict is that of seeing inter- 
national law as a union, like municipal law, of rules 
and rulings, or, if not so explicitly, at least as 
having somewhere, an agency of determination for its 
own rules. Although it is recognised that the inter- 1 
national court is not, in effect or operation, any— ' 
way comparable to a municipal court, still its judgments 
are seized upon as "declaratory" of international '
customary law or state-practice etc * So too, the ; . ■ 
articles of treaties are pressed into similar declaratory ■ 
service, or argued as manifesting mirabile dictu ' 
"international legislation", just as if they were o f , 
the same solid stuff as the statutes of a national 
parliament.
By these and similar shifts, concepts such as 
recognition, sovereignty, consular immunity etc® are
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afforded the same treatment, academically, as the 
elements of contract, tort, and all the familiar 
concepts of municipal law. All are formally alike 
in being conceptualised in a string of cases or 
statutory provisions as a clear and coherent body of 
rules, exceptions, principles etc. In this lies the 1 
source of that inevitable confusion that must later 
arise when states, by their very nature, do not be­
have as the individuals the subjects of private law? . - 
and persistently and perversely upset the fond \ :
theorisings and conceptualisations that such an ' . ' ■
academic or formalistic Interpretation conveniently, 
provides.
Shortly, it is to be said that rulings, in the 
sense above defined, do not have a place within 
international law. It is therefore a futile exercise . 
to build any explanatory scheme upon any ersatz : >
rulings culled from the texts of treaties, or the 
dicta of judges of international courts* That rulings 
do not exist, at least in the form and with the ,
perlocutionary and illocutionary force and consequence 
that characterise those of municipal law does not of 
course bear materially upon the existence of the 
rules of international law, which are, as in the case 1 
of the rules of municipal law, the actual practice - 
of the states in their interrelations. To characterise 
these rules as currently enacted and now developing 
space is to be done as Friedmann advises; one must 
look to the realities; what principles or patterns , 
of practice or modern concepts of the role and identity 
etc. of a state are governing or are disclosed by the 
behaviour of states towards each other® It is neither 
practicable nor sensible to look for any guidance to
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the words or forms of now obsolete decisions of courts 
or tribunals or arbitrations, still less to the over-^ . 
formalised; views of theorists too eager to define 
concepts into a form too rigid now to comprehend 
or explain modern developments#
In the matter, then, of recognition for example? , 
if any rules are thus to be excerpted from or seen 
as constituted by the practice of states, these must 
accommodate all manner of recognition, be it effected 
by trade relations or informal or consular dealings or 
whatever; such an accommodation and realistic account- 
must not be circumscribed by an a prioristic or ill- 
founded formalisation of what recognition ought or is . 
theorised to be# Similarly, if the standard or 
orthodox concept of sovereignty is now seen to be v, ' 
compromised by state practice, it is submitted that 
the concept, as an element of traditional theory or 
of some still recurring conservative judgments of the , - 
international court, must be jettisoned as no longer, 
affording an adequate account of the real nature of 
the rules of international law in respect of the . ■ 
character of its personalities.
Of this suggested approach to international law? 
it might again be said that, contrary to conventional' 
attitudes or those traditional to that area of the  ^
law, it somewhat discounts the importance, already ' 
diminished, of the "formal" agencies of that law, -,
i#e# the courts and the statutes etc., or in this 
case, particularly the articles of a convention or 
treaty# It should be stressed, however, that these? ■ , 
however much they are not rulings, are not for that 
reason to be scorned as worthy of no serious attention; 
rather it is the case that they are to be seen accurately
V: yjL.'
as what they are, namely, part of the practice and Inters 
course of states on the level of international affairs®.
As such and as, moreover, an explicit form of that 
practice, these are an important index or manifestation 
of what are the rules that practice discloses or 
constitutes. This importance in no way qualifies the 
dicta of the courts or the terms of a treaty or a . '■ 
convention to be taken as, in themselves, the exact 
and truthful statement of what are, or should be? :
the rules of international law any more than the dicta,, 
of domestic courts are per se the rules of municipal ’■ , 
law. Nor should it be expected that the relationship 
of the explicit propositions on international law from 
these sources to the rules (i.e. practices) of that 
law should parallel that observed in municipal law enel 
earlier described. Clear differences of immediacy of-h^. .■ 
conformity, of certainty of execution, not to mention 
the possibility on the part of states of applying all:.; .
manner of irregular remedies on a diplomatic or . ' '
political level in any situation, preclude any such 
easy parallel. In summary answer both to this last .; 
matter and to the preceding observations on international 
law, it is to be said that what is urgently and primarily, 
needed is an examination of the actual behaviour of 
the states and the facts of their intercourse in the. 
international milieu; this will more readily and ■ . .. ‘ 
accurately disclose the rules and their existence than 
the fiction or theoretical establishment within inter­
national law of concepts and phenomena which are alleged . 
to exist there only because they are so required in 
the explication of municipal law.
By this concentration on the facts and behaviour' 
of states it is not intended (covertly) to offer a , 
judgment on that perennial question of international law?
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that is, whether or not it really is law* It might /■ .
be thought that international law is thus reduced? 
in the absence of any agency to pronounce rulings „ o 
or any method of enforcing sanctions to give these " ' 
perlocutionary effect, to no more than a body of ; '
international morality or state practice*
Now, as for those critics who would term all that 
does not fit the classic positivist mould of law as 
command and sanction a mere morality, it will suffice ‘ ;
only to repeat what has earlier been s a i d , t h a t  
morality is unthinkingly and unprofitably used as a . 
place to off-load theories of law found unsatisfactory 
in terms above * Morality is moreover a specifically - : • 
personal matter; any relegation of international law . ' ■ 
to the moral plane would entail that states, inter- 
national organisations, governments etc* be treated f ; 
as individuals, which is as desperate aa. the only ' • 
other alternative - the attribution of the traits, - 
concepts, dialectics and rationalisations applicable. ■ . 
to the characterisation of individual moral behaviour \
to a diverse set of international corporate entities® ‘ , 
As to the allegation that international law is here 'v
made equal to the sum of state practice, that it is
inherently no more law than other more conventional \. -,
and overt diplomatic practice, it is to be countered 
by inquiring what purpose is to be served by so positive , . 
an identification of international law*. It has been  ^ p. 
the object of this brief foray into the subject, aud ' 
should be that of any worthwhile examination, not to \ 
state categorically what that law is or under what; .-.'h
guise it cloaks its real identity* Rather the object' : f :
has been no further understanding of international.,by , 
first dispelling the many misconceptions that obscure ;'h ';
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a clear view of these matters*
As part of the functions and international re­
lations of states, there a resort to courts of a / 
specialised sort, there are treaties of a specialised , , 
type; there ^  a reliance placed upon? a distinct
use made of, each of these# Whether these are the " re a l 
things" or operational fictions or conventions is à ' :
problem of identification which does not bear radically 
upon their function in and contribution to international, • 
affairs. If international law must be (idly) identified■ ; • 
as diplomatic practice or state practice, it con­
stitutes such a highly legalised practice that it would ' 
serve no useful purpose to study it among diplomats? ,: 
or, more practically, to instal these as judges and , 
advocates in the international courts and tribunals® - 
It is so highly charged with legalisms, of term inology  ^
and procedure that its careful analysis and com-; 
prehensive understanding must be tasks for legal 
understanding, providing that this understanding marks , 
the divide clearly between municipal and international■ ■ : '
law® ' '.
There has been much similar wasted effort of ' •
identification in the matter of administrative law; ■ v ' ‘ 
much trouble has been spent, many pages written over 
the "quasi-judicial" etc* in relation to tribunals 
etc. It is submitted that these labours of identification 
aimed at giving a universal and categorical name to .
the complete substance of international or administrative 
law are not only futile, but unlikely even to bear 
upon the realities and concerns of the parties involved / 
in the relationships of either international or 1.:
administrative law® This is not to say that it is, ' ■ : ' ■
in any instant case, vital to assess critically '
whether a rule of municipal law, or a principle of 
evidence or natural justice etc® is conceptually and
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Gonstitutively common to any body of legal rules, be 
it civil, administrative or international#
The relationship of international law to municipal . 
law is not to be fathomed by any such simplistic en bloc 
comparison, as though one were a poui^ d^ of butter and ' . 
the other some short-weight• In search of some more 
subtle characterisation of the relationship, one 
should hope if any one epithet is to be selected 
("parasitic", "imitative" seem somehow unsatisfactory), 
that it comprehends both those instances where inter-? ■ ■ 
national law (or administrative law) is so much at 
one with municipal law as to incorporate or be in­
corporated into it without amendment? and also those 
instances where what holds for municipal law clearly 
may not be ingested into its international or administr'=^ 
ative counterpart# Obviously in international law the 
matters of state sovereignty and a sanction-enforcing • ■
court are mutually exclusive o
In sum, then, given the dependence of international 
law upon the forms, procedures and terms fundamental , ■ 
to law, and given too the import and export of each 
to the other of a vast amount of now common substantive 
law via that common legal apparatus, it may now be.seen 
that, in counselling an attention to state practice? , 
it is in no way intended to ignore the legal forms , 
of that practice, still less to say they are not law®
A concentration upon the facts of state practice re- ; ! 
veals not only what is behind the screen or superficies 
of the legal forms of international law, but must see 
as equally significant the very fabric and effect of 
that screen itself*
In conclusion, then, it has been the object of this 
closing chapter to illustrate and emphasise those three '
"panph^” ooppldered as vital to jurisprudential or 
Philospphioal inquiry, not, save hy way of its 
instrumental relevano© to these three themes, to 
offer any exhaustive analysis of international law 
as oontrasted with municipal law» It hardly needs 
saying that muoh more on both as, one way and another, 
pomposed of rules remains to he said. The points here 
made are anyway of a sufficiently general nature to 
render repeated exemplification ■unnecessary for one 
not directly interested in the matter used as an 
example. The overriding concern has heen to show the 
utility of a linguistio and empirical examination of 
the language and reality of the law, hy marking the 
distinction between a rule and a ruling; next to show 
how a valid distinction so made may afford a better 
appreciation of matters the existence or knowledge 
of which was never in doubt ; if Ryle may again be 
quoted, one may usefully make it the aim of philosophy 
not to discover but reohart the logical geography of 
what we know already. In tei^ms of the geography, then, 
of the relationships here considered, of the courts 
and statutes to the rules of a legal system, and of 
municipal law to international law, it is submitted 
that such recharting is abundantly necessary.
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